

# Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates

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*We present updated estimates of central bank transparency for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework. We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years. Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely to be found in countries with strong and stable political institutions. They are more likely to be found in democracies, with their culture of transparency. Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency in monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability, though not also with less inflation persistence.*

## INTRODUCTION

Commenting on British monetary policy in 1929, Otto Niemeyer, director of financial inquiries at HM Treasury, observed that "In prewar days a change in bank rate was no more regarded as the business of the Treasury than the colour which the Bank painted its front door."<sup>1</sup> In 1987 William

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<sup>1</sup> DONALD E. MOGGRIDGE, *BRITISH MONETARY POLICY, 1924-1931*, at 160 (1972).

Greider entitled his exposé of the Federal Reserve *Secrets of the Temple*.<sup>2</sup> Since then the world of monetary policy has changed. Transparency is now a byword. Central banks are supposed to be open about their objectives, outlooks, policy strategies, and even their mistakes. The days when monetary policy deliberations were regarded as no more the business of outsiders than the color that the central bank chose to paint its door are now firmly in the past.

Or so it might seem. Assessing whether this move in the direction of monetary policy transparency is permanent — and, if so, how far it might go — or whether it might be reversed requires understanding what lies behind the trend in the first place. One view is that transparency enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. Transparency about monetary policy objectives, outlooks and strategies is necessary for effective communication with the markets, and effective communication is necessary for monetary policy to have stabilizing effects. Monetary policy transparency makes it easier for observers to anticipate central bank actions and minimizes disruptions when policies change. It enhances the ability of policymakers to manage expectations, which is a key channel through which monetary policy affects outcomes. Transparency about not just current but also expected future policy gives the central bank leverage over long-term interest rates (which depend on expectations) and thus provides an important mechanism for influencing consumption and investment.

The seminal research on this subject built on the Barro-Gordon model<sup>3</sup> in which wages are set now on the basis of expected future monetary policy.<sup>4</sup> Imagine, for example, that inflationary pressures are building and unions contemplate raising their wage demands. If the central bank is transparent about the priority it attaches to price stability, the risk it perceives that inflation will exceed its target, and the likelihood of having to respond by raising interest rates, then wage-setters will have reason to anticipate that inflationary pressures will subside. They will be less likely to demand higher wages now, which would require costly and difficult wage reductions in the future. There will be fewer disruptions to the economy from policies to contain inflation. And monetary policymakers are less likely to fall prey to an expectations

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2 See WILLIAM GREIDER, *SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY* (1987).

3 Robert Barro & Roger Gordon, *A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model*, 91 J. POL. ECON. 589 (1983).

4 See, e.g., Petra M. Geraats, *Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts* (July 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Cambridge); Petra M. Geraats, *Central Bank Transparency*, 112 ECON. J., at F532 (2002).

trap in which the directions that expectations take force them into unpalatable policy choices.<sup>5</sup>

Transparency thus allows the central bank to more effectively communicate with the markets. It helps it to credibly commit. It is a way for monetary policymakers to communicate the importance they attach to price stability.<sup>6</sup> This in turn enables them to respond flexibly to disturbances, without undermining confidence in their commitment to their long-term target.

A second view is that transparency is a mechanism for democratic accountability in a world of policy discretion and central bank independence. Once upon a time, central bank policy was constrained by rules like those of the gold standard, if not absolutely, then at least more tightly than today. Central banks may have had statutory independence — many of them were in fact still private banks — but they did not have policy independence.<sup>7</sup> The demise of the gold standard was associated with the spread of modern central

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5 See Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, *Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory*, 115 Q.J. ECON. 147 (2000); Lawrence J. Christiano & Christopher Gust, *The Expectations Trap*, ECON. PERSP. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.), Q. II, 2000, at 21, available at <http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/2000/2qep2.pdf>.

6 Faust and Svensson consider a model in which the public attempts to infer whether or not the central bank is serious about limiting inflation from information on policy outcomes. Its inferences are imperfect because of unanticipated policy-implementation errors that the public is incompletely able to observe. Greater transparency about economic conditions thus enables agents to infer the central bank's preferences more accurately. In turn, this gives the monetary authority an incentive to build a reputation for valuing price stability. The private sector becomes more sensitive to unanticipated policy responses and actions, attenuating the incentive for the central bank to engage in them. The result is thus greater sensitivity of inflation expectations to policy actions, less benefit to the central bank for fueling inflation, and less inflationary bias. In this way, increased transparency about control errors improves social welfare. Greater transparency about the central bank's objectives may be more of a mixed blessing in this framework. In addition to reducing uncertainty about future inflation and output, which would, all other things equal, be welfare-improving, transparency about objectives removes the central bank's incentive to curtail inflation in order to signal its type, which could be welfare-reducing. See Jon Faust & Lars Svensson, *Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals*, 42 INT'L ECON. REV. 369 (2001).

7 Moreover, while observers may never have been exactly ignorant about the influence of monetary policy over economic and financial conditions, it was less fully appreciated than today, when traders hold their collective breath on the days when the central bank announces its interest-rate decision. And where the extent of the franchise and of political contestability was limited, there was no more need for the central bank to be democratically accountable than any other branch of government.

banking, but also with increasing central bank dependence on the government (as alluded to in Niemeyer's quote above). At that stage there was no question regarding the political accountability of the central bank. More recently, there has been recognition of the efficiency advantages of delegating the conduct of monetary policy to an independent entity. Moreover, with the move away from pegged exchange rates, central banks have acquired greater discretion over the stance of policy. But with the growth of independent powers comes a need for democratic accountability, for assurance that the independent technocrats that now have discretion over monetary policy decisions take those decisions in a manner consistent with the public interest, and that they will be taken to task for failing to do so. This mechanism for democratic accountability will be effective only if the central bank is transparent about its decisions — only if those deciding monetary policy cannot claim that their policy decisions are, in fact, in the public interest for reasons that only they understand. In the absence of adequate transparency, suspicion about central bank motives may develop, and pressures to curb the institution's independence may be irresistible.

Both rationales have been questioned. If asymmetric information is a distortion, then the theory of the second-best suggests that removing one distortion in the presence of another may not be welfare-improving. It is not hard to construct scenarios in which additional transparency destabilizes expectations and accentuates financial market volatility.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, there are critics of the view that transparency can substitute adequately for direct political sanctions as a mechanism for holding monetary policymakers accountable.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, even those who embrace these efficiency- and

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8 Morris and Shin illustrate the point in a model in which individual welfare depends not just on the state of the world, but on the actions of other individuals (there exists a coordination externality). Starting from a position where both private and public information are imperfect, they show that greater precision of public information can lead individuals to attach inadequate weight to private information. In the absence of coordination motives, the precision attached to the public and private signals will be commensurate with their relative precision. When coordination motives are present, however, agents attach greater weight to the public signal, since they know this to be common information. But since the public signal is noisy, this weight on the public signal may be suboptimal from a social-welfare point of view; agents may be led to coordinate on the basis of an inefficient equilibrium. The more precise the private information, the more likely this adverse outcome is to ensue. See Stephen Morris & Hyun Shin, *The Social Value of Public Information*, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1521 (2002); Stephen Morris & Hyun Shin, *Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices*, [2005] 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1.

9 Thus, some critics of the European Central Bank, whose transnational status, embedded in an international treaty, makes it difficult for national politicians to

accountability-based arguments wonder whether central bank transparency can go too far. The European Central Bank (ECB) has justified its refusal to publish the minutes and voting records of its board on the grounds that individual members would then be subject to pressure from special interests (national interests, in this context) that might compromise their independence and lead to inefficient policy decisions.<sup>10</sup> Clare and Courtenay argue that minutes that record contentious discussions among central bank board members can heighten asset-price volatility, suggesting that copious information only confuses investors.<sup>11</sup> More generally, van der Crujisen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin suggest that agents may be confused by the large and increasing amount of information with which they are bombarded in a highly transparent regime. They suggest that excessive transparency may cause agents to realize how uncertain the central bank is about economic conditions and the efficacy of policy, in turn heightening volatility.<sup>12</sup> Others ask whether requiring the central bank to provide detailed information about its intermediate targets, only to miss them, might similarly confuse and raise questions about the competence of policymakers. Thus Goodhart<sup>13</sup> questions the efficacy of requiring the central bank to provide information on not just, *inter alia*, inflation forecasts, but also its forecasts for the future path of the monetary policy instrument, on the grounds that this would so complicate the process (board members would have to agree on an entire trajectory for their policy instrument at each decision point) as to potentially undermine effective decision-making.<sup>14</sup> Mishkin warns that a high degree of transparency might

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sanction those responsible for its policy, question whether policy transparency provides adequate political accountability.

- 10 See Sirkka Hamalainen, *The ECB's Monetary Policy — Accountability, Transparency and Communication* (Sept. 14, 2001) (speech delivered to the Conference on Old Age, New Economy, and Central Banking), *available at* <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2001/html/sp010914.en.html> for an early statement to this effect.
- 11 Andrew Clare & Roger Courtenay, *Assessing the Impact of Macroeconomic News Announcements on Securities Prices Under Different Monetary Policy Regimes* (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 125, 2001).
- 12 Carin A.B. van der Crujisen, Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger & Lex H. Hoogduin, *Optimal Central Bank Transparency* (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the De Nederlandsche Bank, Tilberg University and University of Amsterdam).
- 13 Charles Goodhart, *Monetary Transmission Lags and the Formulation of the Policy Decision on Interest Rates*, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., July/Aug. 2001, at 165.
- 14 Some central banks go partway toward indicating the prospective future path of interest rates; the Federal Reserve, for example, regularly signals its "bias" toward future interest-rate increases or reductions by issuing a "balance of risks" statement.

disrupt communication with the public, which would not easily understand that forecasts for the policy instrument are conditional on the future state of the economy, and which might misinterpret changes in the forecast (or deviations between the forecast and realized rates) as the central bank renegeing on its commitments.<sup>15</sup>

We cannot resolve these debates here, but the evidence we present speaks to them. Specifically, in this paper, which is the latest in a series we have been writing on the subject of central bank transparency, we have undertaken three tasks.<sup>16</sup> First, we document changes in the prevalence of central bank transparency, updating our measures through 2006. Second, we analyze the determinants of the degree of transparency, focusing here on the role of political variables. Third, we examine the consequences for monetary-policy outcomes such as inflation variability and inflation persistence. Here we probe for nonlinear effects of transparency on policy outcomes as a way of providing a provisional answer to Mishkin's question whether "transparency can go too far."<sup>17</sup> A methodologically significant aspect of our work is that we consider the determinants of transparency and the effects using a unified analytical framework. This means that we can use our analysis of the determinants to identify instrumental variables that address the concern that an observed correlation between outcomes and transparency reflects the impact of the former on the latter, rather than the other way around.

## I. DATA

Our indices of central bank transparency follow the work of Eijffinger and Geraats.<sup>18</sup> In contrast to earlier studies, most of which focused on particular aspects of transparency (for example, whether the central bank announced an explicit target for inflation), Eijffinger and Geraats acknowledged that transparency has multiple dimensions. The result is 15 subindices (detailed in the appendix) designed to capture the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of monetary

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15 Frederic Mishkin, *Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?* (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.10829, 2004).

16 See also Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, *Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why and with What Effects?* (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13003, 2007).

17 Mishkin, *supra* note 15.

18 Sylvester Eijffinger & Petra Geraats, *How Transparent Are Central Banks?*, 22 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 1 (2006).

policy transparency.<sup>19</sup> Political transparency denotes openness about policy objectives; economic transparency openness about data, models and forecasts; procedural transparency openness about the way decisions are taken; policy transparency openness about the policy implications; and operational transparency openness about the implementation of those decisions.

We have drawn our data from information on central banks' websites and in their statutes, annual reports, and other published documents. We have gathered this information for as large a number of central banks as possible (whereas Eijffinger and Geraats looked at just nine central banks).<sup>20</sup> In addition, we have gathered the same information for every year from 1998 through 2006. Where there was a change in some aspect of transparency over the course of a calendar year, we have taken the value that prevailed for the largest portion of the year.<sup>21</sup>

We were able to assemble this information for 100 central banks.<sup>22</sup> Most

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19 The overall index thus runs from 0 to 15. Adopting the same criteria used by these previous investigators has the advantage of facilitating comparisons across studies and frees us of any suspicion that we have constructed our measures so as to maximize or minimize the impact of transparency.

20 An earlier study by Bini-Smaghi and Gros also considered 15 aspects of central bank transparency, although they considered only four central banks. See Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, *Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?* (European Network of Econ. Policy Research Inst., Working Paper No. 7, 2001). De Haan, Amtenbrink and Waller developed a similar index for six countries, while De Haan and Amtenbrink apply a similar approach to 15 countries. See Jakob De Haan, Fabian Amtenbrink & Sandra Waller, *The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank*, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 775 (2004); Jakob De Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink, *A Non-Transparent European Central Bank: Who Is to Blame?* (May 2002) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Bank of England to the conference on Monetary Policy Transparency). Siklos expands coverage to twenty central banks, all from advanced industrial countries. See PIERRE SIKLOS, *THE CHANGING FACE OF CENTRAL BANKING: EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II* (2002). The most comprehensive previous study in terms of country coverage is Fry et al., although they construct indices only for 1998. See Maxwell Fry et al., *Key Issues in the Choice of a Monetary Policy Framework*, in *MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 1* (Lavan Mahadeva & Gabriel Sterne eds., 2000).

21 Adding this time dimension was particularly challenging, since many central bank websites describe current practice, but not that of prior years. For that we had to rely mainly on published documents. We were able to access a relatively complete run of these on the basis of holdings in the University of California and Joint IMF-World Bank libraries. We are grateful to the staff of the Joint Bank-Fund library for granting us access to their collection.

22 This is the vast majority of central banks in the world (recall that there are more countries than there are central banks, given the existence of monetary unions,

of the omissions are central banks of micro-states: our sample includes the central banks of all large, systemically significant countries.<sup>23</sup>

Table 1 shows the results by country and region. The most transparent central banks in 2006, according to our coding, were the Swedish Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Czech National Bank, the ECB, and the Central Bank of Hungary. We see here a number of countries that received high marks for transparency in previous studies (Sweden, New Zealand, the UK, Canada), but also others appearing for the first time (the Czech Republic, Hungary), which is a reminder of the advantages of broad country coverage and of the fact that a number of countries with relatively opaque central banking practices have been moving in the direction of greater transparency. The six least transparent central banks were those of Aruba, Bermuda, Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Table 2 shows our coding of the 15 individual components for these 13 countries as of 2006.

More generally, we can compare different dimensions of central bank transparency. In 2006, 65 central banks received scores of 2 or more for political transparency (inter alia, providing a quantitative definition of their objectives to the public).<sup>24</sup> Economic transparency (disclosing data, the policy model and forecasts) is less; only 5 central banks received the highest possible rating. A similar picture emerges in regard to procedural transparency (the release of minutes and votes), where only four central banks received the highest possible score, and in regard to policy transparency (prompt announcement and comprehensive explanation of policy decisions), where only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Swedish Riksbank received the full score and the Swedish Riksbank and the Fed received a score of 2.5. The only central bank receiving a perfect score of 3 for operational

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countries that have unilaterally adopted the currencies of other countries, etc.). A subsequent study by Crowe and Meade constructs measures of transparency very similar to our own, but only since 2000 and for a much smaller (37 country) sample (their purpose being to compare measures of central bank transparency and independence). See Christopher Crowe & Ellen Meade, *Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness* (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/119, 2008).

23 Among the omissions are Bolivia, Ecuador, Chad, Iran, and Afghanistan. We are aware that this creates a form of sampling bias: we tend to oversample more transparent central banks. Although econometric corrections for this bias (involving strong assumptions) do exist, we have not implemented these yet. Our defense is that the number of consequential omissions is relatively slight.

24 Up from 47 in 1998.



transparency (release of information about disturbances, control errors, etc.) is the Swedish Riksbank.

Taking the unweighted averages of the countries making up a region (as in Table 1), we find the highest level of transparency in Australia-New Zealand, followed by Western Europe, Northern Europe, South East Asia, Southern Africa, and North America. That South East Asia and Southern Africa should score higher in transparency than North America is a misleading artifact of the unweighted averages. When we take GDP-weighted averages instead, as in Table 3, the most transparent regions as of 2006, in descending order, are Europe (led by Northern Europe), North America, Oceania and Southern Africa (dominated by South Africa); because of the lower weights on its relatively transparent small economies, South East Asia drops down the scale. Either way, the lowest levels of transparency, starting from the bottom, are those of Northern Africa, Southern Asia, Eastern Africa and Western Africa — no surprises here.

Turning to trends over time, the average transparency score in our sample rose from 3.4 in 1998 to 5.4 in 2006. Strikingly, none of our 100 countries moved in the direction of less transparency. Figure 1 compares our measures of transparency in 1998 and in 2006 (with 2006 on the vertical axis). There are only 10 countries on the diagonal, indicating no increase in transparency, while the remaining 90 cases are all above and to its left.

Figure 2 shows transparency by level of economic development (again, using weighted averages). Consistent with the preceding discussion, central banks in the advanced countries are more transparent than central banks in emerging markets (defined as middle-income countries with significant links to international financial markets), which in turn are more transparent than central banks in developing countries. Consistent with the implication of Figure 2 above, there have been increases in central bank transparency in all three country groups. Perhaps most strikingly, the increase among emerging markets is, on average, as large in absolute value as the increase among advanced countries; the corresponding increase among developing countries is smaller. Much of the increase in emerging markets was concentrated in the period following the Asian crisis and again in the early parts of the present decade.

## II. DETERMINANTS

We now use regression analysis to further characterize differences in central bank transparency across countries and over time. Our goals here are to work toward an explanation for these variations and also to identify instruments

for our analysis of the consequences of transparency. We proceed in two stages, first updating our previous findings and then pursuing a more detailed political-economy analysis.

We start with the 1998-2006 cross-section, with all variables averaged over the period.<sup>25</sup> We regress transparency on a vector of economic determinants: per capita income, inflation history (defined as the lagged log first difference of the consumer price index), the de facto exchange rate regime (the Reinhart-Rogoff version as updated by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia),<sup>26</sup> and financial depth (defined as the ratio of M2 to GDP). In addition, we include a range of potential political determinants: rule of law, political stability, voice and accountability, and government efficiency (all taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi),<sup>27</sup> together with a number of measures of democratic orientation (democracy and autocracy dummies and overall polity score) taken from the Polity IV database.<sup>28</sup> Variable definitions and sources are described in Appendix A.

Since the political variables are strongly correlated with one another, we include them one at a time. (This can be seen from the variance-covariance matrix presented in Appendix B.) The results (Table 4) suggest that per capita GDP is a robust determinant of overall transparency. There is good reason to think that transparency should rise with the general level of economic and institutional development, for which per capita income is a proxy; this is also the measure of Figure 2 above. In addition, countries with more flexible exchange rates (where a larger value of the index denotes greater flexibility) tend to be more transparent in the conduct of monetary policy, as anticipated by our introduction — the absence of an exchange-rate peg eliminating one traditional device for monitoring central bank actions.<sup>29</sup>

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25 2006 being the most recent year for which all the ancillary variables are currently available.

26 Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff & Miguel Savastano, *Debt Intolerance*, [2003] 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1; Barry Eichengreen & Raul Razo-Garcia, *The International Monetary System in the Last and Next 20 Years*, 21 ECON. POL'Y 393 (2006).

27 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006* (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4280, 2007).

28 Where we use variables from the Polity database, we are forced to end the analysis in 2004.

29 Readers may be concerned that the exchange rate regime is endogenous — that countries with experience with monetary policy transparency may be better able to operate regimes of greater flexibility. In the event, dropping the exchange-rate regime leaves the other results unchanged.

Finally, most of the political variables are significant and affect central bank transparency in plausible ways.<sup>30</sup> Greater transparency characterizes central bank operations in countries that rank higher in terms of rule of law, that have more stable political systems, that have higher ratings in terms of voice and accountability, and that are more favorably regarded in terms of government efficiency.<sup>31</sup> Countries with more open (democratic) political systems are also more likely to have transparent central banks; it can be argued that the demand for political accountability is strong in such settings and that transparency is an important mechanism for accountability.<sup>32</sup>

As a form of sensitivity analysis, we interacted the exchange rate regime with openness (exports as a share of GDP) and added openness as an additional regressor. The results (available from the authors on request) suggest that greater openness is associated with greater transparency if the country in question has a relatively flexible exchange rate, but with less transparency if the country has a relatively rigid currency. This accords with intuition and casual observation.

Next, we analyzed the determinants of the individual components of the transparency index to gain further insight into exactly how practice responds to these same economic and political factors. In Appendix C we report analogous regressions for each component of the transparency index. As can be seen there, per capita income and exchange rate flexibility are positively associated with each of the five components of the overall index. But the different components show different degrees of responsiveness to the various political factors. Political transparency is a positive function of political development as measured by voice and accountability.<sup>33</sup> Economic transparency (the public disclosure of data, the policy model and

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30 The other variables do not approach statistical significance at conventional confidence levels. For what they are worth, the point estimates suggest that central banks of countries with better developed financial markets tend to be more transparent. Similarly, central banks of countries with a history of inflation tend to be more transparent, presumably as part of a credibility-building strategy. This is not something that might have been anticipated from the contrast between transparency in advanced and developing countries.

31 When we include multiple political variables, it is voice and accountability and government efficiency that are most often significant at standard confidence levels.

32 Note that the "polity" variable in the final column is the difference between "democracy" and "autocracy."

33 Political transparency also appears to decline with financial depth, which is not a pattern for which we have an immediate explanation. Interestingly, other components such as economic and procedural transparency are positively associated with financial depth, as can be seen from the corresponding tables.

forecasts), procedural transparency (the release of minutes and votes) and operational transparency (release of information about disturbances, control errors, etc.) are positively associated with a range of political factors (voice and accountability, government efficiency, democracy versus autocracy, and the polity score) related to a wide range of political factors. Policy transparency (prompt announcement and comprehensive explanation of policy decisions) stands out for being significantly related to each and every one of our measures of policies and institutions, not just those that affect economic, procedural and operational transparency, but also political stability and rule of law. Thus, there are some subtle differences here in terms of which components of the transparency index are driving the observed correlation with political and institutional factors — the correlation appears to be weakest in the case of political transparency — but the results for the different measures are broadly consistent overall.

We can also use this specification to consider factors influencing trends in transparency. In Tables 5 and 6 we pool the annual observations and estimate fixed-effects models (including separate intercepts for each country).<sup>34</sup> The estimates are now driven by the time-series variation in the data; they thus tell us something about why central bank practice is evolving in the direction of greater transparency. The move to more flexible exchange rates (especially in open economies), per capita GDP (as a measure of general economic and social capability), rule of law and government efficiency appear to be the main variables driving the increase in transparency over time. While the democratic/autocratic nature of the political system helped to explain the above cross-country patterns, the spread of democracy does not appear to have much power for explaining within-country changes in monetary policy transparency over time.

The correlation of some of these political variables with central bank transparency — rule of law and government efficiency, in particular — will be useful when we consider the impact of transparency on the economic and financial variables below. That is, while it is not hard to come up with an argument for why the transparency of monetary policy should affect inflation, financial markets, or the development of trade, it is harder to concoct a story for why it should have a first-order effect on, say, rule of law, which depends on the larger political and social setting and is the product of a country's history. It can thus be argued that such political variables satisfy

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<sup>34</sup> The standard Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests reject random effects and simple pooling in favor of fixed effects (the Hausman test statistic is reported at the foot of the tables). See also the further discussion below.

the two criteria for a valid instrument: exogeneity and correlation with the explanatory variable of interest.

The fact that we will be relying on these measures as instruments also makes it important that we consider their correlation with the different components of the transparency index, as we did with the simple cross-section above. There are some suggestive variations here (see Appendix D). When we focus on trends over time, policy transparency displays a correlation only with rule of law. Economic transparency appears to be affected only by political stability and rule of law. Procedural transparency responds only to government efficiency, voice and accountability and rule of law; operational transparency to government efficiency, political stability and rule of law. Political transparency, for its part, does not display a correlation with either rule of law or political stability, but it moves in the expected manner with most of the other political and institutional variables.

### III. EFFECTS

We now explore the effects of monetary policy transparency. Some previous studies suggest that greater transparency should be associated with a reduction in uncertainty about future policy actions and thus with a reduction in inflation volatility.<sup>35</sup> Consistent with the hypothesis, Demertzis and Hughes Hallett, employing the Eijffinger-Geraats index for 2001, find a negative relationship between inflation variability and central bank transparency.<sup>36</sup> Other studies suggest that there is less variability and dispersion in inflation expectations when central banks publish numerical targets for inflation.<sup>37</sup> Still others suggest that greater transparency should be associated with lower inflation persistence, insofar as the credibility of monetary policy is enhanced and market participants do not extrapolate future inflation from current inflation. A study of the United States, Sweden and

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<sup>35</sup> Mishkin, *supra* note 15.

<sup>36</sup> But not between the level of inflation and transparency. See Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallett, *Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice*, (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Netherlands Bank and Vanderbilt University).

<sup>37</sup> Gregory Mankiw, Ricardo Reis & Justin Wolfers, *Disagreement About Inflation Expectations*, 2003 NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. MACROECONOMICS ANN. 209 (2004); Andrew Levin, Fabio Natalucci & Jeremy Piger, *Explicit Inflation Objectives and Macroeconomic Outcomes* (European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 383, 2004).

the UK by Gurkaynak, Levin and Swanson provides indirect evidence on this question; it shows that in the United States, where the authorities do not publish a target for inflation, there is a greater tendency for market participants to extrapolate inflation expectations from the recent behavior of inflation.<sup>38</sup>

These studies are subject to important limitations. Most compare a relatively small set of not-obviously-representative central banks. In other words, central banks that are transparent about their policies are not likely to be selected randomly from the larger population. They focus on specific dimensions of transparency (publication of an inflation forecast, for example) in lieu of comprehensive measures. Others utilize indicators of transparency that are available only for one year. Virtually none of them acknowledge that central bank transparency is a choice variable than may itself be affected by the economic, financial and political environment.

Here we consider the impact of transparency on inflation variability and inflation persistence. In contrast to previous studies, we acknowledge the endogeneity of monetary policy transparency by using the political variables utilized to explain the degree of transparency in Part II as instruments for transparency in this Part's (second-stage) regressions.<sup>39</sup> These second-stage coefficients are estimated using GMM to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in our panel-data set-up.

Table 7 reports the estimates for inflation variability. In each column we report the sum of squared residuals, comparing the change in the point estimates with the loss of efficiency when instrumental variables are used; the change in the point estimates being relatively large, this supports our use of instrumental variables. In addition to the level of past inflation, which is positively related to inflation variability, the most important determinant is the (fitted value of the) central bank transparency index. This variable is negative and always significant at conventional confidence levels.<sup>40</sup> This is consistent with theories suggesting that greater monetary-policy transparency allows the public to respond more quickly to policy actions, in turn discouraging the authorities from attempting to manipulate inflation in the pursuit of other objectives.

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38 Refet Gurkaynak, Andrew Levin & Eric Swanson, *Inflation Targeting and the Anchoring of Long-Run Inflation Expectations: International Evidence from Daily Bond Yield Data* (June 2005) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Riksbank Workshop on Inflation Targeting, Stockholm) (on file with authors).

39 Results using alternative instrument lists are discussed below and are available from the authors on request.

40 Though the confidence level in question depends on which specific controls are included or excluded.

Table 8 considers inflation persistence. Transparency enters negatively and significantly when it is interested on its own (column 1), which is consistent with the notion that greater monetary policy transparency allows the public to adjust more quickly, in turn limiting the incentive for the central bank to run inflationary policies in an effort to achieve objectives other than the maintenance of price stability. This result is also consistent with theories suggesting that greater monetary-policy transparency is a source of policy credibility, allowing the authorities to respond to events without exciting expectations of chronic inflation. However, the coefficient in question loses its significance as soon as other plausible determinants of inflation persistence are added to the specification. The relationship of transparency to inflation persistence is not as robust, in other words, as its relationship to inflation variability.

By adding a squared term in transparency, we can also ask whether there are diminishing returns to central bank transparency ("whether transparency can go too far").<sup>41</sup> In the equation for inflation variability, transparency continues to enter with a significant negative coefficient as before, but transparency squared enters positively and also significantly (see Table 9). This suggests that increased transparency has the strongest effect on inflation variability for the most opaque central banks.<sup>42</sup> The same broad pattern is evident in the regressions for inflation persistence, which show persistence declining with increased transparency, but at a decelerating rate. In this case, however, the coefficients on the squared term designed to capture nonlinearities are not significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels. Again, the relationship between transparency and inflation persistence does not appear to be as robust as that between transparency and inflation variability.

We explored the sensitivity of these results using alternative instrument lists, for example instrumenting transparency with rule of law alone instead of the entire vector of political and institutional measures. The results were very similar, with stronger effects of transparency on inflation variability than inflation persistence and evidence of diminishing returns once transparency reached a certain threshold.

Since completing the first draft of this paper, we have seen the analysis

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41 The squared term, like the level, is constructed from the fitted value of transparency derived from the first-stage regression.

42 If the coefficients are taken literally, they suggest that the benefits in terms of reducing inflation variability dissipate and inflation variability begins to rise with transparency when the index for the latter exceeds five, a suspiciously low threshold. Thus we do not want to push these particular point estimates too far.

of van der Cruijssen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin, who similarly ask whether there are nonlinear effects of transparency on inflation persistence, with persistence declining initially as transparency rises, implying an optimal degree of central bank transparency. They estimate their model using our data and find significant coefficients on both the level and squared terms in transparency. They model persistence differently, using current inflation as the dependent variable and including the lagged inflation term interacted with transparency (and transparency squared) as an independent variable. They also include a different set of controls.<sup>43</sup>

In fact, the consequential difference between their approach and ours is not how persistence is measured or what controls are included, but simply whether or not the potential endogeneity of transparency (our key point) is taken into account. In column *a* of Table 11 we show our replication of their result. But when, as in column *b*, we use our instruments for transparency, the significance of the key coefficients dissolves.<sup>44</sup> In columns *c* and *d* we substitute our version of the dependent variable, running OLS in column *c* and instrumenting transparency in column *d*. In neither case is there evidence of a significant impact of transparency on inflation persistence.

We also explored more closely which component or components of the transparency index mainly drive the negative association with inflation variability and persistence. (Results are not reported to avoid a proliferation of tables, but are available from the authors on request.) All five components continue to be associated with lower inflation variability and (less robustly) with lower inflation persistence when they are included one at a time (in each case being instrumented by rule of law). When we include all five simultaneously (employing a longer list of political instruments: rule of law, political stability, democratic accountability, government efficiency, and regulatory quality), there is an obvious multicollinearity problem. For what it is worth, these results suggest that it is operational transparency (openness about the implementation of central bank decisions) which mainly drives the reduction in inflation variability. This component enters negatively, and its coefficient differs from zero at the 99 percent confidence level. None of the other components have coefficients that differ from zero at standard confidence levels.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Van der Cruijssen et al., *supra* note 12.

<sup>44</sup> The versions of the equation run with instruments are again estimated by GMM. The two-stage least squares version simply applying the instruments to transparency yields the same results.

<sup>45</sup> The coefficient on the fifth component enters with a t-statistic of 4.2. None of the other coefficients have t's in excess of one.



An alternative is to test whether the five dimensions of transparency matter as a group. To this end, we constructed the principal components of our measures of the five dimensions of transparency. We entered into the equation the first and second principal components (where the first explains 34 percent of the variation in the group, the second 12 percent). When substituted for the various individual measures of transparency, the two principal components enter negatively and significantly in the equation for inflation variability (they are significant as a pair and the second principal component is significant individually), but they enter insignificantly in the equation for inflation persistence, which is consistent with the results reported above.

## CONCLUSION

Greater transparency of central bank operations is the most dramatic recent change in the conduct of monetary policy. We understand this as a response to changes in the monetary policy environment. It is a way of ensuring the accountability of policymakers when the traditional mechanisms for doing so — public monitoring of compliance with an exchange-rate commitment and direct oversight by a government with formal control — are in decline, reflecting the shift to flexible exchange rates and central bank independence.

In this paper we have presented new data on the extent of the trend and its effects. The trend is general — a large number of central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency in recent years. The question is whether it will prove durable or be a passing phase. In part, the answer depends on the consequences. Our preliminary analysis suggests broadly favorable impacts on inflation variability, though there is less evidence of an impact on inflation persistence. Still, if institutional arrangements that produce favorable results retain public support, then this suggests that the trend toward greater monetary policy transparency is here to stay.

The other way of approaching this question is to ask whether the changes in the policy environment that precipitated the move toward greater transparency might themselves be rolled back. We see the abandonment of pegged exchange rates as a response to financial liberalization and greater central bank independence as a way of insulating the conduct of monetary policy from short-term political pressures in democracies. If financial globalization and political democratization are here to stay, as we suspect, then so too is greater transparency in the conduct of monetary policy.

## DATA APPENDIX

This appendix describes the construction of the transparency index. The index is the sum of the scores for answers to the fifteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15).

### A. Political Transparency

Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a formal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple goals, a quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.

- (a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit prioritization in case of multiple objectives?  
No formal objective(s) = 0.  
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2.  
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.
- (b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?  
No = 0.  
Yes = 1.
- (c) Are there explicit contracts or other similar institutional arrangements between the monetary authorities and the government?  
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0.  
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2.  
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract, although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure = 1.

### B. Economic Transparency

Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central bank employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal (model-based or judgmental) forecasts that the central bank relies on.

- (a) Is the basic economic data relevant to the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? (The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization.)  
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0.

Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2.

Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1.

- (b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy analysis?

No = 0.

Yes = 1.

- (c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?

No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0.

Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than quarterly frequency = 1/2.

Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instrument (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1.

### C. Procedural Transparency

Procedural transparency concerns the way monetary policy decisions are taken.

- (a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary policy framework?

No = 0.

Yes = 1.

- (b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time?

No, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.

Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward and forward-looking arguments = 1.

- (c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating instrument or target was reached?

No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.

Non-attributed voting records = 1/2.

Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.

### D. Policy Transparency

Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions, together with an explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely future policy actions.


- (a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target announced promptly?  
No, or only after the day of implementation = 0.  
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1.
- (b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions?  
No = 0.  
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2.  
Yes, always and including forward-looking assessments = 1.
- (c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting, or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)?  
No = 0.  
Yes = 1.

### **E. Operational Transparency**

Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank's policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is included here as well.

- (a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main operating targets (if any) have been achieved?  
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.  
Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2.  
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect control over main operating instrument/target = 1.
- (b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?  
No, or not very often = 0.  
Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2.  
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1.
- (c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its macroeconomic objectives?  
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.  
Yes, but superficially = 1/2.  
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the objectives = 1.

**Figure 1: Comparison of Transparency in 1998 and 2006**



**Figure 2: Trends in Transparency by Level of Economic Development: Weighted Averages**




Table 1: Transparency, by Region

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Africa</b>	2.2	2.3	2.5	3.0	3.3	3.5	3.6	4.0	4.0
<i>Eastern Africa</i>	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.9
Ethiopia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Kenya	2	2	2.5	4	4	4	4	4	5.5
Malawi	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Mauritius	4	4	4	4	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Rwanda	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	1.5
Uganda	2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Zambia	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
<i>Northern Africa</i>	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.5
Egypt	1	1	1	1	1	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sudan	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Tunisia	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	4	4	4	4	4.5
<i>Southern Africa</i>	3.2	3.2	3.8	5.0	5.3	5.7	6.0	7.2	7.2
Lesotho	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	4.5	4.5
Namibia	4	4	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.5	6.5	8	8
South Africa	4.5	4.5	5.5	9	9	9	9	9	9
<i>Western Africa</i>	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.2	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
Ghana	3	3	3	3	4	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Nigeria	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4	4	4	4	4
Sierra Leone	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
<b>Americas</b>									
<i>Latin America and the Caribbean</i>	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.0
East Caribbean	2.5	2.5	3	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Aruba	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Bahamas	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Barbados	2.5	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
Cuba	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Jamaica	3	3	3	4.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	5.5
Trinidad and Tobago	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	5.5	5.5	5.5

(con't) Table 1: Transparency, by Region

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Central America</b>	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.9	2.9	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.4
Belize	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
El Salvador	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Guatemala	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	4.5	4.5	6
Mexico	4	4	4	4	4	4.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
<b>South America</b>	3.8	4.2	5.1	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.1	6.1	5.7
Argentina	2	2	2	2	2	4.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Brazil	3.5	5.5	9	9	9	9	9	9	7.5
Chile	7	7	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5
Colombia	2.5	3.5	5.5	5.5	6	6	6	6	5
Guyana	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Peru	5	5	5	6.5	8	8	8	8	8
Uruguay	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
<b>Northern America</b>	6.7	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.3
Bermuda	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Canada	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	11	11	11
United States of America	8.5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
<b>Oceania</b>	5.4	6.2	6.2	6.8	7.2	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.4
<b>Australia and New Zealand</b>	9.3	10.5	10.5	10.8	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5
Australia	8	8	8	8	9	9	9	9	9
New Zealand	10.5	13	13	13.5	14	14	14	14	14
<b>Melanesia</b>	1.5	1.9	1.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.4	3.4	3.4
Fiji	1.5	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4
Papua New Guinea	1	1	1	3.5	4	4	5	5	5
Solomon Islands	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Vanuatu	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
<b>Asia</b>	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.8	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.2
<b>Central Asia</b>	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.7	3.3	4.0	4.0
Kazakhstan	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	5.5	5.5

(con't) Table 1: Transparency, by Region

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Kyrgyzstan	3	3	3	4	4	3	5	5	5
Tajikistan	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
<i>Eastern Asia</i>	4.6	4.8	5.2	5.2	5.7	6.3	6.6	6.6	6.7
China	1	1	1	1	1.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Hong Kong	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7.5
Korea	6.5	6.5	8	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5
Japan	8	8	8.5	8	8	8	9.5	9.5	9.5
Mongolia	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
<i>Southern Asia</i>	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.9	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.9
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	3	3.5	3.5	3.5
Bhutan	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	3	3	3	3	3
India	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Pakistan	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	4
Sri Lanka	5	5	5	5	6.5	6.5	7	7	7
<i>South-Eastern Asia</i>	3.1	4.0	5.0	5.6	6.5	7.2	7.4	7.6	7.7
Indonesia	3	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	7	8	8	8.5
Malaysia	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Philippines	3.5	5	5	6	10	10	10	10	10
Singapore	2.5	4	4	5.5	4.5	5.5	5.5	6.5	6.5
Thailand	2	2	6	6.5	8	8	8	8	8
<i>Western Asia</i>	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.8
Armenia	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Bahrain	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Cyprus	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	6	6	6.5	6.5	6.5
Georgia	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4
Iraq	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.5	2.5	2.5
Israel	5.5	7	7.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	10
Jordan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.5	2	2
Kuwait	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Oman	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Qatar	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Saudi Arabia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Turkey	3	2	4	5.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	10



(con't) Table 1: Transparency, by Region

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
United Arab Emirates	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Yemen	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>Europe</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.8</b>
<i><b>Eastern Europe</b></i>	<i><b>3.4</b></i>	<i><b>3.9</b></i>	<i><b>4.3</b></i>	<i><b>4.6</b></i>	<i><b>5.5</b></i>	<i><b>5.6</b></i>	<i><b>6.0</b></i>	<i><b>6.4</b></i>	<i><b>6.8</b></i>
Belarus	1.5	3.5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Bulgaria	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5	5.5	5.5
Czech Republic	8.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	10	11	11	11	11
Hungary	3	3	5	6	8.5	8.5	8.5	10	10.5
Poland	3	5	5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7	8	9
Republic of Moldova	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.5	6	6	6	6	6
Romania	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	4.5	4.5	6.5	6.5	7
Russian Federation	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Slovakia	4	4	4.5	3.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6	8
Ukraine	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
<i><b>Northern Europe</b></i>	<i><b>6.4</b></i>	<i><b>6.6</b></i>	<i><b>7.2</b></i>	<i><b>7.4</b></i>	<i><b>7.9</b></i>	<i><b>8.0</b></i>	<i><b>8.0</b></i>	<i><b>8.1</b></i>	<i><b>8.3</b></i>
Denmark	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6
Estonia	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5	6	6
Iceland	5.5	5.5	7	7	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	8
Latvia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Lithuania	4	4	4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5
Norway	6	6	6	7.5	7.5	7.5	8	8	8
Sweden	9	9.5	11.5	11.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5
United Kingdom	11	12	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5
<i><b>Southern Europe</b></i>	<i><b>4.0</b></i>	<i><b>4.0</b></i>	<i><b>4.1</b></i>	<i><b>4.4</b></i>	<i><b>5.0</b></i>	<i><b>5.8</b></i>	<i><b>6.0</b></i>	<i><b>6.0</b></i>	<i><b>5.8</b></i>
Albania	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	6	7	7	6
Croatia	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Malta	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	7	7	7	7
Slovenia	5	5	5	5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5
<i><b>Western Europe</b></i>	<i><b>7.3</b></i>	<i><b>7.8</b></i>	<i><b>8.0</b></i>	<i><b>9.0</b></i>	<i><b>9.3</b></i>	<i><b>9.8</b></i>	<i><b>10.3</b></i>	<i><b>10.3</b></i>	<i><b>10.3</b></i>
Switzerland	6	7	7.5	8	8	9	9.5	9.5	9.5
European Union	8.5	8.5	8.5	10	10.5	10.5	11	11	11



**Table 3: Regional Transparency Index (Weighted)**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Africa	2.77	2.74	3.09	4.26	4.47	5.14	5.41	5.44	5.31
Eastern Africa	1.88	1.97	2.14	2.74	2.93	2.97	2.94	2.91	3.25
Northern Africa	1.21	1.20	1.25	1.27	1.55	1.90	1.91	2.32	2.35
Southern Africa	4.47	4.46	5.45	8.84	8.86	8.87	8.90	8.95	8.95
Western Africa	3.37	3.38	3.43	3.86	3.96	4.13	4.13	4.12	4.12
Americas	7.76	8.80	8.98	9.00	9.11	9.17	9.27	9.25	9.15
Latin America and Caribbean	2.84	2.88	3.14	4.62	4.99	5.18	5.60	5.59	5.50
Central America	3.84	3.86	3.88	3.90	3.89	4.35	5.40	5.41	5.47
South America	3.39	4.51	6.68	6.62	7.58	7.85	7.99	8.05	7.04
North America	8.63	9.57	9.57	9.57	9.57	9.57	9.62	9.62	9.63
Oceania	8.22	8.53	8.50	8.54	9.50	9.52	9.54	9.53	9.54
Australia and New Zealand	8.32	8.61	8.58	8.61	9.56	9.58	9.59	9.58	9.60
Melanesia	1.21	1.71	1.66	3.22	3.50	3.51	4.41	4.46	4.48
Asia	5.59	5.74	6.19	5.81	5.91	6.49	7.16	7.01	6.88
Central Asia	3.36	3.35	3.37	3.44	3.44	3.38	3.48	5.33	5.35
Eastern Asia	6.48	6.58	7.02	6.45	6.46	7.16	8.04	7.89	7.69
Southern Asia	1.98	1.98	1.99	2.02	2.06	2.23	2.38	2.37	2.43
South-East Asia	2.97	3.88	4.99	5.48	6.15	7.13	7.46	7.62	7.84
Western Asia	2.72	2.59	3.20	3.68	4.50	4.63	4.71	4.64	5.03
Europe	8.27	8.57	8.58	9.60	9.70	9.74	10.10	10.02	9.96
Eastern Europe	2.78	3.68	3.63	3.99	4.51	4.54	5.03	5.21	5.30
Northern Europe	9.78	10.49	10.62	10.74	11.06	11.11	11.17	11.11	11.12
Southern Europe	3.42	3.53	3.58	3.95	4.96	5.17	5.22	5.19	4.95
Western Europe	8.41	8.44	8.46	9.92	9.92	9.96	10.46	10.46	10.47

**Table 4: Determinants of Transparency, 1998-2006 Averages†**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-9.11* (-3.33)	-11.83* (-5.37)	-8.07* (-3.84)	-5.92 (-1.93)	-11.18* (-5.93)	-12.17* (-6.67)	-11.49* (-6.20)
Past Inflation	3.42 (1.48)	2.25 (0.99)	3.21 (1.52)	4.21 (1.85)	1.59 (0.72)	1.93 (0.87)	1.73 (0.79)
ER Dummy	0.31* (6.57)	0.34* (6.92)	0.29* (6.41)	0.29* (5.96)	0.26* (5.00)	0.27* (5.12)	0.26 (5.00)
Financial Depth	0.00 (0.49)	0.00 (0.84)	0.01 (1.25)	0.00 (0.63)	0.00 (0.61)	0.00 (0.59)	0.00 (0.62)
GDP per Capita	1.15* (3.79)	1.44* (5.75)	1.03* (4.42)	0.78* (2.28)	1.29* (5.88)	1.61* (8.21)	1.42* (6.91)
Rule of Law	0.79* (2.15)						
Political Stability		0.41 (1.40)					
Voice and Accountability			1.10* (4.17)				
Government Efficiency				1.27* (3.03)			
Democracy					0.24* (4.04)		
Autocracy						-0.30* (-3.88)	
Polity							0.14* (4.07)
Number of Observations	88	88	88	88	81	81	81
R-Squared	0.64	0.63	0.68	0.65	0.68	0.67	0.68

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

**Table 5: Determinants of Transparency, Fixed Effects Models**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-32.07 (-0.10)	-31.90 (-0.10)	-31.53 (-0.09)	-32.55 (-0.10)	-36.91 (-0.11)	-37.14 (-0.11)	-36.84 (-0.11)
Past Inflation	-0.19 (-0.58)	-0.19 (-0.57)	-0.18 (-0.54)	-0.18 (-0.53)	0.19 (0.53)	0.18 (0.51)	0.18 (0.51)
ER Dummy	0.09* (4.22)	0.09* (3.91)	0.09* (4.04)	0.09* (3.88)	0.10* (3.56)	0.10* (3.64)	0.10* (3.58)
Financial Depth	0.00 (0.13)	-0.00 (-0.26)	-0.00 (-0.24)	-0.00 (-0.03)	-0.00 (-0.02)	-0.00 (-0.05)	-0.00 (-0.03)
GDP per Capita	4.09* (15.96)	4.08* (15.96)	4.03* (15.62)	4.16* (15.88)	4.61* (11.11)	4.68* (11.39)	4.62* (11.11)
Rule of Law	-1.09* (-3.63)						
Political Stability		-0.57* (-3.80)					
Voice and Accountability			-0.05 (-0.21)				
Government Efficiency				-0.67* (-2.51)			
Democracy					0.06 (1.14)		
Autocracy						-0.05 (-0.50)	
Polity							0.03 (0.97)
Haussman test	32.78*	35.55*	40.92*	36.86*	31.48*	30.81*	31.09*
R-Squared	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

**Table 6: Determinants of Transparency, Fixed Effects Models**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-30.20 (-0.10)	-30.40 (-0.10)	-29.75 (-0.09)	-30.93 (-0.10)	-36.81 (-0.11)	-37.02 (-0.11)	-36.69 (-0.11)
Past Inflation	-0.19 (-0.58)	-0.18 (-0.55)	-0.18 (-0.54)	-0.18 (-0.53)	0.11 (0.30)	0.10 (0.29)	0.10 (0.29)
ER Dummy	0.00 (0.31)	-0.00 (-0.17)	-0.00 (-0.24)	0.00 (0.00)	0.15* (3.77)	0.15* (3.73)	0.15* (3.76)
Openness*ER Dummy	0.00* (1.99)	0.00 (1.74)	0.00 (1.79)	0.00 (1.72)	-0.00 (-1.70)	-0.00 (-1.56)	-0.00 (-1.65)
Financial Depth	0.00 (0.12)	-0.00 (-0.20)	-0.00 (-0.14)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (-0.57)	-0.00 (-0.60)	-0.00 (-0.59)
GDP per Capita	3.92* (13.72)	3.97* (13.83)	3.90* (13.44)	4.04* (13.73)	4.61* (11.04)	4.69* (11.25)	4.62* (11.02)
Rule of Law	-1.36* (-4.02)						
Political Stability		-0.58* (-3.75)					
Voice and Accountability			-0.00 (-0.01)				
Government Efficiency				-0.70* (-2.44)			
Democracy					0.07 (1.41)		
Autocracy						-0.05 (-0.58)	
Polity							0.04 (1.21)
Haussman test	29.35*	29.92*	36.09*	32.76*	29.89*	29.37*	29.53*
R-Squared	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

**Table 7: Effect of Transparency on Inflation Variability  
(instrumental variables pooled regressions, GMM)**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Constant	5.02* (9.27)	6.96* (4.84)	5.74* (9.45)	1.66* (1.67)	2.05 (0.86)	-4.60* (-1.67)
Transparency Index	-0.61* (-5.58)	-0.47* (-3.01)	-0.87* (-1.94)	-0.22* (-1.80)	-0.37* (-1.85)	-0.81* (-2.33)
Openness*ER Dummy		-0.00 (-1.44)			0.01 (1.54)	0.01* (1.96)
Financial Depth			0.01 (0.26)		-0.07* (-2.56)	0.02 (0.91)
Past Inflation				21.33* (3.46)		38.40* (3.78)
Durbin-Watson stat	0.77	0.71	0.76	0.96	0.54	0.54
J-statistics	7.13	3.37	12.29	3.17	9.02	2.18
Number of observations	745	683	707	743	663	511
Sum of Sq. Res.	20187	20004	21979	19964	19665	18785

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses

Note: Dependent variable is inflation variability, which is the standard deviation of the inflation rate for 12 months.

Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first-stage regression on constant, rule of law, political stability, accountability, government efficiency and regulatory quality.

**Table 8: Effect of Transparency on Inflation Persistence  
(instrumental variables pooled regressions, GMM)**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Constant	0.76* (22.57)	0.77* (10.29)	0.74* (23.05)	1.01* (2.79)	0.72* (9.78)	0.66* (4.32)
Transparency Index	-0.01* (-1.91)	-0.00 (-0.48)	0.01 (1.15)	-0.04 (-0.92)	0.01 (0.49)	0.02 (1.13)
Openness*ER Dummy		-0.00 (-0.44)			0.00 (0.34)	0.00 (0.54)
Financial Depth			-0.00* (-2.71)		-0.00 (-1.63)	-0.00 (-1.55)
Past Inflation				-1.41 (-0.74)		0.15 (0.13)
Durbin-Watson stat	1.57	1.52	1.58	1.13	1.53	1.46
J-statistics	0.24	1.27	0.29	1.50	0.20	0.19
Number of observations	729	675	692	728	655	507
Sum of Sq. Res.	62	57	59	62	55	43

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses.

Note: Dependent variable is inflation persistence, which is the estimated coefficient of the regression where monthly inflation data is used and inflation is regressed on the inflation in the previous month.

Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first-stage regression on constant, rule of law, political stability, accountability, government efficiency and regulatory quality.



**Table 9: Effect of Transparency on Inflation Variability  
(instrumental variables pooled regressions, GMM)**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Constant	13.20* (5.33)	13.20* (4.82)	15.39* (5.11)	3.55* (2.34)	16.45* (5.04)	21.40* (3.06)
Transparency Index (TI)	-4.38* (-3.79)	-3.33* (-2.81)	-4.73* (-3.55)	-1.95* (-2.95)	-5.18* (-3.43)	-8.08* (-3.07)
TI*TI	0.37* (3.18)	0.30* (2.42)	0.50* (3.39)	0.20* (2.97)	0.55* (3.21)	0.91 (3.00)
Openness		-0.03* (-3.78)			-0.00 (-0.24)	-0.01 (-0.66)
Financial Depth			-0.07 (-4.18)		-0.06* (-2.78)	-0.08* (-2.28)
Past Inflation				35.25 (6.70)		19.46* (1.90)
Durbin-Watson stat	0.73	0.67	0.63	0.56	0.63	0.52
J-statistics	2.51	5.56	0.03	7.08	0.18	0.13
Number of observations	745	688	707	743	668	516
Sum of Sq. Res.	19549	19510	19396	19531	19300	18747

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses

Note: Dependent variable is inflation variability, which is the standard deviation of the inflation rate for 12 months.

Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first stage regression on constant, rule of law, political stability, accountability, government efficiency and regulatory quality.

**Table 10: Effect of Transparency on Inflation Persistence  
(instrumental variables pooled regressions, GMM)**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Constant	0.62* (4.58)	0.59* (4.83)	0.64* (3.72)	0.42* (1.96)	0.71* (4.74)	0.69* (2.06)
Transparency Index (TI)	0.05 (0.73)	0.08 (1.58)	0.06 (0.74)	0.10 (1.53)	0.02 (0.31)	0.01 (0.05)
TI*TI	-0.01 (-0.87)	-0.01 (-1.54)	-0.01 (-0.62)	-0.01 (-1.62)	-0.00 (-0.14)	0.00 (0.17)
Openness		-0.00 (-1.30)			0.00 (0.36)	0.00 (0.62)
Financial Depth			-0.00 (-1.27)		-0.00 (-1.59)	-0.00 (-1.39)
Past Inflation				0.63 (0.98)		0.38 (0.38)
Durbin-Watson stat	1.57	1.53	1.59	1.57	1.53	1.50
J-statistics	0.79	1.42	0.11	0.98	0.13	0.16
Number of observations	729	675	692	728	655	654
Sum of Sq. Res.	62	56	59	61	55	55

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses

Note: Dependent variable is inflation persistence, which is the estimated coefficient of the regression where monthly inflation data is used and inflation is regressed on the inflation in the previous month.

Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first-stage regression on constant, rule of law, political stability, accountability, government efficiency and regulatory quality.

**Table 11: Further Results, Alternative Measures of Persistence**

	<b>Eijffinger measure</b>	<b>Eijffinger measure, two stage<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Our measure<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>Our measure, two stage<sup>a,b</sup></b>
Constant	0.01* (7.05)	0.02* (1.24)	0.67* (41.52)	0.76* (2.62)
Inf <sub>t-1</sub>	0.50* (6.16)	0.31 (0.09)	-0.10 (-0.13)	30.19 (0.52)
Inf <sub>t-1</sub> *transparency	-0.15* (-5.09)	-0.08 (-0.10)	-0.42 (-1.34)	-6.46 (-0.46)
Inf <sub>t-1</sub> *transparency <sup>2</sup>	0.01* (3.24)	0.03 (0.25)	0.05 (1.35)	1.36 (0.59)
Political Stability	-0.00 (-1.94)	0.01 (0.38)	-0.02 (-1.26)	0.18 (0.58)
Regulatory Quality	-0.00 (0.29)	-0.03 (-0.83)	0.01 (0.68)	-0.28 (-0.60)
Inf <sub>t-1</sub> *Financial Depth	-0.00 (-1.05)	-0.00 (-0.11)	0.01 (0.65)	-0.25 (-0.78)
Inf <sub>t-1</sub> *Openness*ER Dummy	0.00* (13.12)	-0.00 (-0.06)	0.00* (3.68)	-0.02 (-0.55)
Total Obs.	699	545	654	507
R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.21	0.04	0.04

t- statistics in parentheses.

\* denotes significance at 5%

<sup>a</sup> Transparency is measured as the fitted value from the first stage regression on the constant and rule of law.

<sup>b</sup> Dependent variable is inflation persistence, which is the estimated coefficient of the regression where monthly inflation data is used and inflation is regressed on the inflation in the previous month.

Source: See text.

**APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS**

**Definition of Inflation Persistence:** We take the 12 months of inflation data for the current year and regress inflation on inflation in the previous month. The estimated coefficient is the measure of inflation persistence in the regression equation.

**Source for Political Indicators data and detailed country ratings:**

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007* (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4654, 2008), available at [www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).

1. *Voice and Accountability (VA)* — measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
2. *Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV)* — measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
3. *Government Effectiveness (GE)* — measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
4. *Regulatory Quality (RQ)* — measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
5. *Rule of Law (RL)* — measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.



## Correlations

	ACC	POL_ STA	RULE_ LAW	REG_ QUA	GOV_ EFF	M2_ GDP	OPEN	TI	TI_1	TI_2	TI_3	TI_4	TI_5	LGDPPC	PCPI
ACC	1.00	0.74	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.34	0.13	0.69	0.40	0.65	0.53	0.61	0.54	0.69	-0.27
POL_ STA	0.74	1.00	0.81	0.71	0.77	0.45	0.38	0.45	0.21	0.42	0.36	0.48	0.31	0.71	-0.25
RULE_ LAW	0.76	0.81	1.00	0.90	0.96	0.57	0.27	0.62	0.25	0.63	0.48	0.67	0.46	0.84	-0.41
REG_ QUA	0.78	0.71	0.90	1.00	0.94	0.51	0.30	0.69	0.41	0.65	0.55	0.63	0.49	0.83	-0.42
GOV_ EFF	0.78	0.77	0.96	0.94	1.00	0.53	0.28	0.69	0.32	0.67	0.53	0.70	0.52	0.87	-0.41
M2_ GDP	0.34	0.45	0.57	0.51	0.53	1.00	0.39	0.33	-0.04	0.42	0.28	0.33	0.35	0.51	-0.40
OPEN	0.13	0.38	0.27	0.30	0.28	0.39	1.00	0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.07	0.01	-0.02	0.24	-0.09
TI	0.69	0.45	0.62	0.69	0.69	0.33	0.03	1.00	0.61	0.89	0.86	0.82	0.83	0.64	-0.13
TI_1	0.40	0.21	0.25	0.41	0.32	-0.04	-0.01	0.61	1.00	0.37	0.45	0.23	0.32	0.37	0.05
TI_2	0.65	0.42	0.63	0.65	0.67	0.42	0.04	0.89	0.37	1.00	0.68	0.76	0.72	0.61	-0.20
TI_3	0.53	0.36	0.48	0.55	0.53	0.28	0.07	0.86	0.45	0.68	1.00	0.63	0.69	0.50	-0.08
TI_4	0.61	0.48	0.67	0.63	0.70	0.33	0.01	0.82	0.23	0.76	0.63	1.00	0.64	0.58	-0.23
TI_5	0.54	0.31	0.46	0.49	0.52	0.35	-0.02	0.83	0.32	0.72	0.69	0.64	1.00	0.47	-0.03
LGDPPC	0.69	0.71	0.84	0.83	0.87	0.51	0.24	0.64	0.37	0.61	0.50	0.58	0.47	1.00	-0.30
PCPI	-0.27	-0.25	-0.41	-0.42	-0.41	-0.40	-0.09	0.13	0.05	-0.20	-0.08	-0.23	-0.03	-0.30	1.00

ACC: Accountability  
POL\_STA: Political Stability  
RULE\_LAW: Rule of Law  
REG\_QUA: Regulation Quality  
GOV\_EFF: Government Effectiveness  
M2\_GDP: Ratio of M2 to GDP  
OPEN: Openness  
TI: Transparency Index  
TI\_1: Political Transparency  
TI\_2: Economic Transparency  
TI\_3: Procedural Transparency  
TI\_4: Policy Transparency  
TI\_5: Operational Transparency  
LGDPPC: Logarithm of GDP per capita  
PCPI: Past inflation

**APPENDIX C: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS  
OF THE COMPONENTS OF TRANSPARENCY**

**Table C-1: Determinants of Political Transparency,  
1998-2006 Averages<sup>†</sup>**

	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VI</b>	<b>VII</b>
Constant	-1.79* (-1.71)	-1.43* (-1.73)	-0.60 (-0.72)	-1.32 (-1.10)	-1.32* (-1.86)	-1.46* (-2.13)	-1.37* (-1.95)
Past inflation	0.71 (0.81)	0.78 (0.91)	0.94 (1.12)	0.84 (0.94)	0.52 (0.63)	0.57 (0.69)	0.54 (0.65)
ER Dummy	0.04* (2.42)	0.04* (2.41)	0.04* (2.06)	0.04* (2.25)	0.04* (1.99)	0.04* (2.04)	0.04* (1.98)
Financial Depth	-0.00* (-2.06)	-0.00* (-2.20)	-0.01* (-2.16)	-0.00* (-2.20)	-0.01* (-3.00)	-0.01* (-3.01)	-0.01* (-3.00)
GDP per Capita	0.40* (3.45)	0.36* (3.81)	0.27* (2.85)	0.35* (2.58)	0.34* (4.10)	0.39* (5.26)	0.36* (4.61)
Rule of Law	-0.04 (-0.30)						
Political Stability		0.03 (0.25)					
Voice & Acc			0.19* (1.75)				
Gov Efficiency				0.04 (0.23)			
Democracy					0.04 (1.58)		
Autocracy						-0.05 (-1.57)	
Polity							0.02 (1.61)
Durbin Watson	1.82	1.82	1.87	1.81	1.99	1.96	1.98
Serial Correlation							
F-test	0.95	0.96	0.91	0.93	0.78	0.82	0.80
Heteroscedasticity	0.85	0.89	0.84	0.88	0.32	0.37	0.34
# Observations	88	88	88	88	81	81	81
R-Squared	0.27	0.27	0.30	0.27	0.33	0.33	0.33

\* denotes significance at 10%

<sup>†</sup> t-statistics in parentheses. Serial correlation LM-test is used for capturing serial correlation and Breusch-Godfrey Test is used for heteroscedasticity.



**Table C-2: Determinants of Economic Transparency,  
1998-2006 Averages†**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-2.43* (-2.89)	-3.50* (-5.13)	-2.43* (-3.63)	-1.81* (-1.90)	-3.12* (-5.25)	-3.36* (-5.87)	-3.19* (-5.47)
Past inflation	0.51 (0.72)	0.15 (0.22)	0.39 (0.58)	0.66 (0.93)	0.05 (0.07)	0.13 (0.19)	0.08 (0.12)
ER Dummy	0.08* (5.70)	0.09* (5.90)	0.08* (5.45)	0.08* (5.14)	0.07* (4.03)	0.07* (4.14)	0.07* (4.02)
Financial Depth	0.00* (1.68)	0.00* (2.08)	0.00* (2.43)	0.00* (1.90)	0.00* (2.26)	0.00* (2.24)	0.01* (2.27)
GDP per Capita	0.23* (2.52)	0.35* (4.54)	0.23* (3.15)	0.16 (1.53)	0.29* (4.18)	0.37* (5.98)	0.32* (4.95)
Rule of Law	0.24 (2.13)						
Political Stability		0.07 (0.78)					
Voice & Acc			0.27* (3.24)				
Gov Efficiency				0.33* (2.51)			
Democracy					0.06* (3.19)		
Autocracy						-0.07* (-3.08)	
Polity							0.03* (3.23)
Durbin Watson	1.36	1.30	1.35	1.28	1.37	1.25	1.30
Serial Correlation							
F-test	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.07
Heteroscedasticity	0.38	0.28	0.31	0.44	0.23	0.10	0.15
# Observations	88	88	88	88	81	81	81
R-Squared	0.58	0.56	0.60	0.59	0.61	0.60	0.61

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses. Serial correlation LM-test is used for capturing serial correlation and Breusch-Godfrey Test is used for heteroscedasticity.

**Table C-3: Determinants of Procedural Transparency,  
1998-2006 Averages†**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-2.06* (-2.34)	-2.39* (-3.41)	-1.63* (-2.31)	-1.29 (-1.29)	-2.24* (-3.82)	-2.55* (-4.42)	-2.36* (-4.04)
Past inflation	0.87 (1.17)	0.69 (0.96)	0.89 (1.26)	1.07 (1.43)	0.49 (0.72)	0.58 (0.83)	0.53 (0.77)
ER Dummy	0.06* (3.84)	0.06* (4.09)	0.05* (3.55)	0.05* (3.41)	0.05* (3.06)	0.05* (3.24)	0.05* (3.10)
Financial Depth	0.00* (0.68)	0.00 (0.84)	0.00 (1.08)	0.00 (0.71)	0.00 (0.13)	0.00* (0.09)	0.00* (0.12)
GDP per Capita	0.24* (2.44)	0.27* (3.42)	0.19* (2.43)	0.15 (1.34)	0.23* (3.43)	0.32* (5.15)	0.27* (4.20)
Rule of Law	0.12 (1.04)						
Political Stability		0.08 (0.91)					
Voice & Acc			0.23* (2.54)				
Gov Efficiency				0.24* (1.77)			
Democracy					0.06* (3.27)		
Autocracy						-0.07* (-2.75)	
Polity							0.03* (3.10)
Durbin Watson	1.75	1.75	1.88	1.74	1.93	1.87	1.91
Serial Correlation							
F-test	0.38	0.50	0.36	0.42	0.73	0.53	0.66
Heteroscedasticity	0.44	0.32	0.58	0.44	0.52	0.30	0.39
# Observations	88	88	88	88	81	81	81
R-Squared	0.38	0.38	0.42	0.40	0.47	0.45	0.46

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses. Serial correlation LM-test is used for capturing serial correlation and Breusch-Godfrey Test is used for heteroscedasticity.

**Table C-4: Determinants of Policy Transparency,  
1998-2006 Averages†**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-1.24* (-1.70)	-2.44* (-4.08)	-2.34* (-3.77)	-0.61 (-0.74)	-2.83* (-5.16)	-2.93* (-5.61)	-2.85* (-5.31)
Past inflation	0.11 (0.18)	-0.43 (-0.70)	-0.27 (-0.43)	0.26 (0.42)	-0.43 (-0.68)	-0.38 (-0.60)	-0.41 (-0.65)
ER Dummy	0.07* (5.81)	0.09* (6.43)	0.07* (5.44)	0.07* (5.04)	0.06* (3.86)	0.06* (3.88)	0.06* (3.83)
Financial Depth	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.62)	0.00 (1.01)	0.00 (0.41)	0.00* (1.88)	0.00* (1.90)	0.00* (1.90)
GDP per Capita	0.12* (1.44)	0.24* (3.57)	0.24* (3.45)	0.04 (0.45)	0.28* (4.42)	0.33* (5.79)	0.30* (4.99)
Rule of Law	0.37* (3.77)						
Political Stability		0.20* (2.52)					
Voice & Acc			0.20* (2.54)				
Gov Efficiency				0.45* (3.98)			
Democracy					0.03* (2.00)		
Autocracy						-0.05* (-2.21)	
Polity							0.02* (2.15)
Durbin Watson	1.75	1.58	1.62	1.81	1.66	1.66	1.65
Serial Correlation							
F-test	0.84	0.47	0.42	0.74	0.88	0.91	0.90
Heteroscedasticity	0.89	0.91	0.87	0.82	0.94	0.30	0.39
# Observations	88	88	88	88	81	81	81
R-Squared	0.59	0.56	0.56	0.60	0.56	0.57	0.57

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses. Serial correlation LM-test is used for capturing serial correlation and Breusch-Godfrey Test is used for heteroscedasticity.

**Table C-5: Determinants of Operational Transparency,  
1998-2006 Averages†**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-1.53* (-2.12)	-2.04* (-3.55)	-1.03* (-1.82)	-0.82 (-1.00)	-1.66* (-3.36)	-1.86* (-3.91)	-1.72* (-3.55)
Past inflation	1.24* (2.03)	1.07* (1.80)	1.27* (2.24)	1.42* (2.33)	0.97* (1.68)	1.04* (1.80)	0.99 (1.74)
ER Dummy	0.05* (4.16)	0.06* (4.29)	0.05* (3.84)	0.05* (3.69)	0.05* (3.40)	0.05* (3.50)	0.05* (3.40)
Financial Depth	0.00* (2.06)	0.00* (2.32)	0.00* (2.63)	0.00* (2.14)	0.00* (1.74)	0.00* (1.73*)	0.00* (1.75)
GDP per Capita	0.16* (1.94)	0.21* (3.24)	0.10 (1.58)	0.07 (0.82)	0.14* (2.51)	0.21* (4.12)	0.17* (3.17)
Rule of Law	0.11 (1.15)						
Political Stability		0.03 (0.38)					
Voice & Acc			0.23* (3.17)				
Gov Efficiency				0.22* (1.99)			
Democracy					0.05* (3.18)		
Autocracy						-0.06* (-3.15)	
Polity							0.03* (3.24)
Durbin Watson	2.18	2.16	2.10	2.20	2.15	2.09	2.12
Serial Correlation							
F-test	0.94	0.97	0.75	0.92	0.67	0.90	0.80
Heteroscedasticity	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.05	0.89	0.77	0.85
# Observations	88	88	88	88	81	81	81
R-Squared	0.41	0.40	0.47	0.43	0.47	0.47	0.47

\* denotes significance at 10%

† t-statistics in parentheses. Serial correlation LM-test is used for capturing serial correlation and Breusch-Godfrey Test is used for heteroscedasticity.

**APPENDIX D: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF TRENDS  
IN TRANSPARENCY**

**Table D-1: Determinants of Political Transparency,  
Fixed Effects Models**

	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VI</b>	<b>VII</b>
Constant	-3.27 (-0.03)	-3.23 (-0.03)	-3.17 (-0.03)	-3.34 (-0.03)	-4.38 (-0.04)	-4.14 (-0.04)	-4.23 (-0.04)
Past inflation	-0.18* (-1.85)	-0.18* (-1.83)	-0.17* (-1.69)	-0.18* (-1.83)	-0.04 (-0.34)	-0.05 (-0.42)	-0.04 (-0.37)
ER Dummy	0.04* (5.33)	0.03* (5.26)	0.03* (5.09)	0.03* (5.20)	0.04* (4.92)	0.04* (5.03)	0.04* (4.94)
Financial Depth	0.00 (0.62)	0.00 (0.38)	0.00 (0.34)	0.00 (0.47)	0.00 (0.59)	0.00 (0.55)	0.00 (0.58)
GDP per Capita	0.55* (7.13)	0.55* (7.08)	0.54* (7.02)	0.57* (7.14)	0.65* (5.10)	0.65* (5.17)	0.64* (5.01)
Rule of Law	-0.10 (-1.15)						
Political Stability		-0.02 (-0.49)					
Voice & Acc			0.19* (2.71)				
Gov Efficiency				-0.09 (-1.07)			
Democracy					0.03* (1.77)		
Autocracy						-0.06* (-2.18)	
Polity							0.02* (2.04)
Hausman test	8.78	12.75*	17.53*	11.00*	14.96*	14.18*	14.47*
R-Squared	0.88	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

**Table D-2: Determinants of Economic Transparency,  
Fixed Effects Models**

	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VI</b>	<b>VII</b>
Constant	-7.93 (-0.08)	-7.93 (-0.08)	-7.79 (-0.08)	-7.63 (-0.08)	-8.58 (-0.08)	-8.65 (-0.09)	-8.64 (-0.09)
Past inflation	0.10 (0.96)	0.10 (0.97)	0.10 (0.97)	0.10 (1.00)	0.08 (0.72)	0.08 (0.74)	0.08 (0.73)
ER Dummy	0.02* (2.28)	0.01* (1.95)	0.01* (2.18)	0.01* (2.22)	0.01 (1.24)	0.01 (1.21)	0.01 (1.25)
Financial Depth	0.00 (0.35)	-0.00 (-0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (-0.09)	-0.00 (-0.43)	-0.00 (-0.42)	-0.00 (-0.43)
GDP per Capita	0.97* (12.31)	0.97* (12.49)	0.95* (12.04)	0.93* (11.55)	1.06* (8.52)	1.06* (8.59)	1.07* (8.54)
Rule of Law	-0.30* (-3.28)						
Political Stability		-0.23* (-5.09)					
Voice & Acc			-0.04 (-0.57)				
Gov Efficiency				0.10 (1.19)			
Democracy					-0.01 (-0.64)		
Autocracy						0.02 (0.73)	
Polity							-0.01 (-0.78)
Hausman test	28.92*	26.59*	32.51*	31.08*	23.32*	22.84*	23.49*
R-Squared	0.89	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.93

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

**Table D-3: Determinants of Procedural Transparency,  
Fixed Effects Models**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-4.04 (-0.04)	-3.98 (-0.04)	-3.98 (-0.04)	-4.32 (-0.04)	-3.70 (-0.04)	-3.84 (-0.04)	-3.80 (-0.04)
Past inflation	-0.04 (-0.42)	-0.04 (-0.40)	-0.06 (-0.54)	-0.04 (-0.40)	-0.01 (-0.06)	-0.00 (-0.01)	-0.00 (-0.04)
ER Dummy	0.01* (1.70)	0.01 (1.54)	0.01* (1.84)	0.01 (1.41)	0.02* (2.46)	0.02* (2.42)	0.02* (2.46)
Financial Depth	-0.00 (-0.30)	-0.00 (-0.54)	-0.00 (-0.49)	-0.00 (-0.28)	-0.00 (-0.92)	-0.00 (-0.89)	-0.00 (-0.91)
GDP per Capita	0.54* (6.77)	0.54* (6.68)	0.54* (6.73)	0.58* (7.13)	0.51* (4.11)	0.51* (4.16)	0.52* (4.17)
Rule of Law	-0.21* (-2.27)						
Political Stability		-0.07 (-1.49)					
Voice & Acc			-0.20* (-2.90)				
Gov Efficiency				-0.25* (-3.02)			
Democracy					-0.02 (-1.06)		
Autocracy						0.04 (1.31)	
Polity							-0.01 (-1.27)
Hausman test	12.49*	11.45*	19.74*	15.89*	12.00*	10.58*	11.74*
R-Squared	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

**Table D-4: Determinants of Policy Transparency,  
Fixed Effects Models**

	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VI</b>	<b>VII</b>
Constant	-10.11 (-0.08)	-10.01 (-0.08)	-9.98 (-0.08)	-10.21 (-0.08)	-12.68 (-0.09)	-13.34 (-0.10)	-12.87 (-0.10)
Past inflation	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.04)	0.12 (0.82)	0.13 (0.88)	0.12 (0.82)
ER Dummy	-0.00 (-0.03)	-0.00 (-0.16)	-0.00 (-0.06)	-0.00 (-0.21)	0.00 (0.34)	0.01 (0.46)	0.00* (0.41)
Financial Depth	0.00 (1.02)	0.00 (0.78)	0.00 (0.80)	0.00 (0.90)	0.00 (1.15)	0.00 (1.11)	0.00 (1.12)
GDP per Capita	1.21* (11.54)	1.20* (11.42)	1.19* (11.39)	1.22* (11.45)	1.49* (8.99)	1.57* (9.59)	1.52* (9.16)
Rule of Law	-0.28* (-2.27)						
Political Stability		-0.06 (-1.04)					
Voice & Acc			-0.07 (-0.78)				
Gov Efficiency				-0.16 (-1.45)			
Democracy					0.02 (0.93)		
Autocracy						0.05 (1.40)	
Polity							0.00 (0.06)
Hausman test	37.17*	38.49*	39.00*	39.17*	31.38*	32.80*	31.54*
R-Squared	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses



**Table D-5: Determinants of Operational Transparency,  
Fixed Effects Models**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Constant	-6.89 (-0.07)	-6.90 (-0.07)	-6.77 (-0.06)	-7.20 (-0.07)	-7.81 (-0.07)	-7.41 (-0.07)	-7.54 (-0.07)
Past inflation	-0.05 (-0.49)	-0.05 (-0.50)	-0.04 (-0.40)	-0.05 (-0.47)	0.05 (0.43)	0.04 (0.31)	0.04 (0.38)
ER Dummy	0.03* (4.57)	0.03* (4.35)	0.03* (4.37)	0.03* (4.28)	0.03* (2.85)	0.03* (2.96)	0.03* (2.85)
Financial Depth	-0.00 (-1.27)	-0.00 (-1.52)	-0.00 (-1.51)	-0.00 (-1.23)	-0.00 (-0.70)	-0.00 (-0.76)	-0.00 (-0.71)
GDP per Capita	0.83* (9.95)	0.84* (10.04)	0.82* (9.77)	0.88* (10.30)	0.92* (6.81)	0.91* (6.86)	0.90* (6.64)
Rule of Law	-0.21* (-2.11)						
Political Stability		-0.17* (-3.50)					
Voice & Acc			0.09 (1.17)				
Gov Efficiency				-0.27* (-3.11)			
Democracy					0.03 (2.16)		
Autocracy						-0.09 (-3.02)	
Polity							0.03 (2.80)
Hausman test	21.92*	23.84*	29.00*	24.89*	20.96*	19.38*	19.94*
R-Squared	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.88

\* denotes significance at 5%

† t-statistics in parentheses

