Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts

Tom Ginsburg*

Though nominally exercised on behalf of private citizens, constitutional judicial review does perform an insurance function for politicians who expect to lose power in future elections. This paper discusses the various dimensions of institutional design of constitutional courts and argues that the extent and power of judicial review can be expected to increase relative to the degree of political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design. The paper then develops a simple empirical test of this hypothesis using data from Eastern Europe, regressing measures for various aspects of court design on the strength of the largest party in the legislature. The paper shows that the design of constitutional courts reflects the interests of the dominant political parties and that independent and powerful courts are associated with situations of divided or deadlocked politics.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial review, by which I mean review of legislation or administrative action for conformity with the constitution, is a central feature of many constitutional systems.¹ It is somewhat surprising, then, that the literature on the economic analysis of constitutions has yet to devote much attention

---

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. E-mail: tginsbur@law.uiuc.edu. For helpful comments, thanks to Jay Kesan, Anna-Maria Marshall, Curtis Milhaupt, Eric Posner, Mark Ramseyer, Eric Rasmusen, Dana Rothman, Tom Ulen, and Omri Yadlin. Special thanks to James Lindgren for exceptional help with the empirical portion of the paper. Thanks also to participants at the Cegla Institute Conference on Constitutional Law and Economics held at Tel Aviv University, December 2000, and the Midwest Law and Economics Meeting in Bloomington, October 2001. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Noah Baum.

¹ I use constitutional review and judicial review interchangeably in this paper. Technically, some bodies that carry out constitutional review are not judicial bodies
to the design of constitutional courts, either from a positive perspective or from the point of view of normative institutional design.2 There are numerous questions of institutional design that constitution-makers must address when establishing a system of constitutional review, including whether to centralize review in a designated court, how to appoint judges, and how much access to give the public. What insights can political economy offer in understanding the design of constitutional review?

Our inquiry must start with foundational questions. On whose behalf is constitutional review exercised, and what is the role of third-party monitors? These issues are discussed in Part I of the paper. Part II lays out the major design questions, including whether constitutional review power should be restricted to a designated body or given to any court of law, how judges should be appointed, and the question of standing. Part III considers empirical evidence on how constitutional courts are actually designed. This Part argues that a key determinant of the design of constitutional courts is the political configuration in place at the time of the court’s design. To explore this issue, I construct a sample of eighteen countries and regress measures for various aspects of court design on the strength of the largest party in the legislature. Through this simple model, I find that the design of a constitutional court reflects the interests of the dominant political parties at the time and that independent and powerful courts are associated with situations of divided or deadlocked politics.

I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

A. Whose Constitution?

The two major recent contributions on constitutional law and economics by Cooter and Mueller both follow Buchanan and other contractarians in

treating constitutional democracy as a mechanism to satisfy individual preferences through collective action.\textsuperscript{3} These authors analogize the democratic constitutional scheme to a series of principal-agent relationships, wherein the people rely on politicians as agents to satisfy their collective demands. If the people are the principal on whose behalf the constitution is created, then the design of constitutional adjudication should respond to the need to monitor these political agents. Judicial review of legislation exists to prevent politicians from reneging on the founding bargain with citizens.

This contractarian perspective is normative rather than positive and is open to criticism on empirical grounds. There are numerous reasons to be suspicious of the proposition that actual constitutional design reflects the interests of citizens. Most obviously, constitutional design would reflect only citizen interests if the designer-politicians who actually draft and agree on the constitutional text were themselves pure agents of those citizens. But that can hardly be the case, because citizens are subject to collective action problems that prevent them from organizing to monitor constitutional debates. So there is theoretical reason to suspect that politicians can exploit this slack to advance their own interests. Much empirical evidence supports the assertion that constitution-making is dominated by the short-term interests of the designers rather than the long-term interests of the citizenry.\textsuperscript{4} Under such circumstances, it is likely that the politicians who draft the constitution seek to design institutions that benefit them narrowly rather than citizens broadly.

\textbf{B. Why Constitutional Review?}

In light of the agency problem involved in constitutional design, we must ask why would self-interested politicians seek to establish judicial review at all. It is not sufficient to describe constitutional review as a device to protect citizens from future politicians, without explaining why it serves the interests of present politicians who serve as a veto gate for the constitution. I argue that the answer depends on the prospective power positions of constitutional designers in the post-constitutional government. Constitutional design is akin to a two-stage game. The designers choose institutions that become embodied in the constitution. The designers then participate in a post-constitutional election. The election determines whether they are able to participate in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3} Cooter, \textit{supra} note 2, at 243; Mueller, Constitutional Democracy, \textit{supra} note 2, at 61-67; James Buchanan, \textit{The Limits of Liberty} (1975).
\end{itemize}
government and receive payoffs. Prospects of electoral success and payoffs are, in part, determined by the constitutional choices, but the actual election involves a random draw.

To understand why designers in this game might desire constitutional review requires a brief review of current theories of judicial independence. One influential model, proposed by Landes and Posner, emphasizes the present value of legislation. An independent judiciary, argue Landes and Posner, can prevent future legislators from deviating from earlier statutory bargains, thereby increasing the present value of legislation to interest groups. Therefore, rational politicians will seek to maintain independent courts so as to maximize present income. This theory has generated numerous criticisms, especially concerning its disregard of the possibility of future legislative overrides of either the initial legislation or subsequent judicial interpretation.

If a legislature can "correct" judicial interpretation of statutes, what is to prevent a future legislature from merely passing new legislation whenever it chooses? In other words, how does a court serving as an agent of a previous legislature constrain the current legislature from selling new legislation to a new interest group? This question is particularly salient because the later legislature controls judicial salaries and budget. Landes' and Posner's argument makes sense for a legislature that wishes to restrain administrative agencies from disregarding the statutory bargain, as much literature has shown, but courts alone do not prevent future legislatures from repealing statutory commitments.

Landes and Posner focus on judicial review as a pre-commitment device. In contrast, Ramseyer adopts an electoral perspective. He argues that politicians will prefer judicial independence when they believe that elections will follow, but that they are likely to lose those elections. Otherwise, politicians will prefer dependent courts that can be manipulated to achieve

---

6 Nicholas Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 296 (1993); see also Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the Independent Judiciary in Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 Const. Pol. Econ. 1, 8-9 (1994) (current legislature has more power over judiciary than previous legislature). Another critique of Landes' and Posner focuses on the problem of determining what constitutes "independent" decisionmaking. Voigt, supra note 4, at 40-41.
policy outcomes. Ramseyer's theory includes a constitutional condition (future elections likely) and a political condition (future success unlikely) and provides an adequate theory of the corresponding emergence of judicial independence at the constitutional level. Although it might be argued that other politicians might in the future reverse judicial independence when it no longer serves their interests, this critique has less bite in the context of constitutional review. The problem of restraining future coalitions may exist for ordinary legislation, but it is less relevant in the context of constitutional constraint and judicial review. Because constitutions are costly to amend, the risk of future repeal is less salient. And while constitutional courts can be manipulated, that too is politically costly. Constitutional designers thus adopt a system of judicial review by independent courts to restrain future governments that they will not control, a different theoretical proposition than that offered by Landes and Posner, who focus on constitutional designers tying their own hands.

Judicial review will, of course, constrain the constitutional designers themselves if they happen to end up in power. So rational constitutional designers will prefer stronger judicial review to the extent that they see themselves being out of power. Politicians who envision themselves out of power may seek some constraint on government, whereas those who are confident in their ability to remain in power after the post-constitutional elections will prefer less constraint. Strong judicial review becomes a minimax strategy to prevent future harms to designers who may lose power.10

I call this the insurance model of constitutional review. By serving as a forum for challenging government action, constitutional review provides a form of insurance during the constitutional bargain to prospective electoral losers. Just as the presence of insurance markets lowers the risks of contracting and therefore allows contracts to be concluded that otherwise would be too risky, so the possibility of judicial review lowers the risks of constitution-making for those drafters who believe they may not win power. Judicial review thus helps to conclude constitutional bargains that might otherwise fail.

As a form of insurance, judicial review is relatively inexpensive because it can be exercised by a court staffed with a few members. While the

---

judiciary, like other branches of government, may seek to expand its budget, it is certainly cheaper to run than, say, a second house of a legislature (which might protect the constitutional bargain because of its different representational system). Thus judicial review, to the extent it serves the interests of the constitutional founders in constraining future majorities, is cheap minoritarianism. As a risk-reduction device, judicial review has positive value even if it does not provide perfectly complete protection against all contingencies. No risk-reduction device is foolproof: just as insurers can go bankrupt, courts can be ineffectual. But if the expected gains from a relatively inexpensive insurance contract outweigh the potentially catastrophic risk of a failed constitutional scheme, judicial review should be adopted.

Other things being equal, uncertainty increases demand for the political insurance that judicial review provides. Under conditions of high uncertainty, it may be especially useful for politicians to adopt a system of judicial review to entrench the constitutional bargain and to ensure they can challenge government action after future electoral change. The presence of elections — the *sine qua non* of democracy — increases uncertainty and, therefore, the demand for judicial review. Autocrats have no need for judicial review. The expansion of judicial power around the globe is a *reflection* of democratization, and not anti-democratic as suggested by some analysts. Appendix 1 presents some data on the recent expansion of constitutional review around the globe.

The discussion so far can be understood in terms of a simple inequality. Constitutional designers will choose judicial review if and only if the expected costs of electoral loss (the probability of electoral loss times the average expected cost) exceed the agency costs of judicial review. As the risk of electoral loss increases, there is a corresponding increase in the incentive to adopt judicial review. Similarly, the greater the perceived loyalty of the judiciary to the constitutional designers, for either ideological or political reasons, the greater the incentive to adopt judicial review, holding electoral risks constant.

The insurance theory is superior to the "pre-commitment" theory in at least one respect: by tying judicial review to electoral uncertainty, it helps us to understand why there has been a global expansion of judicial review accompanying the recent wave of democratization. It is unclear in the pre-commitment theory why judicial review would accompany the spread of democracy. In addition, the two theories differ in their empirical predictions.

---

If pre-commitment is necessary to enter into a constitutional bargain, we should expect the level of judicial constraint to *increase* the greater the size of the dominant party: there will be more demand for such commitment because of fear that the dominant party will win post-constitutional elections and run roughshod over smaller parties. If judicial review reflects insurance needs, we should expect the level of judicial constraint to *decrease* the greater the size of the dominant party. This is because the dominant party, knowing it is likely to govern after the post-constitutional elections, will want maximum flexibility.

Strictly speaking, using the term insurance implies risk aversion, but this is not a necessary element of the theory as I have articulated it.\(^\text{12}\) I use the term insurance in a looser sense. A risk-averse party is one that would prefer, for example, a sure chance to govern for one year to a one-in-four chance to govern for four years. While such risk-averse parties are likely to value judicial review, since they know they will be out of power for three years, even risk-neutral parties will value judicial review, since they are still more likely than not to be out of power. Insurance is effective so long as there is intertemporal uncertainty between the time that institutions are chosen and the time they will actually begin to operate. Certain other technical elements of insurance may, in fact, fit the analogy to judicial review, but are not necessary for the theory. For example, knowing that judicial review is available might lead a party's members to work less hard in future elections, since the presence of judicial review reduces the absolute consequences of electoral loss. This can be seen as a form of moral hazard.

### II. Design Issues

#### A. Introduction

This Part considers several different design issues relevant to constitutional courts: centralization versus decentralization; access to the court; court size; term-length of judges; abstract versus concrete review; and appointment mechanisms. Each of these issues is discussed with regard to its effects on the costs of reaching an accurate decision. I leave aside "internal" issues of court design and decisionmaking criteria: voting rules, agenda control, and others. These issues are not typically considered in the design of constitutional review, though of course, they are relevant.

---

12 I am grateful to Eric Rasmusen and Eric Posner for discussion of these points.
For purposes of this argument, I adopt an empirically doubtful but
simplifying assumption that there is indeed a "true" constitutional solution
to any issue. One need not be a post-modernist to doubt that a single "true"
answer is possible. However, the assumption is not essential to my argument
as long as one accepts that particular constitutional interpretations can be
more or less accurate. One can argue that the constitutional provision that
one must be thirty-five years old to become President of the United States
is open to interpretation, but most people would dismiss out of hand an
interpretation that an eighteen-year old could become President. Thus the
problem for the court is to deliberate towards an accurate solution within
the resource constraints it faces.

Whether review is designed to protect citizens from their agents, as
assumed by normative theorists, or to protect designers from the short-term
risk that citizens might throw them out of office, as posited by the insurance
theory, it is plausible to assume that all constitutional designers have
an interest in ensuring accuracy of future interpretation. Constitutionally
accurate review preserves the constitutional bargain as it was adopted. Some
prospective judicial ability to render accurate review is always Pareto-
optimal at the time of constitutional design. Because no member of the
constitutional coalition knows what its position will be in the post-election
government, each prefers to know that the bargain will be preserved, even
if the member would seek to defect from the bargain after winning the
post-constitutional election.

However, in practice, there is a tradeoff between accuracy and deliberation
costs in constitutional review. If time were costless, judges would deliberate
until the risk of reaching an inaccurate decision fell to zero. In reality,
deliberation is costly, and judges must render a decision at some point
where such risks of error are positive. At what point should they do so? The
standard economic answer is when the marginal cost of an additional unit of
deliberation equals the marginal benefit obtained from increased accuracy.
Determining the marginal benefit from increased accuracy assumes that we
can evaluate all the social costs and benefits of a particular decision. While
it may be difficult to determine this as a practical matter, it is clear that the
ability of courts to render accurate constitutional adjudication is related to
design issues. If politicians care about optimizing judicial accuracy, they are
likely to design courts accordingly. In evaluating the design elements below,
I will consider their effects on the costs of reaching a correct answer.

B. Centralization and Decentralization

The broadest issue faced in designing a system of judicial review is whether
to adopt a centralized or decentralized form of review. Should constitutional review be limited to a specially designated body with exclusive power to review laws for constitutionality? Or should all courts be empowered to declare any law unconstitutional? The latter form, decentralization, is found in the United States, the homeland of judicial review. However, the centralized system, designed by Hans Kelsen for Austria and subsequently adopted in Italy and Germany, has gradually become predominant since World War II. Of the sixty-six systems of judicial review revived or adopted since 1980, for example, forty-seven utilize some form of centralized designated body for constitutional review.\(^1\)

In contrast, a 1978 study of world constitutions found that only 26% of those constitutions provided for a designated constitutional court with the power of judicial review.\(^2\) It is clear that a designated constitutional court has become a norm among drafters of democratic constitutions. What possible rationale underlies this trend?

Consider first the risk of inconsistent or inaccurate rules in a decentralized system. In such a system, the first decision on constitutionality typically will be made by a court of first instance. Allegedly inaccurate decisions will be appealed. So while error costs may be high in the first instance, they are systematically reduced through the appeals process, with the supreme court serving as final arbiter. In contrast, the centralized system achieves accuracy through specialization. Just as the Continental systems separate out administrative cases (and sometimes those from other areas of law as well) for specialized adjudication, some of these systems have established a designated constitutional court with the exclusive power of constitutional interpretation.\(^3\) Specialization allows judges to render more accurate decisions, because they see only one type of issue. In short, decentralized systems rely on many (relatively) inaccurate judges; centralized systems rely on a few accurate ones.

Let us assume that the transaction costs of deliberation increase with the number of judges that consider the issue and the number of instances at which an issue is heard. The decentralized system utilizes at least two

\(^1\) See infra Appendix. Of course, not all systems of review are explicitly sanctioned in new constitutions, as the discussion of Israel below demonstrates. Constitutional amendments can also lead to a system of judicial review.

\(^2\) Henc van Maarseveen & Ger van der Tang, Written Constitutions (1978).

\(^3\) Although this is sometimes characterized as the "European" model, in fact only five of the fifteen current EU members have adopted this model: Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Austria. Scandinavian countries have never used the model. There is a clear correlation between size and centralization in Europe, an interesting fact that has not yet been accounted for.
instances. Between a centralized court of $n$ members and a decentralized system where the supreme court has $n$ members, decision costs are lower in the centralized system, because there is a single instance as opposed to two. The decentralized system uses more judges and instances to reach the same decision. Furthermore, the centralized system may be more accurate if the benefits from specialization offset the benefits from the increased number of decisionmakers in the decentralized system. Because decision costs are likely to be lower, the constitutional designers should choose the centralized system unless there is reason to believe that many non-expert decisionmakers are more likely to be accurate than fewer specialized decisionmakers.

As noted, it is probably impossible to determine, either as a theoretical or empirical matter, which of the two systems reaches more accurate decisions. Constitutional accuracy is difficult to measure at a systemic level. While one can use proxies for the accuracy of a particular court or judge (such as percentage of decisions overturned on appeal), there is no way to determine whether the court of final instance has decided accurately. From the standpoint of politicians who seek insurance, however, the centralized model typically features more political appointment mechanisms than does the decentralized model (see infra Section F). The centralized model can, but does not necessarily, feature standing requirements that are more open. Thus, the particular configuration of constitutional review may be more important than the broader matter of whether to adopt a centralized or decentralized system. If this is the case, the choice between the two models may depend on such factors as legal tradition and the level of confidence in ordinary judges.

If there is no reason to prefer centralized review in the abstract, we must look at political or historical reasons to explain the trend toward adopting centralized systems. In new democracies, there may be particular reason for distrusting a decentralized system. After all, the judiciary typically was trained, selected, and promoted under the previous regime. While some judges may be closet liberals, there is little ability to ensure that these judges will wield power in a decentralized system. Furthermore, there is significant popular distrust of the judiciary in new democracies. Giving the ordinary judiciary the power of constitutional review risks dragging the prestige of the constitution down to the level of the adjudicators in the public eye. Setting

---

16 As noted in Section A, we are assuming, for purposes of argument, that there is right answer to constitutional questions.

17 Some scholars argue that the decentralized approach of the common law is a better design. See the discussion in Mauro Cappelletti, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference — or No Difference at All?, in Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert 381, 384-87 (Herbert L. Bernstein et al. eds., 1981).
up a specialized body, by contrast, designates constitutional adjudication as a distinct, important function. So one explanation for the trend toward centralized review may be that widespread democratization has occurred and decentralized review is particularly unattractive in new democracies.

One virtue of the decentralized system is that it allows for many more monitors of the constitutional process. This prevents the establishment of a monopoly on adjudication in the event of the capture of the (supreme) constitutional court by a single faction. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate this distinction, because even if a rogue first-instance court is free of political influence and therefore renders accurate adjudication, this decision could be quashed on appeal by a politically dependent supreme court. For example, there is some evidence that the Supreme Court of Japan is more conservative than the lower appeals courts and thus serves as a political instrument in the hands of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party.18

Another advantage of the decentralized system is that it places all law and courts within a single hierarchy. Systems that divide legal authority between a constitutional court and a supreme court face coordination problems when allocating jurisdiction and resolving inconsistencies in rulings. This leads to problems, particularly in new democracies where a new constitutional court competes with an old, established supreme court reluctant to concede authority.

C. Standing and Access

Constitutional review systems differ widely on the matter of who has standing to bring a claim. One can array access to the court on a spectrum from very limited access, as in the original design of the 1920 Austrian model in which only the state and federal governments could bring cases, to the present design of the German Constitutional Court, where not only political bodies but also individuals enjoy direct access through constitutional petitions and where ordinary judges can refer questions to the Court as well. The present Hungarian Constitutional Court has perhaps the widest access of any such body in the world today, as the right of constitutional petition for abstract review is not even limited to citizens.19


19 The Slovak court allows petition by "anyone" whose rights are the subject of inquiry, but this right is probably limited to citizens. Slovk. Const. arts. 127, 130(f).
Like other elements of institutional design, access can change over time. For example, 1974 constitutional amendments in France extended the right of petition to any group of 20% of the parliamentary deputies, thereby allowing minority parties to challenge governmental action on constitutional grounds. Judicial decisions too can expand or contract standing. Standing doctrine in the United States Supreme Court has varied over the years, reflecting different judicial agendas.

### Table 1: Accessibility of Constitutional Adjudication
(lower on table = more accessible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCESS MECHANISM</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special bodies only</td>
<td>Austria 1920-29, France before 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special bodies + legislative minorities</td>
<td>France after 1974, Bulgaria, Rumania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special bodies + any court</td>
<td>Poland before 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any litigant</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special bodies + any court + citizen petition</td>
<td>Germany, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special bodies + any court + open petition</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the perspective of a normative theory of rights, it seems likely that the more open access, the better. The Hungarian solution of universal standing seems ideal, at least if non-citizens have some rights under the constitution (as they typically do through non-derogable human rights

---

provisions). Universal standing increases the chance that constitutional violations will be identified and corrected.

Economic theory sheds a different light on the question of optimal access, taking into account the possibility of spurious claims being filed. The objective of access is to increase monitoring and thereby decrease constitutional violations. We can assume that the possibility of a spurious claim increases the more open access is. This assumption is plausible because the costs of bringing a claim decline as access increases. If access is restricted to, for example, any group of one-third of the members of parliament, then the private citizen will have to expend resources to convince a parliamentary party to espouse his claim. These costs will be factored into the decision to pursue such a claim. Thus, more open access will lead to more claims of lower average quality.

Furthermore, claimants in open-access systems are less likely to be repeat players. Where access is restricted, for example, to particular political bodies, the players are likely to gain an understanding of what the constitution requires. Hence, the average quality of claims should increase not only because access is costly, but also because the players are likely to be better informed and therefore less inclined to bring losing claims. We should therefore expect "win rates" to be higher in systems with more restricted access.

There is some evidence for this last proposition. Compare three prototype courts that have served as influential models for others around the world: the French Conseil Constitutionnel, the German Federal Constitutional Court, and the United States Supreme Court. We would predict that the success rate of claims would be highest in the French system, where access is limited to politicians, who tend to be repeat players; next highest in the United States, where claimants must incur significant litigation costs to get to the Court; and lowest in Germany, where the constitutional petition mechanism allows for large numbers of spurious claims to be filed.

Available evidence is consistent with this prediction. Stone reports that from 1981 to 1992, the French Conseil Constitutionnel found 52.1% of the laws referred to it wholly or partially unconstitutional. During an
overlapping period, the Rehnquist Court in the United States struck 16.1% of the federal laws that it ruled on in its first four terms.\(^{24}\) Another study that included instances where the U.S. Supreme Court used the Constitution to interpret statutes narrowly found that since the New Deal, the Court had struck or narrowed 29.4% of the federal statutes challenged in cases accepted for review.\(^{25}\) As for other decentralized courts in the United States, a large sample of cases from sixteen American state supreme courts showed that 19.4% of constitutional cases had resulted in a declaration of unconstitutionality.\(^{26}\)

Success rates vary for constitutional claims before the German Federal Constitutional Court by access mechanism. Abstract review is initiated by governments or legislative minorities at either the state or federal level; these cases form a very small percentage of the Court's caseload. Concrete cases are raised through ordinary courts when a constitutional issue is pending, and they have a success rate of around 5%. The majority of claims, however, have been brought through citizen petition, totaling over 80,000 complaints to date. Only around 4% of these claims have led to a decision by the Court, as the vast majority have been rejected for lack of jurisdiction or on the merits by an initial panel of the Court. The success rate of constitutional petitions, as a percent of those filed, was 2.25% through 1991.\(^{27}\)

Again, it is difficult to draw normative conclusions from these figures about court design. We do not have a simple formula for evaluating the social cost of a constitutional violation or the marginal benefits from increased

\(^{24}\) Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 320 n.62 (1993). The Rehnquist Court, although not generally considered to be an activist court, was comparable to the more activist Warren Court by this measure.\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\) Zeppos, supra note 6, at 309.

\(^{26}\) Robert Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 961 (1978). Those courts with high discretion to select cases struck laws in 30.1% of cases. For more on the difficulties of evaluating aggregate "win rates" such as these, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 584-92 (1998). Note that it may be true that courts are more likely to challenge regime interests on constitutional grounds than on others, because of the difficulty in passing overriding amendments that could "correct" a politically unpopular judicial interpretation. Clermont and Eisenberg study win rates in federal courts and report that plaintiffs challenging the federal government in civil cases win around 19% of the time in original jurisdiction. Where the government is plaintiff, however, it wins almost 97% of the time in original jurisdiction. Id. at 594.

\(^{27}\) Christine Landfried, Germany, in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power 307 (C. Neal Tate & Thorsten Vallinder eds., 1995).
accuracy. We do not know the marginal costs of considering spurious claims. Thus, it seems difficult to determine whether, for example, the German-style open system is preferable to the less-open French system, even though the open system leads to a smaller percentage of valid claims.

We might also argue in favor of open access that the availability of constitutional petitions has an educative aspect. By making access to review widely available, such a system makes the public more aware of, and thus engaged in protecting, its constitutional rights. This argument relies on a notion of constitutional review as a repeated game. Open access, over time, should improve the quality of petitions as citizens learn about their rights and improve their monitoring capabilities. On the other hand, it might be argued to the contrary that the experience of sending petitions to the constitutional court, a large percentage of which are rejected, might denigrate the constitution in the eyes of the public.

Regardless of normative conclusions, there is a positive conclusion to be drawn. Politicians who believe they are likely to be out of power will want to ensure open access to the constitutional court so that they can challenge the government in court in the future. Open access also allows watchdog groups that might share the policy preferences of the "pessimistic" politicians to make claims and assist in monitoring the government. We should thus expect a correlation between political uncertainty and open access. This proposition will be tested in Part III.

D. Court Size

The constitutional designers may specify in the constitution the number of judges on the court. The major tradeoff here again is between speed and accuracy. The greater the number of judges, the higher the costs of deliberation. At the other extreme, a single judge deciding all cases would be a relatively cheap method of judicial decisionmaking. The problem with a single judge is that we recognize that the potential error costs of such a system are high.\footnote{At an extreme, in the United States, we let the trial judge decide the initial matter himself, even though his preferences may not reflect those of the court as a whole or of the median judge. Warren F. Schwartz & C. Frederick Beckner III, \textit{Toward a Theory of the "Meritorious Case": Legal Uncertainty as a Social Choice Problem}, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 801 (1998).} It seems plausible to assume that error costs are reduced by deliberations, following the Condorcet Jury Theorem. There is evidence that suggests that group decisionmaking is of higher quality than individual
decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{29} One might expect that as the number of judges increases, the average quality of the decisions increases (assuming that judicial quality is constant). Hence, it is common for judicial panels to increase in size as an issue rises through a system of appeal. For example, United States federal appeals courts frequently decide cases in panels of three judges with appeal to the court en banc. However, it is not clear that additional judges provides increasing returns to accuracy. Some have argued that larger panels might be associated with a decrease in quality because of free-riding by judges.\textsuperscript{30}

Richard Posner has recently argued that an expansion in court size may be associated with a decline in quality of decisions, in part because norms of work are less sustainable with larger groups.\textsuperscript{31} However, his evidence is not dispositive on the question. Furthermore, he is considering overall court size for an appeals court whose initial decisions are made by panels, so the research does not directly address the argument made here about en banc constitutional review.

One might argue that the salient variable to examine is panel size rather than court size. But the size of panels is typically a matter left to ordinary law or the organic statutes of a constitutional court, rather than being specified in the constitutional text. Furthermore, because important cases often are heard en banc, the overall size of the court is a relevant variable that is subject to the influence of the constitutional designers.

There is some empirical support for the proposition that designated constitutional courts are larger than their counterparts that are the courts of final appeal for all issues. For new constitutional courts set up after 1989 (n=25), the mean number of justices is 11.25. For supreme courts given the power of constitutional review in the same period (n=8), the mean size is 8.25. The fact that supreme courts are smaller, even though they have non-constitutional cases to consider, may indicate that first-instance consideration of the issues saves time later on.


\textsuperscript{30} See also Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem, 18 J.L. Econ. & Org. (forthcoming 2002).

E. Term Length

Term length is typically regarded as constituting a key component of judicial independence. Like central bank governors, judges are at risk of being subject to undue pressure to advance short-term political interests rather than the long-term collective good. Other things being equal, it is argued, the longer the term of appointment, the freer a judge will be in exercising discretion. The longer the appointment, the more independent a judge can be of prevailing political sentiments. We should thus expect preference for longer judicial terms to correlate with politicians who value judicial accuracy and independence. Term length does not, however, have any connection with the cost of the system, other than the costs of choosing new judges.

While one might think that lifetime appointments are always longer than designated terms, this is not the case because virtually all systems with "lifetime" appointments provide for a mandatory retirement age of 65-70. Even if this were not the case, lifetime appointments could come late in life as a reward for political loyalty rather than as an incentive for independent adjudication. Thus actual time served on such courts may in fact be lower than judges on courts with specific and limited terms.

F. Appointments

The judicial appointment mechanism is among the most crucial of design issues. Constitutional designers are unlikely to adopt constitutional review unless they believe it will be carried out by impartial appointees. If designers believe they are likely to lose post-constitutional elections, they will not be in a position to appoint judges. So overly partisan mechanisms are especially unattractive. The normative task is to select an appointment mechanism that will maximize the chances that judges will interpret the text in accordance with the intentions of the constitution writers. This in turn requires considering judges' utility functions, an issue concerning which there is no consensus in the literature.

Appointment mechanisms are designed to insulate judges from short-term

32 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 5.
33 For example, Israel's judges are required to retire at age seventy.
political pressures, yet ensure some accountability. The United States federal judicial system has lifetime appointments for insulation, but puts tremendous effort into screening potential candidates in the appointment process. Other legal systems set up mechanisms for ensuring accountability for judicial performance ex post by providing for renewable terms. Many American states use a system of elections that allows a judge to be appointed by the governor upon recommendation by a mixed committee. Judges are then subjected to recall elections where they "run on the record," that is, without opposition. Judges in these systems are very rarely recalled, so the threat may not be much of a constraint in reality.

Mueller persuasively argues that a supermajority requirement for judicial selection will tend to protect the minority from losing in both the courts and the legislature and, by extension, will tend to produce more moderate, acceptable judicial candidates. Mueller also considers the merits of having both the judiciary and chief executive serve as appointing authorities for the judiciary. He favors such professional appointments by existing judges, noting that the judiciary has internal incentives for competent selection. A judiciary that appears incompetent invites modification of the appointment system. Indeed, one design suggested by Mueller would allow judiciary-nominated judges to take office, barring legislative intervention by the supermajority. This proposal combines accountability and independence, since most appointments would be routine, but there is a mechanism for political intervention should judges nominate candidates who are far out of step with political opinion.

I divide appointment mechanisms into three broad types: professional appointment mechanisms, as in Mueller's proposal; cooperative appointment mechanisms; and representative appointment mechanisms. Theoretically, one can also have single-body appointment mechanisms where, for example, the executive can appoint all members of the constitutional court without legislative oversight. Single-body mechanisms of this type are unusual because they lead to all-or-nothing compositions of the court. If the President can appoint all the judges, the presumption of effective constitutional

35 This is the so-called Missouri Plan. Mary Volcansek & Jacqueline Lucienne Lafon, Judicial Selection (1998).
36 Mueller, Constitutional Democracy, supra note 2, at 281.
38 Id.
constraint disappears. Therefore the insurance rationale for judicial review loses its appeal.

Cooperative appointment mechanisms require the cooperation of two bodies to appoint constitutional justices. The American, Russian, and Hungarian procedure of presidential nomination followed by legislative confirmation is one example of this type of mechanism. This system seems consistent with the objective of supermajoritarian requirements to ensure broad support (institutional or political) for those who are to interpret the constitution. They do risk deadlock, however, since they require the agreement of different institutions to go forward. While there are no institutional barriers to such bargains being concluded, it is possible that in circumstances of political conflict, appointments would not be made.

Finally, representative mechanisms utilize multiple appointing authorities. For example, in Italy a third of the nine-member court is nominated by the President, a third by the Parliament, and a third by the Supreme Court. This system has been copied in such diverse places as Bulgaria, Korea, and Mongolia. (Alternative versions provide for one-third of appointments by each house of a bicameral legislature and one-third by the chief executive.) In some countries, the appointments by the judiciary are made by a professional council. Representative systems can be distinguished from the cooperative system in that theoretically, appointees can be much closer to the pure agents of the appointers. Because no other institution must agree to the appointment, there is no need for compromise. There may also, however, be a dynamic that prevents politicized appointments when there are three appointing bodies. Each body that appoints a person who appears to be a pure agent signals that it may be planning to engage in extraconstitutional action and needs to influence the court to uphold its action. By appointing someone who appears "neutral" and non-partisan, the appointing authority signals that it does not anticipate needing or using the court to uphold its own controversial actions. Thus representative mechanisms may provide an incentive for moderate appointments.

Despite their popularity, representative systems have a disadvantage compared with cooperative systems. Although a dynamic of moderation as described above may come into play, there is some likelihood that politicians will simply nominate pure agents. Opinions issued by a court of pure agents are likely to be internally fragmented and of lower quality than those issued by a more centrist, consensual deliberative body, as appointed through cooperative mechanisms. Cooperative mechanisms more closely

39 Volcansek & Lafon, supra note 35.
approximate the supermajority principle of constitutional economics, but risk deadlock in the appointing process. Representative systems ensure a smooth appointment process, but risk deadlock on the court.

In the German system, under which each house of the legislature can appoint an equal number of members to the Constitutional Court, supermajority requirements are used in selecting judges.\(^4\) This has led to a norm of reciprocity that has established de-facto party seats distributed among the three major parties. The norm produces a stable court that reflects broad political preferences without over-representing either of the two largest parties, while ensuring representation from the third, smaller party. This version of the legislative-centered system turns parties, not institutions, into the important players in the appointment game. The system is stable because the party system is stable.

The dynamics of the party system are a crucial variable in evaluating the desirability of selection systems in a given regime. A system of self-appointment by a professional judiciary may be the most likely to produce accurate review under our assumption of judicial neutrality, but can lead to a court that dominates the legislature if the party system is too fragmented and unstable to provide a constraint on judicial decisionmaking. In stable systems, supermajority requirements will produce moderate judges, but appointments may not be made if there is deadlock in the legislature. Representative systems ensure no deadlock in the appointment process, but create other risks. For example, if the chief executive is the head of the majority party in one or both houses of parliament, this system will lead to a court that is allied with the chief executive. Where there is little party discipline or where the chief executive is independently elected, however, institutional rivalries can lead to a more divided court.\(^4\) In short, various dynamics can come into play under any system, but other things being equal, cooperative appointment systems seem to be preferable from the point of view of the hypothetical constitution-drafter who values accuracy.

---

40 The Bundestag appoints its justices through a two-thirds vote of the Judicial Selection Committee, where party representation is proportional to that of the body as a whole, and the Bundesrat appoints its justices through a two-thirds vote of the body as a whole. Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1989).

41 Bailey proposes that constitutional issues be decided by a legislature, possibly the previous sitting legislature that appointed judges if the issue is legislation passed by the current legislature. Martin Bailey, Toward a New Constitution for a Future Country, 90 Pub. Choice 73, 99 (1997).
G. Abstract versus Concrete Review

The centralized-decentralized dimension of constitutional court design concerns who conducts review; the access dimension concerns who can bring a claim for review. Another dimension relates to what the prerequisites of bringing a case are. Concrete review requires litigation of constitutionality in the context of a particular case. Abstract review determines the constitutionality of a statute without a specific case. The remedy for a finding of unconstitutionality in a concrete case consists of relief for the particular plaintiff and a finding that the statute is unconstitutional, meaning either non-applicable or void. The remedy for a finding of unconstitutionality in an abstract case only affects the statute, without affecting any particular legal rights.

A related issue concerns the timing of review. In the French system, review can only take place ex ante promulgation of the law. This means that the law can be modified by the legislature to conform with the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel; this form of review makes the Conseil more akin to a third house of the legislature than to a court. Ex post review allows for more types of claims: a claimant can argue not only that a statute is unconstitutional on its face and its purpose, but also in its effects. Ex ante constitutional review may increase the average quality of legislation — patently unconstitutional bills cannot be passed. But ex post constitutional review may also have a similar effect. By demonstrating that unconstitutional legislation cannot be effectively implemented, ex post review may reduce the incentives to pass such legislation. To the extent that review after promulgation allows more information to be considered, there may be an advantage for ex post monitoring.

Arguably, concrete review should be more accurate than abstract review for the same reasons that ex post review is better than ex ante review. This is because the court has a specific fact situation in which to decide the case; it has more information about the questioned statute than it would in a purely abstract procedure. It can evaluate the statute not only on its face and in light of its purpose, but also in the context of its actual effects. Concrete review also is more expensive because it typically requires a lower court

---

42 Of course, politicians could pass the unconstitutional legislation to claim credit from their supporters and shift blame to the court for striking it. For example, members of Congress often proposed anti-abortion legislation of dubious constitutionality in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values: Elected Government, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate (1996).
to determine issues of constitutionality, and lower court gatekeepers are costly.\textsuperscript{43}

In short, pure concrete review in the United States system may be more accurate than pure abstract review such as that conducted in France, but it also requires significantly more expenditure because private parties have to bear the initial cost of a constitutional violation and then the cost of litigating for a remedy. The German system, on the other hand, with multiple access channels and means of challenging a statute, allows review \textit{both} before and after actual application of the law and, therefore, may maximize opportunities to identify constitutional violations. The positive implication is that prospective losers will seek to broaden review to include both concrete and abstract review.

\textbf{H. Summary}

To summarize the argument so far, each dimension of design choice has certain effects on the capacity of the court to render accurate review. The table below summarizes the three prototype constitutional courts along these dimensions. For each, the court with the presumptively more accurate and/or costly option is shaded.

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Dimension & United States & Germany & Poland \hline
Concrete Review & Yes & Yes & No \hline
Abstract Review & No & Yes & No \hline
Upfront Costs & High & Low & High \hline
Expenditure & High & Low & High \hline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{43} In the German system, the lower court does not decide constitutionality, but must evaluate whether or not a constitutional issue exists in the case. If it does not find necessary grounds for referral to the Constitutional Court, there is no constitutional review. One way to look at this mechanism of access is as an appeals process that actually protects the state. If the plaintiff believes the statute violates the constitution but cannot prove it to the satisfaction of the ordinary judge, she must look to other mechanisms of access to the court, such as the citizen petition where available. Where such other mechanisms do not exist (e.g., Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland until 1997), the statute will stand, without having been challenged before the constitutional court. But where the citizen is able to show that the law is unconstitutional in the first instance, the state gets automatic review on this issue \textit{de novo} before the constitutional court. Where the citizen fails, she cannot appeal.
Table 2: Dimensions of Design Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany — Constitutional Court</th>
<th>United States — Supreme Court</th>
<th>France — Conseil Constitutionnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>16 members in two senates of 8 members each</td>
<td>9 members</td>
<td>9 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standing</strong></td>
<td>Petition + courts + requests from government</td>
<td>Access through courts only</td>
<td>Restricted standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justiciable questions</strong></td>
<td>Concrete and abstract</td>
<td>Concrete only</td>
<td>Abstract only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decentralization</strong></td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appointments</strong></td>
<td>Representative — 2 houses of parliament (supermajority)</td>
<td>Cooperative — president + parliament</td>
<td>Representative — president, 2 houses of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Life — no age limit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DESIGN

The normative task of the court designer is to optimize accuracy given that it is costly. But we should not assume that designers should automatically adopt the shaded institutions, for they can make tradeoffs across and within dimensions. Suppose a country were to adopt a large court, whose judges serve for life upon appointment by a cooperative or supermajority method, with the power to hear both abstract and concrete cases brought by individual
The court would have the power to identify and remedy all sorts of violations. But it would still have limitations of capacity. In fact, it might be more effective to adopt a smaller court with less open access that could focus more intensively on the questions brought before it.

Even if there is no single optimal design for accurate review, the framework laid out above can help us determine whether court design in practice has proven to be consistent with the theoretical considerations laid out in Part I. To summarize that argument once more, judicial review provides an insurance policy for prospective losers in the electoral arena. If politicians design constitutional review to meet their "insurance" needs, we ought to expect that politicians who are not confident of remaining in power will seek a configuration that allows more accurate review. This is because they foresee themselves losing in the post-constitutional elections and seek a court that will be able to accurately identify violations of the constitutional bargain. Thus we ought to see such politicians designing courts that lean toward the shaded dimensions of Table 2. Politicians who see themselves winning the post-constitutional elections have no interest in judicial constraint of the government. They may wish to restrict standing, for example, only as a means of keeping the opposition from challenging government policy in court. Let us consider the evidence.

A. Judicial Review as Insurance: Anecdotal Evidence

There is strong anecdotal evidence to support the hypothesis that judicial review will be more accessible and powerful where political forces are diffused at the time of the constitutional bargain and more limited when a single party controls the process. This would seem to support the insurance theory over the pre-commitment theory of judicial review.

Take as an initial example the French system, sometimes referred to as limited constitutional review. In France, constitutional review is restricted to abstract, \textit{ex ante} review by a centralized body, with limited standing restricted to certain designated governmental bodies and, since 1974, minority groups of parliamentary deputies. Limited standing and abstract \textit{ex ante} review imply that decision costs are relatively low: there are few frivolous cases and no need for complex factual inquiries into the actual operations of

\footnote{There is similar evidence that central bank independence is strongly correlated with politicians' time horizons. As politicians' time horizons shorten, independence increases. John Goodman, The Politics of Central Bank Independence (1992).}

\footnote{See Appendix for countries that have adopted this system.
allegedly unconstitutional statutes. Few frivolous cases means the success rate of constitutional claims is high. However, since nominal constitutionality is assured after promulgation, it is possible that irresolvable constitutional deficiencies that were not apparent \textit{ex ante} promulgation may appear later.

This analysis is perfectly consistent with the history of the French Fifth Republic. The Conseil was adopted at the instigation of General De Gaulle, who wanted a strong executive to prevent the legislative deadlock that had characterized the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle’s confidence in his electoral prospects was such that he drafted the entire constitution around his personal popularity and did not trust parties or parliamentarians. By allowing the Conseil to consider statutes only \textit{before} promulgation, he placed a check on parliament’s ability to dictate policy. Restricted standing allowed De Gaulle and government agencies to bring cases, but not ordinary citizens, who might challenge legislation that the government wants. Furthermore, eliminating concrete review meant that the government would be able to act without constitutional scrutiny once policies were adopted.

This scheme changed radically when standing was broadened in 1974 to include any minority group in parliament. This change was initiated by President Giscard d’Estaing, who headed the small Republican Party that governed briefly. As a minority party heading a coalition government, the Republicans valued expanded standing that would provide a guarantee of access once they were out of power. These changes have had a profound effect on French constitutional law.\textsuperscript{46} Predictably, this expanded standing has led minority groups in parliament to complain frequently to the Conseil and to judicialize the very issues they lost in the legislature.

The German system features a centralized body that can engage in both abstract and concrete review. Standing is broad and includes constitutional petitions. Thus, decision costs are high because for every meritorious claim, many spurious claims must be discarded. The Federal Constitutional Court deals with this through a staff of lawyers who scan constitutional petitions as an initial matter and by restricting concrete review to those cases where lower courts have already completed the fact-finding \textit{and} made a preliminary assessment as to unconstitutionality.\textsuperscript{47} Accuracy is likely to be high because the court benefits from information provided by concrete application of the allegedly unconstitutional provision.

The design of the German system reflects a strong ideological desire

\textsuperscript{46} Stone, \textit{supra} note 23.
\textsuperscript{47} See \textit{supra} note 44.
to maintain an open and effective system. The strong emphasis on basic rights, combined with the post-War distrust of the ordinary judiciary, made a centralized constitutional court an attractive option. The German Basic Law was, in many respects a compromise between those who emphasized "positive" economic and social rights and those who emphasized "negative" rights, such as the right to property. An easily accessible constitutional court served the interests of both groups.

The Israeli system illustrates how judicial review can also be adopted in established democracies as political configurations change. Demand for insurance should increase when established political forces believe that they will no longer be able to remain in power. Faced with a deeply divided society at independence in 1948 (as today), Israel's founders chose not to adopt a constitution but, rather, to use a series of incrementally enacted non-entrenched Basic Laws to embody the nation's central political principles. For many years, a secular Ashkenazi elite dominated Israeli politics. The election of Menachem Begin in the late 1970s initiated an alternation of power between the Likud and Labor parties. As political outcomes became less predictable, the Israeli Supreme Court became more assertive as the expositor of the constitution. This move was tolerated, and in fact institutionalized, by secular politicians who passed two Basic Laws protecting civil rights and explicitly empowering the Court to void any legislation not in accordance with the provisions of the Laws and the basic values of the State of Israel. These politicians were facing political uncertainty with the rise in popularity of the ultra-orthodox Sephardic party, on the one hand, and the massive wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union, on the other. Judicial review was an attractive way of ensuring that the values of the secular, Ashkenazi elite remain protected from future attack.

Consider as a further example the post-1989 Eastern European constitutions. Where communist parties remained intact and able to enact new constitutions quickly, judicial review was limited in scope. In Bulgaria, for example, there is no public access to the constitutional court; rather, only

49 See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, Law Soc. Inquiry 91 (2000). Israel's system of judicial review is structurally similar to the American one, with the exception that judges must retire at age seventy in Israel.
designated political bodies can assert constitutional claims. Similarly, the Romanian Constitutional Council follows the French design, wherein review is limited to reviewing legislation before promulgation, with very limited access to the Council for ordinary citizens.\footnote{On France, see supra note 23.} Where communist parties were more thoroughly discredited and new parties quite diffuse, as in Hungary, constitutional courts are powerful bodies that are accessible to the public.

B. Judicial Review: Empirical Evidence

We can undertake a simple empirical test of the insurance model by examining the constitutional courts adopted in the former Soviet bloc after 1989. Nearly every post-communist country has adopted a constitutional court, usually along the lines of the German model of a centralized body. But the details of institutional design vary across countries. The following table presents some data on these countries and their constitutional courts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Constitution Year</th>
<th>No. Judges</th>
<th>Term in years</th>
<th>Access (dummy)</th>
<th>Party Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>life</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{On France, see supra note 23.}
To examine whether demand for political insurance is a determinant of constitutional court design, we must evaluate the relationship between demand and those features of court design predicted to produce more accurate constitutional review. To capture demand for insurance, we use a proxy variable Party Strength, which is the difference in the first post-constitutional election between the seat shares of the strongest and second-strongest parties or blocs of parties in the legislature. This captures the extent to which there is a dominant party in the post-constitutional legislature/political arena and should correlate with the degree of political uncertainty during constitutional drafting. The lower the differential between seat shares, the less certain the

---

53 For our purposes, this indicator is superior to another one frequently used in comparative political studies, namely, the effective number of parties. The effective number of parties is \( N_s = 1 / \sum p_i^2 \) where \( p_i \) equals the percent share of seats in the legislature of the \( i \)th party. Markku Laakso & Rein Taagepera, *Effective Number*
leading party or bloc will be that it will end up in power. Note that in most cases, we cannot use the political configuration *before* democratization, as the former configuration was generally a one-party system that did not reflect the true range of political views. The political configuration in the first election after the adoption of the constitution is a reflection, albeit an imperfect one, of the true extent of diffusion before adoption of the constitution. Therefore we draw data from the first post-constitutional election where earlier data are unavailable.

The column Term indicates the number of years in a nominal appointment to the given constitutional court. The prediction is that as the level of party dominance rises, the length of terms will fall. This is because reappointments and short term-length give politicians the ability to influence judges, especially if a party anticipates staying in power through multiple reappointment cycles. In practice, judges may not actually serve as long as provided in nominal appointments, but the constitutional courts of Eastern Europe are too young to offer reliable data on actual time served. There is the additional problem of assigning term length for purposes of statistical tests to judges with lifetime appointments. In the data analyses that follow, we therefore assume, somewhat arbitrarily, that "lifetime" appointments are eleven years long, precisely the same length as the longest designated term in the data set.

Figure 1 presents a scatterplot showing the relation between term length and party strength.

---

*Effective number of parties might correlate inversely with political uncertainty, as the smaller number of parties indicates a greater chance of each to capture seats in government. However, it would not capture the situation of political deadlock between two equally large parties, which would create high uncertainty, but a low number of parties. Thanks to Omri Yadlin for pointing out this problem in an earlier version of this paper.*
In Figure 1, the countries tend to cluster in either the lower right or upper left quadrants. The lower right represents a strong party with short terms, while the upper left represents a weaker party with longer terms for constitutional court justices. We note that Armenia is somewhat of an outlier, featuring a dominant party with lifetime appointments. Figure 2, below, presents a similar scatterplot diagram, comparing the size of the court with the strength of the dominant party, and shows similar results.
The Access variable in Table 3 is a dummy variable that captures standing. The value is 1 if citizens have the right to petition the constitutional court or if ordinary courts can refer constitutional questions to the court. Thus, both a decentralized system such as that of Israel and a centralized system like that of Germany would carry Access value 1. Systems of limited access where only designated political institutions can bring questions to the court have Access value 0. This is a feature of the French model, but also is found in some courts that otherwise resemble the German model. The predicted relationship between extent of party dominance and access is negative. The stronger the dominant party in constitutional drafting, the less incentive to design an open system of access to the constitutional court.

The table below presents the results of four separate least-squares regression operations, with Party Strength the sole independent variable. Although Access should ideally be analyzed with a probit or logit model, the $n$ is too small to produce meaningful results. We present the regression with Access as suggestive only. We also regress an index variable consisting of the sum of the normalized versions of the other variables.
### Table 4: Regression Results: Insurance Model of Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient (t-stat)</th>
<th>Regression Confidence Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regression one: ( y = \text{court size} )</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>-.10 (-2.30)</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression two: ( y = \text{term length} )</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>-3.05 (-1.22)</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression three: ( y = \text{access} )</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.71(-1.03)</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression four: ( y = \text{index summing normalized variables court size, term length, and access} )</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>-6.49 (-2.47)</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( N = 18 \)

The regressions demonstrate relatively strong results for all three dependent variables and very strong results for the index variable. All coefficients have the predicted sign, and the results for court size and the index are statistically significant. Three features thought to enhance independence and accuracy of the court are those that are chosen in diffused party systems, where politicians should have incentive to do so. This presents support for the insurance model. If the pre-commitment model were correct, we would expect to see that stronger parties chose more open access,
longer terms, and larger courts, because there would be greater need for pre-commitment. The insurance model has more explanatory power.

CONCLUSION

Judicial review, though nominally exercised on behalf of citizens, is political insurance for constitution-drafters. Given that no insurance contract is perfect or infallible, drafters must consider various institutional configurations that might achieve their goal of reducing risk. Because designers make simultaneous choices along several dimensions of court design, there is no single optimal configuration, but, rather, a Pareto set. Even with various design options, agency problems may lead to sub-optimal design because drafters pursue their own short-term interests. Data from constitutional court design in post-communist settings support these propositions and show that features of design that enhance judicial ability to constrain future politicians correlate with weaker political parties.

Appendix: Constitutional Review in New Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of constitution/last major amendment (*= amendment only)</th>
<th>Form of Constitutional Review (Key: CR= review by special body; JR = review by courts; L = scope of review or access limited)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1991*</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1972/1991*</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina-Faso</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>LCR/LJR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1990/1997*</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1984/1990*</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>LJR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1949/1990*</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>CR+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>LJR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1922/1991*</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1972/1996*</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2000*</td>
<td>LJR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1972/1994</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>LJR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>JR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>JR/CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>LCR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>