Peripheral Anti-Imperialism:  
The New Revisionism and the History of Argentine Foreign Relations in the Era of the Kirchners

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Historicizing the New Left

After 2000, a funny thing happened to the political language of the new left in South America. While leaders in many countries and of many political stripes regularly evoke the past, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez made a science of historicizing current problems by reviving the distant and forgotten as relevant and poignant. The point of the exercise was to resurrect obscured narrative as historical revision with sharp, current political meaning. In 2007, for example, at the height of a simmering dispute with the Colombian government, Chávez accused Colombian president Álvaro Uribe of fronting for a “Santanderista oligarchy.” Less striking than the evocation of a contentious narrative on how independence era icon Simón Bolivar died (murdered by his erstwhile ally, Brigadier General Francisco Santander) was Chávez’s confidence that an ancient story of political betrayal could resonate with his supporters. How many political leaders can trot out a two centuries-old story and make it meaningful to followers in contexts of current political debate?

Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is one. She has followed Chávez’s example, first, by inverting the historicized narrative form in moving to monumentalize her late husband and president, Nestor Kirchner, as a historical figure on par with independence era heroes. But in addition, recent historical revisionism as politics in Argentina has lionized the figure of the early

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republican caudillo for reasons that have much to do with what Chávez grasped about resurrecting opaque but credible narratives, and rebranding them to lend authority to a political project. In June 2012, for example, national media generally favorable to the government reported on the president’s quick trip to the province of Catamarca where she posthumously promoted the caudillo federal Felipe Varela to Army General on the 142nd anniversary of his death. Varela was without a doubt a significant historical figure but his political value to the government in 2012, his vindication a century and a half after-the-fact, rested on two additional keys. Like Santander in the 2007 Venezuelan context, Varela was a well-known figure – but not so well known popularly that his story could not be tweaked to emphasize areas of politics and heroism in keeping with current government policy. This is not to say that the vindicated Varela was an invention (nor that the historical literature that set him aside was the final word on the matter). Rather, the new narrative emphasized some features of his story, while ignoring others and at the same time presented his accomplishments in ways recognizable as positive and heroic to thoughtful cristinistas.

Why Varela? His vindication story sharply evokes goals and nemeses of the president (many of which overlap with those of Hugo Chávez over the preceding decade). Like other popular regional caudillos, he was mercilessly crushed by an emerging nation state in the hands of Buenos Aires oligarchs far from and disinterested in the rights and living conditions of working people. History texts unfairly erased his accomplishments, casting him as uncivilized and a tyrant. A supporter of Latin American unity, la “Patria Grande,” and an “Unión Americana,” Varela’s vision of one “American” people and nation was thwarted by Buenos Aires elites who saw Argentina as “European” (including Bartolomé Mitre, not coincidentally, one of the founders of the current anti-government Buenos Aires daily La Nación). After the outbreak of the War of the Triple Alliance in 1864, an outraged Varela opposed Argentina’s invasion of Paraguay as primed by what seemed a murky alliance with European imperial powers. He led a force of 40 men in an attack on Argentina, quickly added 4,000 more inside Argentina’s borders, and gave his “Proclama Americanista” (December 1866) calling on Argentines to abandon the war and join Paraguay in a union of all American republics. This latter point was highlighted in a press release by the Argentine embassy in Paraguay at the time of Cristina’s 2012 Catamarca visit.

The new Argentine popular revisionism (which incorporates academic and journalistic writing in conjunction with the political) has a combative tone in keeping with the growing intensity of national and international politics under the current presidency. The institutionalization of a “revisionist” history in conjunction with kirchnerismo’s recent turn toward a harder left, has asserted itself combatively in the formation of the Instituto Nacional de Revisionismo...
Histórico Argentino e Iberoamericano “Manuel Dorrego.” That institute’s explicit objective is to counter what might have been termed two decades ago in the United States and elsewhere, “great man”-oriented, liberal, positivist historical narratives emanating from national and international institutions, starting with the Academia Nacional de la Historia de la República Argentina. One difference, for now anyway, between Argentine revisionism and new historical analysis in the United States, for example in the 1970s, that also challenged what seemed to many a staid positivism, is that in Argentina there have been few accompanying openings for sub-alterns to structure their own historical narratives and political initiatives as dominant. Asserting an aspiration to influence (and reminding some that President Juan Perón once shut down the older and more politically sedate Academia Nacional de la Historia), Instituto president Pacho O’Donnell likes to point out that the Instituto and the Academia are institutional equivalents as dependencies of the Argentine presidency. Also prominent among Instituto members are the wildly successful popular historical writer Felipe Pigna and the longtime rector of the Universidad Nacional de Lanús, Ana Jaramillo. In its writings and its politics, the new revisionism draws explicitly on earlier generations of revisionists whose positions on the caudillos and the Buenos Aires oligarchs was not far off the current variant.

The politics of Cristina Kirchner’s appeal to Varela and other pasts, legitimized in part through ideological ties to O’Donnell and other new historical revisionists, may well be inspired in part by Hugo Chávez’s vulpine media savvy. Their Argentine origins, though, are closely associated with political and social upheaval in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 economic crisis and with an exponential growth in the power of the presidency in national political life since the collapse of dictatorship in 1983. By the mid-1990s, in a fiercely hierarchical system that concentrated party power in the executive, the presidency had not only detached the Congress from its constitutionally mandated independent political functions, but had made it subservient to the executive office. In the 1980s, the congressional majority leader César Jaroslavsky maintained strong political ties to president Raúl Alfonsín. At the same time, a decade later, so politically powerful had the presidency become that it would have been hard to imagine an equivalent to Jaroslavsky in Congress – strong, politically independent despite a shared party affiliation with the president, and with a congressional agenda that did not always coincide with presidential schedules and objectives.

In this context, and in the aftermath of the 2001 economic meltdown, Néstor Kirchner assumed the presidency with plans for historically transformative change. That political cycle – kirchnerismo – is ongoing. It has been marked by a remarkable period of sustained, economic growth; a celebration of dictatorship-era human rights groups and their visions of democracy; transformative
migration and naturalization legislation that reversed Argentina’s longstanding preference for white, European immigrants; and enormously popular social welfare programs that have depended on a treasury bursting with revenues from the export-driven economic boom. Since 2008, though, the kirchnerista cycle has manifested other hallmarks.8

Sustained, robust economic growth became a thing of the past, the result in part of slowing Brazilian and Asian economies that had devoured record Argentine bumper crops of soy and other exports. Economic uncertainty combined with the election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the death of Néstor, and news of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s illness (and subsequent death) all contributed to profound shifts in kirchnerismo (though for many, that change had begun long before). In the international community, Argentina assumed diplomatic and strategic positions closer to those of Venezuela in tone and substance than to those of Michelle Bachelet’s Chile and Inacio Lula da Silva’s Brazil, which had marked Néstor’s presidency. At home, the national government moved to halt the economic slide by expanding state intervention in how the private sector managed production, exports, and the movement of capital in and out of the country.9 Early in her first presidency, Cristina antagonized small- and medium-sized agricultural producers over such regulations.10 The resulting ongoing confrontation with the rural sector configured one of many political skirmishes between government and working people that quickly marked kirchnerismo in two ways.

First, rural workers and small-scale producers claimed, as did many urban wage labourers, that Cristina had abandoned Néstor’s laudable vision for a new, more representative form of grassroots democracy. That accusation, echoed by many middle class urban Argentines who had once supported Néstor, helped shape the rapid development of a severe breach in Argentine society after 2009, fuelled by pro- and anti-kirchnerista media, between those who supported and those who opposed the government. Here again Argentina came quickly to reflect current Venezuelan political cultures where there could only be two sides to a controversy and no middle ground; one was either pro- or anti-government, and ferociously so. Second, kirchnerismo moved to counter growing criticisms in society through a politics of historical vindication that placed Néstor and the political movement he led at a culmination of triumphal historical narratives that revived dozens of political figures like Florencio Varela, and that bridged academic and popular historicizing in the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Revisionismo Histórico Argentino e Iberoamericano “Manuel Dorrego.”11

This article reasons that the politics of historical vindication have their origins in conjunction with a historiographical shift that since 2002 has recast the past to dovetail and intersect more closely with kirchnerista narratives on
problems related to the veneration of Felipe Varela, but in other ways as well. That historiographical shift has been subtle, varied, and sometimes independent of government messages. It has helped legitimize, though, historical narratives important to kirchnerismo including the related themes of a Latin American Patria Grande, and opposition to U.S. dominance in the hemisphere. While the post-2002 historiographical shift is evident in many areas, this article focuses on the re-emergence of anti-imperialism as a core problem in how scholars conceive of and understand Argentina’s international history. The anti-imperial emphasis contrasts with a more neoliberal analytical framework for many scholars in the 1990s, and provides an indirect context for the emergence of figures like Varela and the popular and academic condemnation of others, like the genocida Julio A. Roca.12

Vuelta de Obligado: Anti-Imperialism at the Creation

Felipe Varela and other regional caudillos were destroyed twice by “civilizing,” European oligarchs in Buenos Aires – first, in military campaigns during the nineteenth-century nation-building process itself, then in their longstanding relegation in high school history texts to marginal barbarismo. For historians over the past decade, this became a cautionary tale in several respects, one of which was the purported erasure in historical narratives of Argentina’s anti-imperial tradition. In reviving anti-imperialism as a central historical problem, historians nevertheless face a conundrum that sits like an elephant in the room. Unlike Fidel Castro’s Cuba, post-1978 Iran, or even Chávez’s Venezuela, Argentina was never much of an anti-imperial scourge for the United States, Great Britain, or anybody else. Like Canada’s refusal to send troops in support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (and the consternation in Washington that generated), Argentina has periodically annoyed and even angered American and British leaders with policy and actions. But Argentina never maintained a medium- or long-term combative, or even sustained opposition to U.S. commercial, financial, or strategic policy in the past 150 years. How, then, can one structure a case for an anti-imperial tradition?

There is little doubt that the longstanding political and cultural prominence of reasonable Argentine territorial claims to the British-held Malvinas Islands is a helpful start to the answer. For almost two centuries, Argentine foreign relations have been shaped in part by the axiomatic sum of the following lemmas: The Malvinas are Argentine; the British are colonial interlopers; and in Argentina’s persistent claim for the reintegration of Malvinas into Argentine territory, Argentina is anti-imperial. But beyond this, many authors over the past decade
have stressed and over-emphasized the episodic as meaningful far beyond a case or multiple cases would warrant. Additionally, they have overestimated Argentina’s international significance. The first point is plain in the title of Pacho O’Donnell’s *La gran epopeya: El combate de la Vuelta de Obligado* (Buenos Aires: Norma, 2010), one of two recent books on this 1845 riverine battle that see its significance in league with the Battle of Carabobo (1821), or perhaps the pyrrhic victory of American revolutionaries at Bunker Hill (1775).  

A long-time historical writer, journalist, political figure, and populariser of history, O’Donnell is the leading voice of historical revisionism in Argentina and, as noted earlier, the president of the Instituto Nacional de Revisionismo Histórico Argentino e Iberoamericano “Manuel Dorrego.” In less than a year, his book sold 40,000 copies – a best seller of monumental proportions in Argentina. In a shorter analysis of the same problem, O’Donnell comes more quickly to the point in laying out the historical significance of the battle in Argentine national and international histories. Vuelta de Obligado might perhaps be described as a pyrrhic victory in defeat in what O’Donnell describes as Argentina’s “Second War of Independence” – a failed campaign, unlike the first. The story is less about the heroic loss of the battle to a combination of French and English forces, than it is about what might have and what should have been. It’s about the seizure of the successful Argentine independence struggle a generation earlier by those O’Donnell identifies condescendingly in quotation marks as the “‘notables’ or ‘decent people’” of the city of Buenos Aires who considered themselves the rightful owners of the port and of the wealth generated in duties on riverine traffic to and from the interior, the Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata (or what O’Donnell sombrely designates “what would in time become our Argentina”). Like most narratives addressed in this article, O’Donnell’s is not a new story. The shorter version cites no primary sources and only twelve secondary sources, six of which are O’Donnell’s own writings. The point of the analysis is to highlight the potential strength of a popular movement (at the back of the Vuelta de Obligado victory, and like that in support of Varela) in the face of a selfish urban oligarchy, falsely claiming to represent civilization versus a barbaric popularly based politics.

The significance of Vuelta de Obligado as a loss that nonetheless inflicted enormous damage on a superior French-British enemy rests not only in the success of caudillo-led popular politics versus elitist oligarchs, but in an ideological triumph over what the latter represented in regard to Argentina’s international vision for nation building. In 1845, a combined British and French force invaded Argentine waters ostensibly to topple the “tyrant” Juan Manuel Rosas. O’Donnell reasonably argues (as have others for over a century) that their true motive was economic – to do away with Rosas’s control over their access to valuable com-
commercial routes on the Paraná River and to help put in place a government of elites willing to assist in that cause. As O’Donnell describes the battle, Vuelta de Obligado was a heroic mix of “coraje criollo” and brilliant patriotic strategy, against odds that included a British-led international embargo on the sale of arms to Argentina and superior British forces. If there’s nothing new about the battle in either version of O’Donnell’s accounts, the purpose of the exercise is crystal clear:

La historia, cuando es verdadera, nos habla del presente, habla de nosotros aquí y ahora…. Incesantemente nuestra patria enfrenta situaciones semejantes a la de Obligado…. El endeudamiento ominoso durante la dictadura…; la privatización a precio vil de empresas estratégicas y la desocupación y pauperización masivas de los noventa fueron derrotas; la independización del FMI, la prioridad de la política por sobre la economía, la sociedad con las repúblicas hermanas de América, las jubilaciones extendidas y la asignación universal por hijo de la década del 2000 son modernas victorias al estilo de Obligado…. The End of Peripheral Realism

Public historians or popularisers of history like O’Donnell who have been writing since 2002 differentiate themselves from academic scholarship in four vital respects. They reach a much more significant audience. Their political impact is, as a consequence, deeper. They position themselves as essayists in a classic Argentine sense. This means in part that they do not write with the university scholar’s imperative to reference ideas and sources, nor do they feel obliged to present their work as a thorough investigation of primary and secondary sources. In addition, their presentation of a linkage between historical problems under consideration and a current political objective is front-and-centre. The most prominent historians of Argentine foreign relations writing since 2002 do not identify themselves as revisionists, nor have they as contentious an interest in promoting a national political agenda in keeping with what Pacho O’Donnell sees as the line joining Vuelta de Obligado and Argentina’s having freed itself from the International Monetary Fund under Néstor Kirchner. At the same time, the recent historical literature on Argentine international affairs reflects the revisionist impulse, a revived tendency to see Argentina as anti-imperialist, and an accompanying end-of-history vision of the Kirchner decade as reflecting both Argentina at its best in the international community – as a thorn in the side of
domestic and foreign moneyed interests – and as a herald of democratic reform. Moreover, the academic scholarship follows the revisionist lead in melding a favourable treatment of a putative anti-imperial past with an even stronger, current anti-imperialist politics expressed in the media.  

While on the one hand, the academic scholarship purports to rely on a mastery of secondary sources, like revisionist works, it tends to be conceptually insular, rarely drawing on sources outside a tight circle of Argentine scholarship in the field and almost never citing current, non-Spanish language scholarship. In Vecinos en conflicto: Argentina y Estados Unidos en las conferencias panamericanas (1880-1955), for example, Leandro Morgenfeld cites Raanan Rein’s Juan Atilio Bramuglia: Bajo la sombra del Líder. La segunda línea de liderazgo peronista (Buenos Aires: Lumiere, 2006) in his bibliography. He never references the work, however, or reflects on Rein’s conception of foreign policy making in a context of national and internal Peronist politics. In another variant of the new anti-imperial historiography, in Las relaciones Argentina-Italia: Una historia de desencuentros, un futuro de posibilidades (Buenos Aires: Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, 2012), the career diplomat Claudio Javier Rozencwaig addresses two-hundred years of history. However, half the book focuses on the period 1976 to the present, and most of that deals with Italy’s economically dominant role in Argentina’s international debt problems.

The above strictures are especially evident in the writings of two of Argentina’s most well-known students of international relations, Carlos Escudé and Mario Rapoport, who not only found common historical cause in what kirchnerismo meant politically and historically, but who managed at the same time to set aside bad feeling for one another that had gone back more than a quarter century. Escudé’s transformation is striking. An adviser to Foreign Minister Guido di Tella during Carlos Menem’s first presidency, Escudé was an architect of Argentina’s exit from the non-aligned movement and of its dramatic early 1990s policy alignments with the United States.

In the 1990s, the theoretical framework for his thinking was what he called peripheral realism; for decades, he reasoned, Argentina had ignored at its peril not only its own irrelevance to the great powers, but the attendant impotence that this signified in international affairs. As a result, Argentina’s economic decline since the mid-twentieth century could be traced in large measure to a blustering nationalism in foreign policy that wrongly assumed Argentina counted for much in international financial and commercial capitals. Argentina’s best hope for the future, Escudé argued, was to do away with this failed historical policy model, assume its true national identity as a weak nation state, and quickly end conflict with the great powers (particularly the United States). As such, Buenos Aires might convert foreign policy into a case-by-case mathematics of cost-
benefit-risk assessment where the powerlessness of a peripheral state implied severe limitations on economic, strategic, and political negotiation. Lambasted by many (Rapoport included) for good reason for what seemed a call for policy impotence and an *apologia* for the “savage capitalism” of the Menem years, Escudé all the same countered effectively a longstanding exaggeration of Argentina’s economic and strategic significance in the scholarly literature that would roar back after 2002.27

Ten years after advocating peripheral realism in policymaking, Escudé did what he himself might call a *volte-façê*. Of Néstor Kirchner’s confrontation with international lenders, Escudé wrote approvingly that it was no longer possible to “take the path of peripheral realism.”28 Systemic financial chaos had reduced the cost of challenging the United States and even Kirchner’s close ties to Hugo Chávez seemed to Escudé to reflect a rational approach to policy unimaginable by the parameters of peripheral realism – as a means of regulating the danger of leftist guerrillas in Colombia, and as a sort of “mafia protection” in regard to dealings with the United States.29

More subtle, but more influential, has been the work of Mario Rapoport in producing a succession of well-researched, multi-archive based analyses of Argentina’s foreign relations since independence, but with a focus on the Cold War period. Unlike Escudé, Rapoport’s affinity with *kirchnerismo* makes ideological and political sense bearing in mind continuities in his writing since the 1980s. Rapoport never held truck with notions of peripheral realism. He understood Argentine foreign policy as far back as the nineteenth century as a direct function of Argentine commercial and financial interests (the oligarchs named by O’Donnell and other revisionists). He believed Argentine policy makers had both the authority and the latitude to negotiate in international forums. At the same time, though, influenced by 1960s desarrollista economic and social models, Rapoport explained Argentine economic weakness and foreign policy failures as a function of economic dependency and inflexible economic policies determined by entrenched business elites. At the beginning of the *kirchnerista* cycle, Rapoport divided modern Argentine history into four key stages that kept faith with how he had understood the past until then, and that underlined elite policy direction, the repeated and failed promise of economic growth, and long-term national decline. The stages were agro-export (1880-1930); import-substitution (1930-1976); finance capitalism (1976-2003); and re-industrialization, a reversal of indebtedness, and economic development (2003 forward).30

This intersection of Rapoport’s rotund confidence in and enthusiasm for *kirchnerismo*31 and the shaping of an end-of-history reworking of his historical analysis of the last century are evident in his assertion that the fourth historical stage is still underway. That intersection is also clear in his remarkable (and
compelling) conflation of the dictatorship-Alfonsín-Menem periods into one historical stage – in juxtaposition to post-2002. Even so, and despite strong archival research, the author has neglected vast and important document sets. Moreover, in spite of his sweeping fourth historical stage, he has been quick to accept at face value kirchnerista and revisionist political and policy assertions. Like other Kirchner-era scholars of Argentina’s international relations, Rapoport highlights the episodic, and often reads evidence without questioning assumptions about the nature of U.S. imperialism and accompanying non-Argentine historical literatures that explain its complexities.

One of several areas where Rapoport’s anti-imperialism and his place in kirchnerista intellectual circles become evident is in his interest in the putative ideological ties between leftist Peronist Héctor Cámpora and the Kirchners. Rapoport argued in 2006 that Cámpora’s eight week long 1973 presidency marked a high point in tense confrontation with the United States and a resulting period of international isolation, not unlike that suffered by Argentina at the end of the Second World War and the Malvinas War. Not only does Rapoport contemplate what, in the context of Argentina’s international relations, was a largely imagined historical “period” (the Cámpora presidency) he has no evidence to back up his assertion. In fact, he makes no use of archival documentation showing that Washington thought little of Cámpora one way or the other, and like most Argentines, saw his presidency as anticipatory of the return of Juan Perón.32

Here and elsewhere in the post-2002 historical literature how does conflict with the United States materialize when there is none, or at most there is the sort of problem in bilateral relations that defines not a hostile or anti-imperial foreign policy on the part of Argentina or other countries, but the normal day-to-day disputes that arise between most nations? In part, the answer speaks to where historical writing fits into a larger, anti-imperial kirchnerista culture and where academic analysis imitates life. In February 2011, for example, Argentine authorities seized weapons and a “secret” suitcase full of illegal drugs from a U.S. Air Force C-17 transport plane on the tarmac in Buenos Aires. American officials countered that there had been weapons but no drugs. The weapons were headed for a routine joint operation between the Grupo de Operaciones Especiales de la Policía Federal and the U.S. Army Seventh Parachute Brigade. Without denying what that statement implied – the embarrassing revelation that Argentina and the United States cooperated militarily on Argentine soil – the Argentine foreign minister attacked past and present American military influence in Latin America, including the historic role of the School of the Americas in training Latin American military officers to torture. Three weeks into the crisis, an Argentine federal court ended the foofaraw by confirming the American version of events.33
What had happened? A non-event that might otherwise have been resolved in a heartbeat was transformed into a larger-than-life crisis for political reasons, specifically, the assertion of a government anti-imperial posture where, in fact, relations with the United States were generally good, if fraught with the sort of difficulty and problems that define most bilateral relations around the globe. The case also depended on an over-estimation of Argentina’s significance for the United States in media imaginings that the episode counted for something in Washington. Rapoport’s analysis of the Cámpora presidency fits these same parameters. In particular, his work reflects a magnification of everyday problems that Argentine and U.S. policy makers and diplomats faced into imagined crises.34

Rapoport cites the August 1973 cooperation agreement between Argentina and Cuba as one of dozens of episodic points of conflict between the United States and Argentina that he argues shaped Argentine foreign relations over the long term. The agreement extended financial credits to Cuba for the purchase of Argentine manufactured goods. These were to include exports from U.S. branch plants in Argentina – an arrangement Washington only approved eight months later.35 While Rapoport presents the case as a point of bilateral tension, and as nothing less than an Argentine challenge to the U.S. blockade of Cuba, there is documentation that he does not cite which shows that it was nothing of the sort, from the perspective of both governments. In October 1973, the foreign minister in the new Juan D. Perón government, Alberto Vignes, followed up on secret conversations with the U.S. State Department throughout the period that the Argentina-Cuba accord was negotiated. He confirmed that Argentina would back U.S. Cold War strategic positions. At a meeting that month with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in New York, Vignes spoke dismissively of the populist tendency in Peronism that Cámpora had represented.36

Kissinger raised the financial credits to Cuba. Vignes was firm. The arrangement was and always had been strictly financial, to support the sale of Argentine farm machinery. “Cuba knows,” Vignes added, “that Argentina is ... anti-Communist.” Vignes and Kissinger spoke a language that incorporated an understanding that the seemingly contentious can be of limited relevance to how two countries formulate policy and interact, but that there might be no good reason for either party to dispel the public face of what seemed contentious in bilateral ties. An assumed hullaballoo between Argentina and the United States over Cuba – promoted by the media and by scholars – gave helpful cover to a still poorly understood defining feature of Argentine Cold War international relations – Vignes’s stated Argentine anti-Communism.37

A failed understanding of the importance of anti-Communism as a formative backdrop to Argentine foreign relations throughout the Cold War is the principal conceptual link between the Kirchner-era historiography and the earlier
scholarly literature. Even so, that conceptual vacuum emerged more strongly after 2002 as a function of how revisionist writers positioned Argentina as anti-imperialist, and kirchnerismo’s self-association with traditions in left-wing Peronism including anti-Americanism and Perón’s “third position.” In addition, the anti-Communism black hole has depended on a tendency among scholars to take public Cold War era political and diplomatic positions – like the 1973 Argentina-Cuba accord – without question and at face value; the assumption that an anti-Communist foreign policy would be incompatible with pragmatic relations with the Soviet bloc or disputes with the United States; and despite some key exceptions, like Rapoport’s previously cited fourth historical stage, a reluctance to see policy continuities across ideologically distinct democratic and military governments after 1940.

In Rapoport’s most important book of the Kirchner era (co-authored with a former student, Claudio Spiguel), Relaciones Tumultuosas: Estados Unidos y el primer peronismo (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 2009), readers will find an additional explanation for the unreasonable focus on an anti-imperial foreign policy (and in this case, the inaccuracy of those reports of “tumultuous” bilateral relations with the United States). Frequently, and as in other scholarly works, the authors cite a limited base of Argentine secondary sources that offer no challenge to long-established political narratives. Moreover, they cite no Argentine primary documentation in making significant analytical points. In addition, their selection of primary documentation from U.S. government sources reflects not the nuanced analysis of the 1973 Vignes-Kissinger conversation, but the authors’ stilted reading of how Americans have viewed Argentina. Much of how Rapoport and Spiguel read U.S. primary documents depends on a vision of American incompetence and misunderstanding of Argentina on par with Spruille Braden’s 1946 bullish missteps – and an ongoing sense that Washington continues to bumble through relations with Argentina in the same way, as in the kirchnerista reading of C-17 incident. This seems to affect both which documents are selected for study, and how the authors read them.

One of many examples is what the authors describe as a “new confrontation” with Washington that developed between 1950 and 1952. In this section, Rapoport and Spiguel rely on not one Argentine primary source, overestimate the significance in Washington of Argentine positions, exaggerate in a manner equivalent to the 1973 Argentina-Cuba case the alarm of American policy makers over Argentine economic policy positions at odds with those of the United States, and place too much importance on public statements as policy. So, for example, Rapoport and Spiegel cite one State Department document on a 19 September 1950 conversation between Perón and the U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires where Perón noted that while “a coming world war was considered inevitable,”
it was not imminent. Containing communism, he went on, was best achieved not by war with Russia but by working to eliminate communist activity country by country. The authors present Perón’s statements as a thoughtful, third-position policy, distancing from the United States’ more bellicose approach to the Cold War, one month before the United Nations General Assembly approved (with an Argentine abstention) UN troops crossing the 38th parallel in the Korean War.38

Was it that? Part of what’s missing from the Rapoport-Spiguel analysis is evidence of much more forceful, pro-U.S. anti-communist doctrine at the root of Cold War Argentine international relations in this and other cases. Four months after Perón’s comments on communism, his Defense Ministry released a secret internal position paper exposing the third position for what it was – a position of limited practical, diplomatic significance, not strategic policy. The Defense Ministry proposed that Argentina continue to press forcefully for an end to “Chinese communist aggression,” as it had done recently at the UN, and that international policy should be guided by that stand. Argentine policy would stress the Americas over other regions. In response to the Defense Ministry paper, Sub-secretary of Foreign Relations Guillermo R. Spangenberg argued that the Cold War now shaped Argentine international ties. In further reference to the third-position policy, after the Rio Pact and the Bogotá Letter, Argentina was no longer neutral. An eventual war between “East and West” was coming, formulated by Argentine policymakers not only as communism versus anti-communism, but in addition, as the “East” versus “Western Civilization.”39

Perón had clearly known about the World War III defense strategy the previous September. What he left out of his conversation with the U.S. ambassador was that Argentina had developed a military strategic plan, the “Fórmula Media,” that left no doubt regarding where Argentina stood. When the new world war came, the Argentine Navy would deploy to join U.S.-led expeditionary forces, the Army would maintain internal security and “repress fifth columns,” and the Air Force would maintain air sovereignty in the face of possible communist aggression. There was no necessary incongruity in publicly defining a third-position policy, adopting a strong anti-Communist, pro-U.S. strategic policy, and saying nothing about the latter to Washington in order to position Argentina publicly as diplomatically disengaged from U.S. strategy.40

Leandro Morgenfeld, a former student of Mario Rapoport, takes his doctoral dissertation director’s analysis and methodology to an even more forceful insistence on an Argentine tradition of anti-imperialism.41 He attributes episodic cooperation with Washington to governance aberrations, as in the case of the brief, military-backed presidency of José María Guido when Argentina backed the U.S. position on the Cuban Missile Crisis, taking part in the naval blockade of Cuba – as though Argentine foreign relations were always one-dimensional
(for or against Cuba), and as though sensible democratic regimes always behaved differently from military governments. Like Rapoport, Morgenfeld sets aside evidence of long-term strategy and policy imperatives in Cold War Argentina that transcended democratic and military governments, and that reflected both the policy parameters set in place by the Fórmula Media and senior diplomats who oversaw their implementation over decades in some cases.

Morgenfeld ignores the 1964 Venezuelan accusation against Cuba of providing arms to Marxist Venezuelan rebels. Like the United States, in keeping with Argentine Cold War policy generally, and citing the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Argentina supported the Venezuelans unconditionally. The “insidious” nature of communism required that “Argentine policy take a clear stand on Castro-communist subversion in a manner that [would cause] no friction among the great western democracies.” Not only does the Kirchner-era historiography discount the forcefulness of anti-communist continuities in Argentine Cold War policy, it ignores the significance of senior diplomats of long standing who executed policy (including, in this case, Ambassador Julio César Carasales, later a key architect of Argentine nuclear foreign policy) and related domestic policy imperatives (in this case “recent subversive acts in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy”). The current historical scholarship also generally sets aside what cannot be cast in the linear chronology. Successive Argentine governments (including anti-Communist military regimes) maintained good relations with Cuba, including the proceso whose diplomacy – under the leadership of Ambassador Carasales – prompted an exponential increase in bilateral cooperation in the nuclear energy sector. That relationship no more signals a pro-Soviet stand than Perón’s “third position” an anti-imperial posture.

Wanting It Both Ways

It is the previously noted elephant in the room that undoes the current historical literature on anti-imperialism – how to resolve arguing all at once that the nation has been led for most of the past two hundred years by wealthy, landed, industrial, and/or financial interests tied to international capital, and the seeming tradition of an anti-imperial policy tradition. The contradiction cannot be resolved, just as many reason that there’s something incongruous about the current political system permitting enormous capital accumulation for some in Argentina, while supposedly confronting international capital interests and practicing a stated redistributive politics.

In Los partidos políticos y la política exterior argentina (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 2013), María Cecilia Míguez comes closer than Rapoport in linking historical
analysis with current politicking. Her approach to the 2011 seizure of weapons from the U.S. C-17 transport plane, for example, strictly reflects the government’s position on U.S. aggression, not the federal court finding after the fact. She explains unsatisfactorily ongoing military and strategic cooperation with the United States after 2003 as simply a function of Argentina wanting to take advantage of training exercises in peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, and environmental work.44 Míguez assesses the Kirchner period as a historical break with the past in its successful search for an independent foreign policy. But while she correctly explains that Néstor Kirchner’s breach with the International Monetary Fund and his government’s financial alliance with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez presented unprecedented decision-making options for Argentina on the problem of foreign debt, she neglects the emergence of related problems and constraints in Argentina’s international financial relations that circle back to the nature of capital accumulation in Argentina. While she castigates Radical and Peronist presidencies in the 1980s and 1990s for their capitulation to foreign capital and to the United States, there is no discussion of how Argentina’s private banking and commercial relations were successfully restructured after 2002, or with whom.

A similar problem is reflected in Mario Rapoport and Eduardo Madrid’s otherwise thorough review of bilateral Brazilian-Argentine relations. Like other works by Rapoport, there is an end-of-history celebratory quality to the assessment of the post-2002 period as the culmination of the creation of a happy alliance between progressive governments in Argentina and Brazil. At the same time, Rapoport and Madrid overplay the supposed animosities between the two countries during the Cold War period. While many, including these authors, believe for example that Argentina and Brazil were rivals in the nuclear sector for much of the Cold War, physicists in both countries have repeatedly insisted that there was nothing to fight over and that scientists regularly shared sensitive data. More important, while this like other Kirchner-era narratives, posits a shared Brazilian-Argentine anti-imperial initiative in reaching cooperative arrangements in many areas, there is no attention to the impact of the emerging Brazil-Argentina alliance on capital formation in either country; nor to the post-2001 industrial flight from Argentina to Brazil (and its impact on Argentine working people and the Argentine labour movement); nor to the growing regional strategic and financial dominance of Brazil; and – whether or not it constitutes imperialism – the growing power and influence of Brazil over the Argentine economy.45

Here again, the historical literature of Argentine foreign relations sets aside an uncomfortable economic reality in favour of a historical narrative that dovetails with a kirchnerista politics of shared international solidarity with Brazil. While government politics in Argentina excoriates foreign investment as exploitative,
the Brazilian share of foreign direct investment in Argentina continues to rise, so that in 2012, Brazil jumped to second in this category behind only the United States with growing investment in the oil and food production sectors — two areas of greatest contention between government and a variety of constituencies.

Writing a decade ago, Tulio Halperín Donghi tied the work of an earlier generation of historical revisionists (including José María Rosa and Jorge Abelardo Ramos) to memory making as “embellecido por la nostalgia.”46 At the same time, though, he argued that their work remained off in a figurative corner, suffering from public indifference. What has changed for the current generation of revisionists is that their work has gone mainstream. Felipe Pigna has become one of the most widely read and publicly respected authors in Argentina — a popular, middle-class reference point for how people understand the past. This success both draws on and reinforces a government political project that has papered over the distasteful contradiction between often meaningful redistributive political projects on the one hand, and growing disparities on the other between the very wealthy (including many close to the president) and those living in poverty. It builds on and complements a recent historiography of Argentine foreign relations that parallels current government policy contradictions in positing an “anti-imperial” Argentina, even as the government participates fully in most regards in international capital and trade markets. And it ties Felipe Varela to Brazilian-Argentine relations over the past three decades by highlighting the nostalgia of an imagined Latin American solidarity, reinvented under end-of-history kirchnerismo, when the history of inter-American foreign relations calls for a more multi-faceted approach to the past.

Notes

1 My warm thanks to Jorge Nállim and Jessica Stites Mor for their helpful criticisms of article drafts.
3 Chávez was also a master storyteller of tales that explicitly linked the historical, the personal, and the spirit world — and to similar effect. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has taken another leaf out of Chávez’s playbook in a kind of post-modern historicizing of herself, in third person self-referential statements of accomplishment. In speeches, her sentences will sometimes begin with, “Esta Presidenta….”
4 “Necesitamos la unidad nacional,” Página/12, 5 June 2012; “Catamarca: la Presidenta Cristina Kirchner promovió al grado de General a Felipe Varela,” Voz de Recreo, 5 June 2012.


Though it deals with the period immediately after the Alfonsín presidency, an excellent analysis of Jaroslavsky’s legislative leadership and the political dynamism of Congress as a counterweight to the presidency can be found in María Cecilia Míguez’s “Los partidos políticos argentinos y el envío de tropas al Golfo Pérsico (1990-1991). Debates y posiciones del oficialismo y la oposición. ¿Distintos proyectos de inserción internacional?” Temas de historia argentina y americana 17 (2010): 123-158. See also Ana M. Mustapic and Matteo Goretti, “Gobierno y oposición en el Congreso: La práctica de la cohabitación durante la presidencia de Alfonsín (1983-1989),” Desarrollo Económico, 32:126 (1992): 201-218.


13 See Juan Manuel Peña and José Luis Alonso, *La vuelta de Obligado y la victoria de la Campaña del Paraná* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 2012). Like O’Donnell, Peña and Alonso believe that the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado has not had its due, despite the fact that in 1973 the Argentine Congress designated the day of the battle, 20 November, a national holiday – the Day of National Sovereignty. At the same time, while their book had neither the sales nor the popular impact of O’Donnell’s book, and while Peña and Alonso have added nothing substantial to the story of the battle itself or Juan Manuel Rosas’s anti-imperialism, they are less explicitly invested than O’Donnell in making points connected to current politics (though this book has been read in the same national political context). That’s particularly evident in the authors’ choice of the conservative historian Isidoro J. Ruiz-Moreno to write an appreciative presentation at the outset; Ruiz-Moreno immediately distances himself from the authors by calling Rosas an autocrat and by noting that readers will likely find points of interpretation with which they will be at odds.  


17 O’Donnell relies on only one strong, current historical work, Ricardo Salvatore’s “Consolidación del régimen rosista (1835-1852),” Revolución, república y confederación (1806-1852), Noemí Goldman, ed. (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1998), 323-380. Like other revisionist authors, he cites the works of an earlier generation of revisionists arguing similar themes, though in different political contexts – for example, José María Rosa’s Historia Argentina (Buenos Aires: Oriente, 1974).

18 See also José Carlos Chiramonte, “Una batalla que no fue nacional,” Ñ. Revista de Cultura, 30 November 2012; José Carlos Chiramonte, Usos políticos de la historia. Lenguaje de clases y revisionismo histórico (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2013), 263-68.

19 While he lists three archives as sources, there are no footnotes in his book, so there is no way of knowing what’s new here.


21 Juan Andrés Bresciano, Juan Álvarez y la historiografía ensayística argentina (Buenos Aires: Librería de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2006), 5-6.

22 Consider, for example, the overlapping themes in Leandro Morgenfeld’s recent book, Vecinos en conflicto: Argentina y Estados Unidos en las Conferencias Panamericanas (1880-1955) (Buenos Aires: Peña Lilo, 1011) and his blog, http://vecinosenconflicto.blogspot.ca, with recent items on “Para justificar espionaje el Gobierno de EEUU usa temor del pueblo a atentados” (5 July 2013) and “EEUU y la necesidad de balcanizar América Latina: lo que hay detrás de la retención de Evo Morales” (5 July 2013).


24 Morgenfeld, Vecinos, 444. There is an accompanying lacuna in the current literature of earlier, strong historiographical influences on Argentina’s relationship with the imperial powers. Seminal works in this category (including Marxist analyses) that still resonate include, for example, Hugo E. Biagini, “La recepción argentina del pensamiento norteamericano,” Cuadernos de filosofía, 19:30-31 (1983): 167-192; Luis V. Sommi, Los capitales alemanes en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1945); Ezequiel Ramírez Novoa, La farsa del panamericanismo y la unidad indoamericana (Buenos Aires: Editorial Indoamérica, 1955).

25 See also David Aliano, Mussolini’s National Project in Argentina (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2012).

27 Carlos Escudé, El realismo periférico: Fundamentos para la nueva política exterior argentina (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992); Carlos Escudé, El realismo de los estados débiles: La política exterior del primer gobierno de Menem frente a la teoría de las relaciones internacionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1995); Alejandro Simonoff, Teorías en movimiento: Los orígenes disciplinares de la política exterior y sus interpretaciones históricas (Rosario: Prohistoria ediciones, 2012), 38-44; José Luis Méndez, Bajo las alas del Condór: La participación en el Plan Condór de los criminales anticubanos; Posada Carriles, Orlando Bosch, Novo Sanpol y otros (Buenos Aires: Cartago Ediciones, 2007).


31 Rapoport has written regularly in the media in support of policy positions taken by the Kirchners. See, for example, Mario Rapoport and Noemí Brenta, “La gran inundación,” Pagina/12, 26 March 2013; Mario Rapoport, “De dónde vienen y adonde van las relaciones con EEUU,” BAE Negocios, 2 February 2013. See also Beatriz Sarlo, “Teoría y práctica cristinista del ‘vamos por todo’,” La Nación, 16 December 2012.


34 See also M. Barrera, I. Sabbatella and E. Serrani, *Historia de una privatización: Cómo y por qué se perdió YPF* (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2012), 101-103.


38 Rapoport and Spiguel, *Relaciones Tumultuosas*, 332.


