linguistic identities that Sephardim inhabit. Judith R. Cohen’s chapter closes the book and the section with an examination of the Judeo-Spanish repertoire collected among the Canadian Sephardim, noting the differences between Moroccan and Ottoman-area communities, but stressing, overall, the vitality of this cultural scene.

This book brings to an English audience a topic that had not been available. It succeeds, as well, in suggesting the benefits of mapping the Americas within the modern Sephardic diaspora in order to fully understand Sephardi contemporary identities.

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What accounts for the devastating Argentine crisis of 2001 that resulted in the largest sovereign debt default in world history? Claudia Kedar poses this question in the introduction to her study of the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Argentina. She seeks to answer it in terms of what she calls the “routine of dependency”—namely, the multifaceted array of interactions that take place between the IMF and debtor nations, including country reports, consultations, IMF missions, meetings in Washington, D.C., and other behind-the-scenes activities. The by-product is described as the creation of an epistemic community: a network of technocrats in the IMF and its borrower states that share a liberal economic ideology and thereby enhance IMF influence over domestic policy choice in Latin America. According to Professor Kedar, “The deep neoliberalization that Argentina—and other Latin American nations—experienced in the mid-1980s and especially in the 1990s was largely facilitated by decades of the routine of dependency” (p. 153).

Drawing heavily on recently released IMF archival materials as well as British, U.S., and Argentine government documents, the book provides a chronological account of the initiation, evolution, and institutionalization of Argentina’s relationship to the IMF between 1942 and 2005. The bulk of the historical narrative consists of a detailed listing of names, dates, and places of official meetings, consultations, and negotiations, which provide a window into the waxing and waning of ties between the Fund and Argentina. The account highlights not only Argentine political instability and related discontinuities in policy choice
but also the relative flexibility of the IMF vis-à-vis Argentina. This flexibility is explained in terms of the professional and personal ties between IMF officials and local technocrats that led the Fund to overlook short-term problems of noncompliance in the interest of maintaining the routine of dependency. In the author’s words, “The IMF’s staff is ready to compromise because compromises ensure the routine of dependency, and the routine of dependency guarantees the IMF’s survival” (pp. 162-163). The Fund’s flexibility is also cited to account for its willingness to work with both military and civilian regimes. Hence Professor Kedar argues that regime type is not the most appropriate prism for examining the relationship between the IMF and Argentina: what matters instead is ideology and related bureaucratic and personal linkages.

In developing her arguments, the author gives domestic politics short shrift. Largely ignored are the ideological affinities and personal linkages that developed between Argentine military officers and liberal economists during the 1955-1983 period, as well as the powerful constraints imposed by the military on civilian policy choice. Alvaro Alsogaray, for example, served as Minister of the Economy under the democratically elected government of Frondizi and the transitional government of Guido as well as Ambassador to the U.S. under the military regime of Ongania, largely at the insistence of the army, in which his brother Julio held a powerful command position. The same is true of other influential conservative economists, such as José Martínez de Hoz and Roberto Alemann, who likewise rotated into positions of power during regimes imposed by the military. Thus the ideological linkages that developed between Fund officials and Argentine policy makers after 1958 were less the product of routine interactions than of domestic political struggles that allowed the dominant faction of the military to impose its preferences.

The author’s analysis of shifting patterns of interaction between the Fund and Argentina also downplays the importance of the broader international economic context, which has shaped the role of the IMF vis-à-vis creditor nations as well as the Fund’s own policies and procedures. For the first twenty-five years of its existence, the IMF’s interactions with members were largely episodic as it mainly focused on resolving short-term disequilibria in the balance of payments. Beginning in the 1970s, when the Extended Fund Facility was created, the Fund adopted a longer term perspective and increasingly sought to address the structural dimensions of adjustment. Particularly in response to the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s and the evident inadequacy of simple traditional prescriptions, the Fund also began to place emphasis on the importance of economic growth. The Fund’s technical assistance services expanded as did new programs designed to assist low income countries, including the Structural Adjustment Facility. More recently, its interests have broadened
further to include the issues of poverty and redistribution. By neglecting these developments, the author has provided us with a rather incomplete account of the shifting relationship between the IMF and Latin America.

Despite these weaknesses, the author’s historical analysis provides important insights into the acute policy dilemmas confronted by both the Fund and national officials as Argentina’s economy began unraveling in the late 1990s. The problem was not merely the overvaluation generated by the currency board arrangement adopted in 1991 and the resulting vulnerability of the economy to external shocks. The possibility of developing a successful program of economic adjustment was also undermined by five decades of policy failures, recurrent economic crises, and international borrowing documented by Professor Kedar, which not only contributed to high levels of dollar-denominated debt but generated deep domestic and international pessimism about the future of the economy.

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Together, these excellent books tell the story of the most profound transformation in urban, middle class Argentine political cultures since the fall of the last military dictatorship in 1983. Middle class Argentines created, defined, and then sharpened a human rights regime that asserted shared societal moralities and norms, integrating political, cultural, and juridical components. Nobody invented human rights in the 1980s. But before the early 1970s, “human rights” in Argentina existed in narrow judicial and diplomatic contexts, not as a popular middle class notion of rights. That changed with the 1973 coup d’état in Chile and the linked rise of Amnesty International and other human rights groups, the 1976 military take-over in Argentina, the unprecedented ferocity of *proceso* state terror, and the ways by which Argentine rights groups understood, cast, and explained that terror. Middle class Argentines emerged from dictatorship in 1983 with a sense that human rights were their last, best defence against the primary abuses of military rule – torture, killing, disappearance, kidnapping, and related violent manifestations of state terror.

While the lionization of human rights in Argentina took multiple artistic, monument-making, literary, and political forms, none was more important than