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Abstract

The article reviews the political dynamics that fostered a transnational political culture among leftist activists in the Southern Cone. This culture resulted from the coming together of various different ways in which activists experienced local political events and reinterpreted global processes. Certain cities at specific moments had a crucial role in the development of these exchanges. In this article, I will briefly review three different periods during which militants from various countries met in a particular city: Montevideo...
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in the mid-sixties; Santiago from 1970 to 1973; and Buenos Aires from 1973 to 1976. The article argues that each experience furthered the expansion of a network of militants and the development of a common political culture that had impacts beyond the region.

**Keywords:** Latin American Cold War, Left Activists, Revolutionary Movements, Guerrilla Groups, Global Sixties, Southern Cone

What was the importance of the Southern Cone in the global sixties? Predominant narratives of this period have given it a peripheral role. By following diffusionist perspectives, most approaches considered the region an empty space that only received influence from other historical processes happening elsewhere in the world. For many historians, the Cuban revolution had a central role in the emergence of the armed struggle in the South, while others have insisted on the influence of the developed world’s 1968 youth revolt. However, my research suggests – as others have also contended – that the region’s own local, national and transnational political dynamics were crucial to the gradual formation of a shared experience among different new left organizations and militants that emerged into public life in the mid-1960s. They not only became key actors in the processes that preceded the consolidation of authoritarianism in the Southern Cone but were also part of the global process of the new left during the late sixties and early seventies. In this sense, the region was a laboratory where activists assessed each local event and drew conclusions that would influence the coming struggles in their countries and the region, but also their global alliances.

These regional exchanges began in Uruguay as a result of rising authoritarianism in neighboring Brazil and Argentina. Che Guevara’s Bolivia campaign in 1966 furthered these interactions. These then became formal exchanges in Chile under the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, or UP) government, where a number of groups started to consider the possibility of creating a new regional organization. This idea eventually took form in the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria, formed by Bolivia’s ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional or National Liberation Army), Chile’s MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria or Left Revolutionary Movement), Argentina’s ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo or Popular Revolutionary Army), and Uruguay’s MLN-T (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Tupamaros or National Liberation Movement). These coordination efforts reached their highest point in Buenos Aires in the period between 1973 and 1976, when the coup d’état in Argentina eliminated the last remaining “refuge” in the region. Following the harsh blows suffered as a result of the repressive actions of their governments, these organizations would then try to regroup during the transition to democracy in the eighties and adapt to that new political context.
These political dynamics fostered a transnational political culture among activists in the region. It resulted from the coming together of various different ways in which activists experienced local political processes and reinterpreted the global ones. Certain cities at specific moments had a crucial role in the development of these exchanges. In this article, I will briefly review three different periods during which militants from various countries met in a particular city: Montevideo in the mid-sixties; Santiago from 1970 to 1973; and Buenos Aires from 1973 to 1976. As I argue, each experience furthered the expansion of a network of militants and the development of a common political culture that had impacts beyond the region.

**Montevideo, 1962–1968.**

Sidney Tarrow argues that there are moments in history when a new repertoire of contention emerges to question established traditions in a specific community. Something like that happened with the Cuban Revolution. Through a demonstration effect and then by training and supporting guerrilla groups, Cuba generated a new regional context that called for renewed protest methods. However, the specific forms that this renovation took in the Southern Cone did not enable an automatic replication of the Cuban experience. There are accounts by militants who would later participate in Chile’s MIR or in the MLN-Tupamaros describing rural military training and the beginning of activities modeled after the actions of the Cuban rebel army, and also Masetti’s experience in Argentina. However, these attempts failed due to the great differences between these territories and Cuba: either because of the absence of a peasantry similar to that described by the accounts of the Cuban Revolution, the lack, in some cases, of geographical features similar to the island’s, or the practical realization that there were other, primarily urban sectors who showed greater willingness to “combat” the governments in power than the rural populations where the campaigns were being attempted. Politically, Uruguay, Chile, and, until 1964, Brazil, were also under democratic regimes that were more or less stable, and Argentina was under a regime that was semi-democratic, as the Peronist movement was banned. Socially, the southern countries represented the region with the greatest urban development, and in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, very small rural populations. Although many leftist Southern Cone militants wanted to emulate the Cuban Revolution they realized they needed to create a different repertoire of contention.

One of the aspects that contributed to the development of this new repertoire of contention was the sharing of experiences among Southern Cone militants through the exile communities in the region. From 1964 to 1968, Montevideo was
a hub for these exchanges. It was there that different groups from Argentina (of Peronist and leftist extraction), Brazil, and Paraguay planned armed incursions against their respective countries. Through their involvement in social struggles in Uruguay and their participation in solidarity activities, these foreign militants came increasingly into contact with their Uruguayan peers, to whom they conveyed the armed struggle experiences they were attempting in the region. This militant movement strengthened networks and enabled debates that were key in the construction of new protest repertoires.

Uruguay’s long-standing tradition of receiving asylum seekers, along with its respect for individual liberties – which continued relatively unaffected until 1968 – turned this country into a hub of Brazilian, Argentine, and Paraguayan dissidents. These conditions transformed the capital of Uruguay into a sanctuary and a space for conspiracy for various militants from the region who viewed the city as a haven of freedom in an increasingly authoritarian regional context. Flavio Tavares, a Brazilian exile linked to Governor Leonel Brizola, saw it as an “ideal place for conspiring,” and described it as having

Absolute freedom, parties of every tendency and all of them legalized (even Trotskyists and anarchists, who are stigmatized in the rest of the world, have headquarters, flags, newspapers, and the such there). And, above all, many books and magazines depicting the utopia of revolution. All of that in plain sight, like those hundreds of Brazilian exiles, who filled the cafés of 18 de Julio Avenue or San José Street or Pocitos, and dreamed of returning.6

A CIA agent meanwhile described Montevideo as having an “extremely permissive political atmosphere,” which, among other things, allowed the Cuban Embassy to become intensely involved in local politics and work with exiles from the region.7 That climate of active political socializing in bars and cafés of downtown Montevideo, along with the dissemination of literature through numerous bookshops, publishing houses, publications, and the weekly Marcha and the daily Época, whose columns featured a variety of foreign intellectuals banned from writing in their own countries, all contributed to building a community of political exchanges that fostered reflection on the processes in the region. A growing number of Argentines and Brazilians flocked to Montevideo and began organizing resistance against the political regimes in their respective countries. While the resistance to Paraguay’s dictatorship – headed by Adolfo Stroessner, a former ally of Perón – was organized primarily in Argentina, given the anti-Peronism of post-1955 governments, there was also a large community of Paraguayan exiles in Montevideo.8
Argentines of various political backgrounds had long used Montevideo as a meeting place for opponents of the government of the moment. As of 1955, after Perón was ousted, Montevideo was increasingly frequented by members of the Peronist resistance, and it became a meeting ground for Peronists from different provinces, who planned actions against the ruling governments and established international contacts. A number of leftist militants not necessarily connected with the Peronist movement also turned to Montevideo, because once Argentina broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba their contacts with the Cubans had shifted to Montevideo.

After the March 1964 coup in Brazil, Montevideo also received a large number of exiles from that country. These included a group of anti-coup military officers, as well as politicians connected with the Rio Grande governor, Leonel Brizola, and members of Ação Popular (Popular Action), a leftist Christian group that had broken away from Ação Católica (Catholic Action). In Montevideo, with members of the catholic left, they helped develop a series of encounters among catholic youth of the region. In January 1968 there was an important meeting at the national university where delegates mainly from Argentina, Chile, and Colombia participated and discussed the idea of creating a “Camilista” movement, in reference to the Colombian clerk Camilo Torres who had died four years earlier.

Despite how promising Uruguay looked to exiles, the country was not going through its best moment. In the mid-fifties Uruguay had achieved a level of social development that was significant in the context of Latin America. That period of high optimism, illustrated by the popular saying “There’s no place like Uruguay,” was characterized by economic growth, the development of the welfare state, advanced labor and social laws, and a stable democracy. According to the 1963 census, Uruguay presented features that were quite different from the more stereotypical conceptions of Latin America. The country’s population was predominantly urban, with 80.7 percent of Uruguayans living in cities, it had an illiteracy rate of 8.7 percent, primary school enrolment stood at 91.6 percent, and the rate of unemployment was 6.3 percent. As for wages, from 1946 to 1950 the country had seen an annual real wage growth of 7.9 percent, which made it possible for it to begin the 1950s with welfare levels comparable to some developed countries. However, that progress proved fragile in the post-war period, as terms of trade deteriorated and the economy faced changes. In the mid-fifties, Uruguay entered a phase of stagnation, which was followed by a structural economic crisis that lasted two decades.

Soaring levels of inflation, which peaked at an annual rate of 60 percent in the second half of the sixties, escaped the control of successive governments of the Colorado and National Parties and had a strong impact on the distribution of wealth. The impact this had on the working classes resulted in rising
labor mobilizations to demand wage increases that would compensate for the falling value of workers’ salaries in real terms. Yet the Left failed to capitalize on this public discontent. The total share of its votes remained below 7 percent throughout the sixties, and the National and Colorado Parties appeared to be unassailable. In 1958, the National Party won the elections after almost a century in the opposition, and in 1967 the Colorado Party returned to power. Although the dominance of the traditional parties persisted, a strong presence among trade unions and students allowed the Left to begin to capitalize on the public mood.

One response to the crisis was the politicization of the labor movement. In an article in the January 1963 issue of Marcha, union leader Héctor Rodríguez wrote that, faced with the crisis, the workers’ movement faced a crossroads: workers could make economic demands without becoming involved in politics, or they could address the crisis and its causes. The latter would require proposing their own solutions and “mobiliz[ing] the forces required to put them into action.”

The state’s response to the growing social mobilization against the crisis was to step up repression and police control. Although most studies have emphasized the increase in state repression from 1967, a series of recent studies have shown how a significant proportion of the authoritarian practices consolidated by the state as of 1968, under the government of Pacheco Areco, had already been part of the repertoire of repressive state practices, having been developed at the start of the decade. Between 1960 and 1963, certain sectors of the National Party government, together with the Colorado opposition, embarked on an anticommunist campaign, specifically focused on the threat posed by the Cuban Revolution. The campaign unsuccessfully attempted to ban the Communist Party, regulate union activity, and break off relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Between 1962 and 1963, a series of groups on the extreme right carried out attacks against political and social activists, exiles, and Jews. In 1963 and 1965, the government decreed prompt security measures, and individual rights were suspended to suppress strikes by public sector unions. These measures allowed the imprisonment of hundreds of union activists and in some cases the use of systematic torture.

The March 1964 military coup in Brazil added a regional component to the authoritarian escalation fueled by Uruguay’s conservative sectors. In September 1965, pressure began to mount in Argentina. In a meeting with Brazilian general Costa e Silva, the influential Argentine general Juan Carlos Onganía – who had given a speech that same year at the West Point Military Academy proposing that national borders be replaced by ideological borders – suggested that the two countries enter into a military pact to stop subversion in Latin America. The two generals saw Uruguay as the main threat, given the strong presence of exiles in that country and its political instability. Nine months later a coup d’état in
Argentina installed a new military dictatorship headed by Onganía. As of 1966, Uruguay was surrounded by military dictatorships.

It was in this context of rising state repression and authoritarianism, lack of electoral options for the Left, and increasing social protests that a group of activists from different political backgrounds (anarchists, socialists, former communists, and independent activists), dissatisfied with the traditional Left, began to meet in what would later be known as the “Coordinator.” This space, which existed from 1963 to 1965, was the seed of the MLN-Tupamaros movement. This small group of militants had multiple contacts with militants from other countries, who in a way helped design the strategy of the Tupamaros. Many of the region’s militants, who passed through Montevideo for different reasons, met with members of the Coordinator.

Although the actions of the first rural guerrilla attempt lead by the journalist Jorge Ricardo Masetti, and supported by Guevara from Cuba, took place in northern Argentina, contacts organized from Bolivia through the Cubans were also made in Montevideo. Various materials were distributed through Montevideo with contact being made first via the Cuban Embassy, until diplomatic relations were severed in September 1964, and later either through the staff that remained in the country or through a significant network sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution. The painter Ciro Bustos—a friend of Guevara’s who had participated in the EGP experience and later in Ñancahauzú, Bolivia—tells how, as one of the few survivors of the EGP in Argentina, he decided to flee to Montevideo, where he reestablished contact with the Cubans. On that trip, he met at the Sorocabana—one of the city’s leading cafés—with the director of Época and with Marcha journalist Eduardo Galeano, who put him in contact with Raúl Sendic, the future leader of Tupamaros, in Montevideo. News of the EGP’s defeat had reached the Uruguayan press and Coordinator activists wanted to know what had happened. Bustos and Sendic discussed for hours the reasons for the EGP’s failure. Sendic told him that he belonged to a group that was interested in launching an armed struggle effort but that they were still not sure what characteristics it would have in Uruguay. The result of that meeting was a collaboration agreement. Bustos gave Sendic some weapons his group had in Montevideo that could not be taken across the border to Argentina, and offered to give him a security course. The meeting apparently coincided, as will be shown below, with the moment in which Coordinator members began to abandon the idea that rural guerrilla warfare was feasible in Uruguay.

Ever since Perón was ousted in 1955, Montevideo had also been a sanctuary for many Peronist resistance activists and a place where they could retreat to. John William Cooke—Peron’s secretary—used Montevideo as his base for operations when he had to flee Argentina. It was also from Montevideo
that Alicia Eguren (Cooke’s wife) arranged the trips of Argentines from various Peronist and left-wing organizations who went to train in Cuba from 1961 to 1962. Another activist linked to the Peronist movement who came to Montevideo around this time was Abraham Guillén, a fifty-year-old Spanish anarchist who fought during the Spanish Civil War. In Argentina, he became close to Cooke and the more radical Peronist sectors. After the 1955 coup he advised Cooke, as a sort of intellectual of the Peronist resistance. In 1960, Guillén was arrested and spent a few months in jail. Upon his release he traveled to Cuba, where, according to his own account, he spent a year training guerrilla groups. He then settled in Montevideo, where he found work as a journalist in the Colorado Party newspaper Acción. In 1963, some members of Tacuara, a nationalist group that turned to the left made their way to Montevideo and joined the Peronist resistance. Joe Baxter, one of the group’s leaders, traveled to Vietnam where he made contact with officers of the Chinese Communist Party who invited the group and another Peronist resistance organization to receive military training in China. After the course, unable to go back to Argentina, the militants returned to Montevideo and joined the Uruguayan Coordinator, offering to form a leader training school for Argentine and Uruguayan militants. Joe Baxter, Nell Tacci, and Pata Cataldo taught courses on theoretical aspects, urban fighting, and explosives. Nell Tacci would later be arrested in 1967 for his involvement with the Tupamaros; Joe Baxter would flee to Havana, returning to Argentina in 1970 and leaving the Peronist movement to join the PRT-ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army - Workers Revolutionary Party); and Cataldo would return to Argentina in 1967.

As of March 1964, Uruguay received a new wave of refugees, this time from Brazil. After the military coup in that country, Uruguay became one of the main organization centers for the resistance against the Brazilian dictatorship. Rio Grande do Sul Governor Leonel Brizola led various resistance activities from Uruguay. There were several insurgency attempts, mostly organized by military officers. The two attempts in Rio Grande do Sul were unsuccessful. Although Brizola focused on the possibility of generating military uprisings in southern Brazil, the repeated failures led him to adopt other strategies, including supporting an initiative by a group of sergeants who had requested his backing to develop a rural foco.

The establishment of a rural foco in the Caparaó mountains in southeastern Brazil, between the states of Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais, was thus planned from Montevideo, Cuba, and Brazil. Cuba provided money through Uruguay and offered military training on the island. In October 1966, the group started a rural foco in Caparaó with fourteen activists, five of whom had been trained in Cuba. According to Denisse Rollemberg, the foco’s launching was coordinated by Cuba, as it was planned to coincide with Guevara’s Bolivia campaign. After
five months, the foco’s militants were found in appalling conditions. While they had not encountered “enemy forces,” the guerrillas had to face extremely harsh conditions, were poorly fed, isolated, injured, and some psychologically affected, so that they were no match for the police and the army when some 3,000 men were deployed in a large operation to suppress the foco. 25

These plans were backed by support activities in Montevideo, which entailed contacts with Uruguayan militants and other exiles. Jorge Rulli remembers how after the coup some Peronist militants had been entrusted by Perón to express their solidarity with João Goulart, who had initially sought refuge in Montevideo. 26 Uruguay’s left-wing parties and media also expressed their support. Uruguayan communists, who were critical of the Brazilian Communist Party’s failure to take up arms against the coup, offered their help directly to Brizola. 27 According to the journalist Samuel Blixen, Sendic personally took weapons to Brazil, and forged a close political relationship with Brizola in Montevideo. 28 Moreover, Época provided a space for Brazilian refugees to denounce the dictatorship’s attempts to pressure the Uruguayan government, as well as cases of direct intervention by Brazilian military or police officers targeting exiles in Uruguay, and gave a detailed coverage of any events these exiles wanted to make known. 29

Through all of these exchanges, the Uruguayans of the Coordinator had firsthand knowledge of what was happening in the region. On the one hand, they witnessed the process of advancing authoritarianism, which was interpreted as a road that the Uruguayan ruling classes would take sooner or later. On the other, the members of the Coordinator had come into contact with the different radical experiences that had been attempted in the region. They saw the limitations of those who tried to mechanically replicate the Cuban process, as had happened to the EGP in Argentina or the Caparaó guerrillas in Brazil. They also held discussions with and took ideas from those who were attempting other ways, such as members of the Peronist resistance. All of these aspects are key for understanding how the Tupamaros came to build a body of ideas on urban guerrilla warfare, which they would later present as an alternative to the Cuban model in the region.

One of the major debates within this small group had to do with the problem of defining the strategy that would be implemented. A flat, grassland country with no mountains or jungles and a low rural population density, Uruguay did not have ideal conditions for rural guerrilla warfare. However, from 1964 to 1965, Sendic and a group of rural workers had been surveying bush areas, lagoons, and swamps in northern Uruguay that could be used as hideouts in a rural guerrilla warfare strategy. Other members of the Coordinator had begun studying different alternatives. In 1965, Jorge Torres, a young former communist, penned a document arguing that in Uruguay the revolution had to be fought from the
cities. Rubén Navillat and the bank employee Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro had also contributed to the document.30

In 1966 Régis Debray was in Montevideo and met with Torres, Navillat, and the Argentine militant Baxter. They had a heated discussion. While Debray said that in Uruguay a revolution was impossible given its geography, the Uruguayan militants and Baxter maintained the feasibility of urban guerrilla warfare, backing their claim with little-known experiences, like that of the FLN in Algeria, the Jewish resistance to British rule in Palestine, and some cases of partisan resistance during World War II. Some members of the Coordinator and Argentine militants who were in Montevideo began to study these more closely.31 These experiences put into question the *foco* theory advocated by the Frenchman. Navillat recalls that at one point in the conversation he and Baxter had with Debray he was so frustrated with Debray’s “smugness” in denying the possibility of an armed insurrection in Uruguay that he said to him, “Che is a fool, but he has balls. He’s going to get himself killed.”32

That same year, Abraham Guillén published his book *Estrategia de la guerra urbana* (*Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*) in Uruguay. He questioned the applicability of rural *foquismo* in Latin America, in particular in highly urbanized countries such as the Southern Cone nations. The text had many points in common with Torres’ 1965 document. The two met in 1965 and Torres accused Guillén of plagiarizing his work.33 Both texts argued that demographic and economic conditions should determine the specific rules that would guide revolutionary strategy. In cases like Argentina and Uruguay, where 30 and 50 percent of the population, respectively, lived in the capital cities, the ideal place to build the basis of a guerrilla movement was the city. Unlike Guevara, they found that developing an urban guerrilla movement presented certain advantages over rural guerrilla warfare, as urban guerrillas, who work during the day and fight at night, are familiarized with their battleground and can fall back on their networks of relationships to ensure their survival.

This discussion was settled in 1967. The Uruguayans in the MLN-T would be the first to apply these political and military ideas to a concrete organization. In their Document No. 1, adopted in June 1967, the Tupamaros included a section entitled *Urban Warfare*, where they explained that their strategy was drawn from the tactics that had allowed them to survive during their first years of existence.34 The shift had occurred in the year 1966, when the police became aware of the organization and they were forced to turn to the city and the periphery of Montevideo for infrastructure and hiding places, abandoning Sendic’s original plans.

The reasons for the shift toward urban guerrilla warfare are connected with two developments. First, the exchange of experiences and debates among different Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan militants was likely to have contributed
to a thorough assessment of the difficulties faced by past rural foco attempts in the region. Second, when the government became aware of the existence of the MLN-T as a result of a shooting in December 1966 and launched a vigorous campaign to hunt down its members, the organization was able to survive thanks to the many networks that they had established in Montevideo with political and labor activists. The experience they gained led to their option of the city as the ideal battleground. For that reason, the document argued that in Uruguay’s case armed struggle could not be tied to “classical strategic ideas.” It then listed the advantages of urban combat as opposed to rural combat: cities offered good communication and liaison conditions; the urban control capacities of the police and the army were relatively idle; there was no need for supply networks in the city; guerrillas could work during the day and fight at night; and urban guerrillas were in an environment they knew. The document also recognized that there were certain aspects of this strategy that were still not fully worked out. One such aspect was the issue of transforming an urban guerrilla organization into a regular army. But it noted that “the continental scope of the process had to be considered and that that transformation could only be attempted in the final stage.”

Toward the end of 1968, the Tupamaros emerged as an example of urban guerrilla warfare that challenged previous models. In July 1968, the Chilean magazine Punto Final featured a long piece on the Tupamaros and reproduced the document “30 preguntas a un tupamaro” (Thirty Questions for a Tupamaro), one of the movement’s first public documents. This article would later be reprinted in the Argentine magazine Cristianismo y Revolución.36 Thanks to the relative success of its initial actions, the MLN-T was able to project itself as a heterodox alternative to the orthodoxy of the Cuban Revolution. The experience and the ideas of the MLN-T began circulating throughout the Southern Cone. These ideas appealed to a number of organizations in the region that were looking for alternatives to Guevara’s focismo. A book entitled Tupamaros: Fracaso del Che? (Tupamaros: Che’s Failure?), published by Argentine journalists in 1969, suggested that the actions by this group were ushering in a new stage in the development of Latin American guerrilla movements. For many analysts, the cycle of rural guerrilla movements had ended with Guevara’s death in Bolivia. However, the Tupamaros were proposing an alternative to rural guerrilla warfare that revived the expectations of those who believed in revolutionary violence.37

The Tupamaro experience was replicated in Argentina by different groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (Peronist Armed Forces), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FAR), and the Fuerzas Argentinas de Liberación (Argentine Liberation Forces) FAL, which in different documents mentioned the Tupamaros strategy as an example to follow.38
The PRT-ERP—the only non-Peronist armed organization that was still active in the seventies—appears to have been less motivated by the Tupamaros, although it also shared a somewhat heterodox approach to rural foquismo. While there are not many references to the Tupamaros in the documents of the PRT-ERP, some of the younger militants who joined the organization in the years 1969 and 1970 remember its impact. Daniel de Santis recalls one of his first PRT meetings in 1969:

The militants I met with were talking about the Tupamarization, an idea I agreed with immediately, as the brilliant operative line of the Tupamaros had won many of us over to the Guevarista strategy."39

During that period, ties were also established between the Tupamaros and members of the incipient guerrilla groups that emerged in Brazil after 1966. In 1969, Carlos Marighella published his Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano (Mini Handbook for the Urban Guerrilla), which had obvious points in common with the ideas that had been discussed in Uruguay. Guillén says his text was translated into Portuguese and a mimeograph version of it was distributed in Brazil.40

According to Andrés Pascal Allende’s and Max Marambio’s memoirs, the new generation that emerged in 1967 within the Chilean MIR which embraced armed struggle also paid close attention to certain MLN-T actions. For instance, the “bank expropriations” were carried out in the framework of the armed propaganda criteria developed by the Tupamaros.41

Lastly, Tupamaros’ strategy had repercussions on a new wave of emerging armed groups in the US and Europe, which saw the urban guerrilla as a more suitable strategy to fight in urbanized and modern societies. In 1972, in a preface to the Actas Tupamaras, Regis Debray—who had opposed urban guerrilla warfare—advocated in favor of the Tupamaros, describing them as “[t]he only armed revolutionary movement in Latin America that—at least until now—has been able to, or has known how to, attack on all fronts.”42


On November 4, 1970, Salvador Allende was sworn into office as president of Chile. His government promised a revolution that raised expectations across the globe. His political project involved bringing together the best of the Cold War’s two worlds by achieving socialism through democracy. Apart from the differences with the Cuban Revolution, this process was conceived as a new step in the road to Latin America’s liberation. Among the possibilities that the
electoral victory of Unidad Popular opened up, it provided a place of refuge for many militants of the region. Indeed, from the start, Allende’s solidarity with political refugees from Latin America was a key aspect of his government and one of the most heated issues of public debate. In the first weeks of his presidency alone Allende granted political asylum to seventeen Bolivians, seven Brazilians, nine Uruguayans, and twelve Mexicans.43

While Chile had a long-standing tradition of political asylum, during this period the number of refugees grew, as many left-wing organizations from the region saw in socialist Chile a safe haven from the persecution they were suffering in their own countries. Often there was no official request for asylum and instead refugees were taken in as a result of the support that certain Chilean left-wing parties provided other Latin American parties, in some cases even against Allende’s wishes or without his knowledge.

It was in this situation that many militants of the Southern Cone armed Left came together, engaged in discussions, and began to conceive political action in the region in a coordinated way. There, a number of academics connected with these political experiences developed the more radical lines of the dependency theory, offering frameworks for interpreting the regional political process through intense public involvement.

In the sixties, Santiago became one of South America’s most important centers of production in the field of social sciences. Institutional spaces such as the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American School of Social Sciences, or FLACSO),44 the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), a number of research and academic centers connected with the Catholic Church, and social sciences research centers such as the CESO and CEREN, linked to the process of renovation of the Chile and Catholic University generated a steady flow of academics, technical experts, and intellectuals coming into Chile from different parts of Latin America.45 Also, the fact that Chile avoided the authoritarian processes that swept the region (Brazil, 1964; Argentina, 1966; Bolivia, 1971) acted as an incentive for several academics who were fleeing their own countries. It was in these spaces that a significant number of exiles were active, working, and contributing to issues that were key for political and academic thinking during that period. Some of these exiles were strongly committed to the ideas proposed by the groups of the new Left that were emerging in the various countries of the Southern Cone.

This was the historical context in which many intellectuals, some of them exiles, and others, visitors who came to know the UP experience, engaged with Chilean scholars and produced many books that would be extremely influential for the Latin-American left in the following years. Books such as Pedagogia del oprimido, by Paulo Freire; Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina, by
Fernando Hernique Cardozo and Enzo Faletto; *Para leer al Pato Donald*, by Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart; *Los conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico*, by Martha Harnecker; and, *El poder dual en América Latina*, by Rene Zavaleta Mercado, among others, are examples of this intellectual moment.

Among these scholars, one group in particular had a specific impact on some of the militants in armed organizations. Specifically, the most radical version of “Dependency Theory,” expressed by the works of Brazilian intellectuals Theotônio dos Santos, Vania Bambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini, and German academic André Gunder Frank, were strongly linked to the political commitments of the new left. These academics, who had been working at the University of Brasilia, came to Santiago escaping the persecution of the Brazilian dictatorship. All had a constant intellectual and political dialogue with socialists and *mirista cadres*, and some were incorporated into these organizations. For instance, Rui Mauro Marini became an organic member of the MIR’s leadership. Among the books that were produced by this group *Capitalismo y subdesarrollo en América Latina* by André Gunder Frank, was *Socialismo o fascismo, el nuevo carácter de la dependencia* and *El dilema latinoamericano* by Theotônio dos Santos, and *Subdesarrollo y revolución* by Ruy Mauro Marini.

In their arguments, they repeatedly challenged two perspectives that had begun to be questioned by academic and political approaches from the mid-sixties. On the one hand, the more classic perspective of Latin American development theory that held that autonomous capitalist development was possible with certain levels of social integration; on the other, the theses that the communist parties had defended since the fifties that propounded a revolution by stages, which involved a first stage of alliance with the national bourgeoisie to develop a national capitalism that would break feudal vestiges.

One of the key arguments of this new radical *dependista* thought was the idea that political radicalization in Latin America was inevitable; that the only way capitalism could survive in a context of political and economic crisis was to resort to a new form of fascism, different from European fascism. Fascism was the result of the new nature of dependency, determined by processes of economic transnationalization. These processes were gradually destroying national economies, undermining national bourgeoisies and the political regimes that these social sectors had presided over since the forties and fifties.

In dos Santos’ perspective, the economic and social crisis that shaped the new form of dependency generated a “revolutionary situation” in which reformist, developmentalist, and popular nationalist alternatives encountered deep limitations: the structural limitation of dependent development, and the political limitation of the contradictions of the demands of the social masses aggravated by the crisis. In this scenario only two paths were open: socialism or fascism.
Many armed groups from the region that were in Chile at the time adopted this way of interpreting the historical process. In September 1971, Bautista van Schouwen, a member of the MIR’s political committee, gave a speech in Santiago’s popular settlement of La Victoria in honor of Commander Carlos Lamarca, a Brazilian military officer who had deserted to join the Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, or VPR). After describing Brazil’s dictatorship as the most hideous in Latin America, Van Schouwen noted that its “sub-imperialist delusion” had become a threat to its neighboring peoples, turning it into the “support base and coordinating center of counter-revolutionary reaction in the Southern Cone.” 47 According to Van Schouwen, “the reactionary and counter-revolutionary dynamics of the Brazilian dictatorship is today the mandatory reference point for devising the strategy for Latin America’s continental revolution.” In view of that threat, “proletarian internationalism” and “revolutionary solidarity” were no longer a question of principles, they were a matter of objective necessity. 48 Lastly, van Schouwen listed the places in which these processes were unfolding in Latin America: Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina.

The region’s rising authoritarianism pushed these groups of militants who met as refugees in Santiago to find concrete ways in which to coordinate their regional actions. A 1975 document of the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria describing its origins indicates that a major meeting was held in the month of November 1972 in Santiago with the participation of the MIR’s political committee, three top leaders of the MLN-T, and some leaders of the PRT-ERP. 49 According to this document, Miguel Enríquez proposed holding a “small Zimmerwald” of the Southern Cone, in allusion to the 1915 meeting in Switzerland convened by socialists opposed to World War I, where the foundations for the Third International were laid. In the text, the JCR’s “imperative” goal was deemed to be: “Uniting the revolutionary vanguard that has embarked decisively on the path of armed struggle against imperialist domination and toward the establishment of socialism.” 50

Besides the continental strategy defined by Guevara in his message to the Tricontinental and which these groups felt they represented, there were concrete needs that demanded the forging of alliances between the region’s groups. From the MIR’s perspective the possibility of an authoritarian reaction in Chile, which seemed increasingly imminent, entailed the need for a strategic rearguard that would make it possible to organize the resistance. 51 In the PRT-ERP’s case, the year 1972 represented the consolidation of a significant shift in its international relations. Besides considering Chile as a potential strategic rearguard, other aspects helped strengthen the need for an alliance. Santucho decided that the PRT-ERP would leave the Fourth International due to the latter’s accusations
against Cuba and the withdrawal of its support for the Latin American guerrilla groups.53 Lastly, with no MLN-T leaders left in Uruguay and the organization’s defeat, the steering committee that the MLN-T had established outside of Uruguay needed to increase its international contacts in the region, as they were key for ensuring their survival in Chile and Argentina, the two places that were chosen at different times as possible rearguards. This was the context in which certain joint activities had to do with the incorporation of militants from the different organizations through an international leadership training school and the forming of committees tasked with military infrastructure and logistic matters.53

**Buenos Aires, 1973-1976.**

The year 1973 ended in a way that was far from the expectations that had been raised at the beginning of the decade. The 1971 Banzer coup in Bolivia, the authoritarian reaction of President Bordaberry in 1972 in Uruguay and the subsequent dissolution of parliament in 1973, and the military coup in Chile in September 1973 had thwarted those expectations. For the militants of the armed Left, however, the Southern Cone was still a “key zone” where the fate of Latin America’s revolution would finally be decided. In 1975, writing in *Correo de la Resistencia* under the pseudonym “Luis Cerda,” Brazilian sociologist Ruy Mauro Marini—who was at the time head of the MIR’s foreign committee—argued that while there were countries in Latin America with nationalist reformist projects (Peru, Panama, Venezuela, Mexico) that were a source of concern for the United States, the “key zone” where the future of revolution in Latin America would be disputed was the Southern Cone.54

In Marini’s view, which expressed the sentiment of the recently created JCR, after 1973 Argentina had become a critical place for the final outcome of the confrontation between revolution and counter-revolution. Argentina was the place where counter-revolutionary forces had not yet firmly established themselves, and the place that, given its geographical location, could serve as a strategic site where revolutionary militants from neighboring countries (Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil) could regroup and form a rearguard.

This period of Peronist Argentina, spanning from 1973 to 1976, marked a new moment in the history of the JCR. On the one hand, as noted above, the Allende experience strengthened the radical positions that posited the inevitability of armed struggle and those that expressed most firmly the concern over the expansion of the military infrastructure of armed left-wing groups. On the other hand, the geopolitical situation turned Argentina into a safe place that offered
these organizations refuge and a rearguard base. During this period, the JCR gained certain institutional autonomy with respect to its founding organizations and developed a significant propaganda, logistics, and weapons infrastructure. It was also at this time that it implemented an international policy through which it expanded its contacts, reaching out to different regions of the world.

Both the armed left-wing groups and the armed forces of the Southern Cone seemed to share the idea that from 1973 to 1976 a conflict unfolded in Argentina that was critical for the future of the Southern Cone and which transcended national politics. In the words of the guerrillas, the conflict was between revolution and counter-revolution, while for the armed forces it was “the geopolitical balance of powers between subversive and counter-subversive forces.”55 But while the members of the JCR saw themselves as authentic revolutionaries, as opposed to other leftist forces that were slowing down the revolutionary process, the armed forces made no such distinctions when it came time to develop their repressive practices, which they unleashed equally across the full spectrum of the region’s social and political left.

The response to growing authoritarianism was to reaffirm the objective of establishing people’s revolutionary armies that these groups had been proposing in their documents since the late 1960s. Although none of these groups was able to form an insurgent army, during this period they all focused much of their efforts on obtaining resources to develop their military infrastructure and train their activists in military combat. The degree of development varied from organization to organization. The Argentine ERP was, without a doubt, the organization that achieved the greatest military development, but the others also aspired to attain that goal.

In Buenos Aires, the Tupamaros and the Bolivian ELN focused on acquiring and stocking up weapons for future armed incursions into their respective territories. Although the MIR was initially unable to consolidate an armed propaganda strategy, as of 1975, under the JCR it began to devise a plan directed by Edgardo Enríquez that also prioritized the military training of a select group of activists in Cuba and later in Argentina.

The fact that it was the PRT-ERP that took the lead within the JCR in focusing on military action can be explained, among other things, by a particular historical circumstance. The military development of the PRT-ERP occurred in a context of democracy, even if it was a limited one, which contrasted with the situation in neighboring countries, where dictatorial regimes had succeeded in halting any attempt at armed resistance. Although initially the PRT-ERP’s military development met with objections within the JCR, by 1975 all its member organizations had embraced that strategy.56
In Argentina, this emphasis on military action furthered by the PRT-ERP has been explained by what is known as “militarist deviation.” This expression, which was part of the discourse used by activists in the 1960s, has been taken up again in many of the academic studies that have concentrated on the actions of the PRT-ERP in the years 1973–1976. It describes the result of the emphasis placed on the confrontation with the army and the failure to politically analyze the democratic situation that began in 1973 and Perón’s leadership in that process. These approaches share a meta-narrative of armed struggle that posits the idea that the movement was going in the right direction until the reinstatement of democracy, and that after 1973 military inertia led them to ignore the opinion of the population, even of those sectors that had sympathized with guerrilla insurgency.57

One of the more paradigmatic approaches of this perspective is the work by Pilar Calveiro, who in her book Política y/o violencia. Una aproximación a la guerrilla de los años 70 counters politics to violence to suggest a view in which the emphasis on military actions in the years 1973–1976 negated the political dimension of these organizations. In her view:

> Weapons are potentially “maddening”: they can be used to kill and, therefore, they create the illusion of having control over life and death. Obviously they are not in themselves political, but placed in the hands of very young people, the majority of whom also lacked any consistent political experience, they were turned into a wall of arrogance that in a sense masked a certain political naivety.58

Recently, historian Vera Carnovale has proposed an alternative version, positing that this “militarization” was not the result of a failure to understand the political process, or of an alienation generated by armed practice, but a foreseeable outcome of the political definitions, meanings, and imaginaries that guerrilla groups had been developing since the late 1960s.59 Carnovale’s approach is relevant as it shows that there was no contradiction between the political project that made these armed groups popular during the dictatorship and the political project that made them unpopular during the democratic period. From the start, the ERP’s political project was predictable. Its documents had clearly set out the organization’s objectives as early as the late 1960s. More than a deviation, what can be found in the PRT-ERP is a great consistency between the goals defined in the 1970s regarding the construction of a revolutionary army and the steps taken in the 1960s to achieve those goals.

Nevertheless, Carnovale’s explanation does not resolve another material issue raised by those who have approached the problem in terms of a militarist
deviation: the determination of the opportunity to move forward in the achievement of the goals that had been set. The goals were clear, but determining when to move forward to attain them was the result of political assessments (correct or mistaken) that were made at one point or another. What led the PRT-ERP to adopt such a confrontational political strategy against the new government of Perón and to determine that was the right time to begin building its revolutionary army? Two explanations have been suggested by authors who have studied this process: on the one hand, the view of Peronism as a form of Bonapartism that the PRT-ERP had contributed to exposing; and, on the other, the reactionary nature of some sectors within the Peronist movement.60

However, the existing literature has paid no attention to something that is quite evident in the documents and political actions of this organization from late 1973 and early 1974: the regional justification of its domestic actions. As discussed before, the coup in Chile was read as a confirmation that armed struggle was the right path and as a forewarning of what could come about in Argentina and had to be avoided. The justification for armed struggle under a democracy, according to the PRT-ERP’s interpretation, had to do with stopping a coup that seemed highly likely given the advancing authoritarianism in the region from 1973 to 1976 and Argentina’s condition as the only non-dictatorial regime in the region. The reaction to this advancing authoritarianism had to be regional. It was not by chance that the JCR was publicly launched at a press conference held after the attack on the Azul cavalry regiment, which marked a qualitative leap in the ERP’s confrontation with the Argentine army.

In this sense, the military strategy deployed by the ERP from 1973 to 1976 should not be read as merely the result of local circumstances, but as the consequence of a regional assessment shared with its “sister” organizations, which gradually started to converge in a common strategy. By 1975, what was left of the other member organizations of the JCR seemed to agree that the strategy implemented by the ERP was the right one, and so they implemented similar strategies in their countries.

During this period, the defeats suffered by the MIR, the Tupamaros, and the Bolivian ELN increasingly isolated the survivors of these organizations. The curtailment of public activity imposed by the dictatorships limited the political life of all organizations but it severely affected the supporters of these organizations, who knew that they were targets of repression. The handful of survivors of the various organizations that were able to stay in their countries reduced their social and political contacts to a minimum in order to avoid being captured and imprisoned or disappeared, but the vast majority of survivors ultimately joined the ranks of exiles in the region. Both the activists who remained in their respective countries and those who were exiled were greatly limited in their political work,
as a result of the authoritarian context. In this sense, emphasizing military action was the most obvious way to continue a struggle that from a political and moral point of view seemed more than justified as it was a fight against dictatorships.

The ERP’s losses as a result of these two operations (Tucumán and Monte Chingolo) tended to weaken its material infrastructure and human resources, as well as what was left of the JCR in Buenos Aires. On March 24, 1976, the coup cancelled once and for all any possibilities of JCR operations in Argentina. The organization’s margin of action was further limited because there were no other places where they could take refuge and the coordination of repression in the region meant that security forces could act freely. The repression against all of the Left and the anti-dictatorial forces that were still in Buenos Aires meanwhile intensified, targeting leaders of a range of anti-authoritarian movements.

Although the exchanges among armed organizations had served to alert each other of the growing authoritarianism in the region, they were no use in assessing the chances that the PRT-ERP could have of resisting a coup. Of a structure of 1,500 activists and 2,200 sympathizers and collaborators that the party had in March 1976,61 by mid 1977 there were only about 300 members left, spread throughout Italy, Spain, and Mexico. As in Uruguay and Chile, the same activists who had accurately foreseen the emergence of new authoritarian regimes had failed to adequately prepare themselves for the political and military challenges posed by such regimes.

Conclusion

These accounts reveal that many of the ideas, political definitions, and strategies that nurtured the new left armed organizations’ experience in the Southern Cone were not only the mere result of the dissemination of ideas from Cuba or Europe. Instead, they were also grounded in the consequence of deep regional dialogues, marked by the increasing conservative authoritarianism, which in turn had important implications for local processes. In addition, several major local events that played a role in shaping this political generation also impacted the global sixties. European new left groups emulated the debates and experiences on urban guerrilla strategies and tactics in Montevideo. The dependentist approaches discussed in Santiago influenced political movements and scholars in Africa, Asia, and other places. And the military experience of some of these groups during the Buenos Aires period was seen as a precedent for some armed organizations in Central America during the late seventies.

Through the historical reconstruction of these exchanges in different Southern Cone cities a more interconnected history of the global sixties is possible: one
that goes beyond the dycotomical visions (outside-inside) that revolve around national historiographies. Indeed, by taking into account more pieces of this infinite puzzle that were the global sixties, it is possible to gain a better understanding of the specific ways in which the nation, the region, and international sphere interacted in the Cold War period.

As other historians have shown the importance of the Third World and Latin America in the global narratives of the Cold War, I would also say that it is possible to argue something similar about the global sixties. The story of transnational activism in the Southern Cone puts the geography and narrative of the sixties into question. As with the nineteenth century revolutions, 1968 is conceptualized to a large extent with a focus on Western Europe and the United States. The vast majority of studies acknowledge the role of the Third World and its struggles in the unrest that stirred the First World. However, these aspects are limited to a mere context and are not included as part of the same network of circulation of ideas and actors. In sum, the sixties were global but the studies on this period for the most part seem to downplay the active role played by some countries of the periphery in the generation of ideas and repertoires of contention in the countries of the center. Studying the experience from the perspective of revolutionary transnational encounters in Southern Cone can thus provide greater insight into the truly global nature of the sixties, enable a reflection on the role of processes that have been largely overlooked by the bibliography on the subject, and, lastly, propose new approaches to understanding the tensions that existed with regards to these issues between the new Left and the traditional Left.

Notes

1 There has been an abundant production of texts that emphasize the role of Cuba in the radicalization of the sixties in each Latin American local area. See for the Argentinean case: Juan B. Yofré, *Fue Cuba* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2014) The recent work of Hal Brands is a sophisticated example of such perspectives. In his book Brands posits that guerrilla groups emerged as a result of the ideological influence of the Cuban Revolution on new generations of left-wing political activists in the different countries of Latin America. In his view, this wave of political violence had a negative political effect as it sparked a conservative reaction that was alarmed by such actions. See Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

2 An extensive literature has discussed the implications that the global sixties had for the Left in different parts of the world. Most approaches agree that the sixties opened fresh possibilities for the emergence of a novel global political movement called new Left that challenged the political assumptions of the traditional Left. However, the main features of this new political movement have been a matter of debate around the world. While, for Jeremi Suri, global unrest was linked to an elusive “international language of dissent” furthered by a new generation of young people (the post-World War II baby-boomer
generation) socialized in universities, for Immanuel Wallerstein and others, 1968 marks the beginning of a revolutionary cycle comparable to that of 1848. But, in contrast to that earlier cycle’s critique of the old regime, this mobilization focused on questioning the global hegemony of the United States and emerged in reaction to the traditional Left’s failure to stop that process. See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Immanuel Wallerstein et al., *Anti-Systemic Movements* (London, New York: Verso 1989).


5 On Chile, see interview with Andrés Pascal Allende conducted by the author. On Uruguay, see some of the activities carried out by some of the groups and militants that would form the MLN-T, in Samuel Blixen, *Sendic* (Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce, 2000), and Fernández Huidobro, *Historia de los Tupamaros*, vol. 1 and 2.


7 Philip Agee, *La CIA por dentro, diario de un espía* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1987), 265. According to Agee, the Montevideo station was the only CIA station in the hemisphere where anti-Cuba operations were the top priority, taking precedence over operations against the Soviet embassy.


See, Broquetas, Magdalena, “Los frentes del anticomunismo. Las derechas en el Urugu

ey de los tempranos sesenta,” and Bucheli, Gabriel, “Organizaciones ‘demócratas’

problemas del siglo XX 3:3 (2012).

See “El gobierno contra el derecho de reunión. Decretó medidas de seguridad. Quieren

el golpe,” Época, April, 9, 1965, cover; and “Dictadura legal,” Época, October 8, 1965,
cover. For a general overview of the period, see Rosa Alonso Eloy and Carlos Demasi,

Uruguay, 1958–1968: crisis y estancamiento (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda

Oriental, 1986).

For a bibliography on the Brazilian influence, see Ananda Simões Fernandes, “Quando

o inimigo ultrapassa a fronteira: as conexões repressivas entre a ditadura civil-militar

brasileira e o Uruguai (1964-1973),” (MA thesis, Historia Universidade Federal do Rio

Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2009); and Giselle Cassol, “Prisão e tortura em terra

estrangeira: a colaboração repressiva entre Brasil e Uruguai (1964-1985)” (MA thesis,

Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2008).

See Época, “Entrevista Onganía-Costa: ‘Uruguay, un grave peligro’,,” September 1, 1965,

7. Época, “¿Otra vez la Cisplatina?,” September 6, 1965, 7. The news raised concern

among Uruguayan diplomats in Argentina and Brazil. See “Declaraciones General Juan

Carlos Onganía,” Argentina, Confidential Folder no. 20, 1965. Archive of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay.

Clara Aldrighi, La izquierda armada: ideología, ética e identidad en el MLN-Tupamaros

(Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce, 2001), Eduardo Rey Tristán, A la vuelta de la esquina:


See Ciro Bustos, “El sueño revolucionario del Che era Argentina,” interview by Jaime

Padilla, Malmö, Sweden, 1997, available in Archivo Cedinci and Bustos, El Che quiere

verte, 231–239. For the reactions to the EGP in Uruguay, see the articles featured in

Marcha: Rogelio García Lupo, “Masetti, un suicida,” Marcha, May 14, 1965, 18; Rodolfo


For an example of Cooke’s activities in Montevideo, see “Carta a Héctor Tristán,” in

Eduardo Luis Duhalde and Eduardo Pérez, De Taco Ralo a la alternativa independiente.

Historia documental de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas y del Peronismo de base (La

Plata: De la Campana, 2003). Alejandra Dandan and Silvina Heguy, Joe Baxter, del na

zismo a la extrema izquierda La historia secreta de un guerrillero (Argentina: Editorial

Norma, 2006), chap. 7; and Bustos, El Che quiere verte.

See Eduardo Pérez, “Una aproximación a la historia de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas,”
in Eduardo Duhalde and Eduardo Pérez, De Taco Ralo a la alternativa independiente.

Historia documental de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas y del Peronismo de base (La


Instituto Superior de Formación Docente (Berazategui) 3 (2008); Reyes, Hernán, “Abraham Guillén: teórico de la lucha armada,” Lucha Armada no. 4, September-November

2005; interview with Abraham Guillén, Bicicleta, Revista de comunicaciones libertarias,

October 1978, Spain; and “¿Quién es Abraham Guillén?” interview in Carlos A. Aznárez

and Jaime E. Cauñas, Tupamaros? Fracaso del Che? (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Orbe,

1969), 167-177.

Eduardo Pérez, “Una aproximación a la historia de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas,”

48, 51.
23 For a biography of Joe Baxter, see Heguy and Dandan, *Joe Baxter: Del nazismo a la extrema izquierda*. On Nell Tacci’s imprisonment, see Cooke’s and Galeano’s articles in *Marcha*.


27 Leibner, *Camaradas y compañeros*, 481.


31 In this sense, one of the most quoted works by some Tupamaros was *The Revolt* by Menachem Begin. See Rey Tristán, *A la vuelta de la esquina*, 173.


33 No copies of Torres’ text have survived but several of his fellow militants say it was the basis for the MLN-T’s Document No. 1, which was adopted by the organization in June 1967. The document has some aspects that are indeed very similar to Guillén’s 1966 book. Blixen, *Sendic*, 139-140. Abraham Guillén became an influential urban guerrilla thinker, publishing books on the subject in Latin America, Spain, and the United States. He even described himself as “the tactical and strategic inspiration” of the Tupamaros, although he did not identify with them politically because of his “libertarian background.” See Bicicleta, revista de comunicaciones libertarias, year 1, no. 9, October 1978.


35 *Punto Final*, “30 preguntas a un tupamaro,” July 2, 1968, no. 58, document section.

36 See *Cristianismo y Revolución*, October 1968, no. 10.


The MIR was particularly concerned with the coverage that these actions would have in the press and engaged a large number of its leaders in them. See Andrés Pascal Allende, *El MIR Chileno, una experiencia revolucionaria* (Argentina: Ediciones Cucaña, 2003), 39; Author’s interview with Andrés Pascal Allende and Max Marambio, *Las armas de ayer* (Santiago: La Tercera, Debate, 2007), 67.


Ibid.

The recollections of the participants in these meetings are not very clear. To date, I have consulted two of the three participants who have survived the dictatorships and the passage of time: Andrés Pascal Allende of the MIR, and Efrain Martínez Platero of the MLN-T. I tried to interview a third participant, Luis Mattini of the PRT-ERP, but have received no response from him. Of the list of participants given by John Dinges in *The Condor Years*, only these leaders are still alive: Mario Roberto Santucho and Domingo Menna of the PRT-ERP; Miguel and Edgardo Enríquez and Alberto Villabela of the MIR, and William Whitelaw of the MLN-T were all killed in different repressive actions. Enrique Gorriarán Merlo of the PRT-ERP and Nelson Gutiérrez died recently. For the list, see Dinges, *The Condor Years*, 51.


Author’s interview with Andrés Pascal Allende, date?.


See: SIDE, “Parte de inteligencia n. 06/76. Asunto: Modificación del equilibrio de fuerzas subversivas contrasubversivas en el plano geopolítico,” MDS, Legajo 22851, Archivo
DIPBA, LA PLATA, ARGENTINA; and Luis Cerda “Aspectos internacionales de la revolución latinoamericana,” *Correo de la Resistencia*, no. 9.


Ibid., 135.


De Santis, 625.