argentino, y nacionalizando el atentado contra la Kehilá argentina a través de su reclamo de ejercicio de plena ciudadanía en todos los espacios de la Nación.

Sin embargo, este importante abordaje desde la antropología sobre el reclamo de ciudadanía por parte de los familiares de las víctimas se habría enriquecido si, además de investigar a los miembros de movimientos de derechos humanos como Memoria Activa o APEMIA, también hubieran sido entrevistados tanto asociados como dirigentes de la AMIA reconstruida luego del atentado; también si se hubiera examinado lo que significaba ser argentino judío para aquellos no afiliados a instituciones comunitarias. Una hipótesis de trabajo desde la historia social y la sociología indaga los beneficios secundarios que dirigentes comunitarios vienen usufructuando por la instalación “victimológica” en la esfera pública de la impunidad de la causa AMIA, así como también por la exitosa transformación institucional de la AMIA, de kehilá (comunidad judía) en una ONG legitimada por su trabajo con toda la sociedad civil argentina.

Aportan lecturas innovadoras en el presente volumen los ensayos de estudios culturales de Edna Aizenberg, previamente publicados en 2002 y 2004 (“Remembering the AMIA Bombing: The Mothers of Pasteur Street and Stones of Memory”); y un brillante enfoque etno-musicológico de Lillian M. Wohl, que procura comprender el rol de los conciertos y performances de cultura idish para resemantizar el legado y tradición judíos, a fin de ayudar a la comunidad convaleciente en su tarea colectiva etno-lingüística de recuperación identitaria post-traumática en la Argentina neo-liberal de los 90.

Finalmente, el ensayo de Annette Levine, “Vestiges of Memory Post-Atentado: Monumental Photographs and Spaces of (Impossible) Return”, brinda categorías analíticas e insights para la comprensión de la producción cultural pos-traumática que talentosos artistas plásticos, fotógrafos, cineastas y teatristas vienen realizando en Argentina para dar testimonio de esos “vestigios de memoria post atentado”.

Leonardo Senkman


Etian Ginzberg’s analysis of the careers of Governors Lazaro Cardenas in Michoacán and Adalberto Tejeda in Vera Cruz sheds light on grassroots political mobilization, the relationship between the federal and state governments, the obstacles to progressive reforms, and the path to the presidency, all major themes in modern Mexican history. Cárdenas and Tejeda came from the progressive wing
of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) and they shared commitments to agrarian reform, public education, anti-clericalism and democratization, all policies enshrined in the 1917 Constitution. The late 1920s marked a watershed in national politics with the assassination of Alvaro Obregón, the conclusion of the Cristero Rebellion, and the onset of the Great Depression. Mexican presidents from 1928-34, strongly influenced by Plutarco Calles, strengthened the presidency and favored capitalism over socialism. Cárdenas largely acquiesced to these policies and remained a favorite of Calles, while Tejeda resisted and lost political support. In 1934 Cárdenas received the PNR nomination for the presidency and won the election, and Tejeda receded into political obscurity.

Michoacán presented many obstacles to reform during Cárdenas’ administration (1928-32). Haciendas and ranches formed the backbone of the regional economy and their owners resisted land reform through violence and law suits, and sided with the Church during the Cristero Rebellion. In 1928 Cárdenas organized the Confederación Revolucionaria Michoacana del Trabajo (CRMDT) to mobilize support for land reform and socialist education, policies he also promoted during numerous trips to villages. These efforts yielded reforms in some regions, increased the political consciousness of the masses, and made Cárdenas a popular political figure.

Adalberto Tejeda’s two terms as governor (1920-4 and 1928-32) shook Vera Cruz to its foundations. The state’s economy was driven by the petroleum industry, textile mills, sugarcane plantations, haciendas and the nation’s largest port. The state’s heterogeneous peasantry included small holders, seasonal wage earners and hacienda peons. The latter, however, represented only 9.4 per cent of the peasantry, compared with 60 per cent in Michoacán. This weakened the ability of hacendados to mobilize private militias and contributed to the success of Ursulo Galván, a leader of the Mexican Communist Party and founder of the Agrarian League. Tejeda drew inspiration from Galván and shared many of his ideological convictions, although he was never a member of the Communist Party.

In 1929 Galván died and Tejeda took over the Agrarian League. He used it to impose an aggressive land reform, gain control over municipalities, forge alliances with urban unions, and to arm the peasantry. By 1932, the Agrarian League had 140,000 members and a militia upwards of 30,000 men, the largest private army in Mexico. Tejeda viewed the League as an autonomous labor organization charged with democratizing Vera Cruz and serving as a model for the rest of Mexico.

Both Tejeda and Cárdenas viewed primary education as a vehicle for transforming the civic consciousness of the masses. The curriculum included lessons on good hygiene, sobriety, conservation, and secularization, which drew criticism from the Church. Tejeda also provoked controversy by closing high schools,
criticizing faculty at the University of Vera Cruz, and attacking the state supreme
court when it ruled against him. When the justices resigned in protest, Tejeda
appointed members of the Agrarian League to take their place.

Tejeda also angered officials in Mexico City when he attacked the Church. The
governor seized Church property and gave it to the schismatic church, limited
the number of priests in Vera Cruz to thirteen, and destroyed Church property.
By contrast, Cárdenas avoided conflicts with the Church apart from criticizing
priests opposed to agrarian reform.

Tejeda and Cárdenas both supported expropriating haciendas and creating
communal farms known as ejidos, an iconic program of the Revolution. How-
ever, from 1928-34 Mexican presidents preferred going slow on land reform
and preserving capitalist agriculture. Once again, Cárdenas followed federal
policy more closely than Tejeda. Tejeda redistributed 97,749 hectares of land
to peasants and authorized 1,133 ejidos, while Cárdenas created fewer ejidos
and divided some haciendas into medium sized farms.

When Cárdenas’ term as governor ended in 1932, he stood by and watched
as his successor dismantled his reforms. Tejeda remained defiant but could not
prevent his opponents from neutralizing the Agrarian League and gaining con-
trol over municipalities, undermining the twin pillars of his regime. In 1934,
the PNR endorsed Cárdenas as its candidate for president, and Tejeda formed
a new party and opposed him. Cárdenas received 98.2 per cent of the vote, and
Tejeda less than 1 per cent.

Cárdenas compromised and survived to fight another day. As president, he
embraced the model of a strong presidency and powerful official party and at-
tempted to implement progressive reforms. Nevertheless, Cárdenas faced stiff
opposition from Callista governors, capitalist interests and the Church. After
1938 he largely retreated from his reform agenda, and his successors pursued
more conservative policies.

Ginzberg’s careful analysis of archival sources provides insights into revolu-
tionary politics at all levels of government, sheds light on the tactics and careers
of Cárdenas and Tejeda, and details the struggle to implement progressive poli-
cies, particularly agrarian reform and democratization. The study would have
benefited, however, from discussion of the responses of industrial and commercial
interests in Vera Cruz, including the foreign-owned petroleum companies, to
Tejeda’s reforms. Big business would have opposed the expropriation of private
property, higher taxes, and stronger unions, and lobbied against these policies
in Mexico City, Washington, D.C. and London.

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